loss of chance doctrine (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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loss of chance doctrine in Indiana

6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2007 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Mayhue v. Sparkmangreen
ind · 1995 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1999–2007
2 sentences

2007Under the loss of chance doctrine, “[t]he compensa-ble injury is not the result, which is usually death, but the reduction in the probability that the patient would recover or obtain better results if the defendant had not been negli *597 gent.” Mayhue, 653 N.E.2d at 1387 .

2000The Alexanders, on the other hand, assert that this Court adopted the loss of chance doctrine in Mayhue , finding support for this hypothesis in the following language: “Accepting the § 323 approach does not require a separate loss of chance doctrine.” 653 N.E.2d at 1389 (emphasis in original).

23
Cahoon v. Cummingsgreen
ind · 2000 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007The Indiana Supreme Court has distinguished § 323 from the loss of chance doctrine by explaining that § 323 "deal[s] with claims for increased risk for an injury that has been incurred” while the loss of chance doctrine applies "where, although the risk had been increased, the plaintiff's ultimate injury was uncertain.” Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 544 (Ind.2000). 7 .

2007The Indiana Supreme Court has distinguished § 323 from the loss of chance doctrine by explaining that § 323 "deal[s] with claims for increased risk for an injury that has been incurred” while the loss of chance doctrine applies "where, although the risk had been increased, the plaintiff's ultimate injury was uncertain.” Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 544 (Ind.2000). 7 .

11
Alexander v. Scheidgreen
ind · 2000 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005For claims such as those presented by the Alexanders, the court adopted the loss of chance doctrine, which is also referred to as "increased risk of harm." 1 Id. at 275, 281 .

2005On the other hand, in Scheid, the court adopted the loss of chance analysis that is applicable here and determined that damages for such an action should be based upon "the reduction of the patient's expectancy from her pre-negligence expectancy" and the jury must "attach a monetary amount" to the patient's loss of life expec-taney. 7 Scheid, 726 N.E.2d at 282 .

11
Cahoon v. Cummingsgreen
indctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000See Smith v. Washington, 716 N.E.2d 607 , 614 n. 3 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Cahoon v. Cummings, 715 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

11
Smith v. Washingtongreen
indctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000See Smith v. Washington, 716 N.E.2d 607 , 614 n. 3 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Cahoon v. Cummings, 715 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

11
Dumas v. Cooneygreen
calctapp · 1991 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 103 ; see also Dumas v. Cooney (1991), 235 Cal.App.3d 1593 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 , review denied (1992); Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hosp.

1994Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 103 ; see also Dumas v. Cooney (1991), 235 Cal.App.3d 1593 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 , review denied (1992); Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hosp.

11
Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hospital Center, Inc.green
md · 1990 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994First, the dissent quotes a statistical analysis presented in Fennel, 320 Md. 776 , 580 A.2d 206 , to argue that the loss of chance doctrine will, on average, result in erroneous awards to plaintiffs.

1994First, the dissent quotes a statistical analysis presented in Fennel, 320 Md. 776 , 580 A.2d 206 , to argue that the loss of chance doctrine will, on average, result in erroneous awards to plaintiffs.

11
Hamil v. Bashlinegreen
pa · 1978 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline (1978), 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280 . 2 Under the traditional analysis-focusing on death as the injury-Sparkman cannot survive summary judgment because the evidence shows that Norma would not have had a better than 50% chance of survival if the cancer had been detected earlier.

1994See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline (1978), 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280 . 2 Under the traditional analysis-focusing on death as the injury-Sparkman cannot survive summary judgment because the evidence shows that Norma would not have had a better than 50% chance of survival if the cancer had been detected earlier.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
McKellips v. Saint Francis Hospital, Inc. green
okla · 1987
2 sentences

2007The Court addressed this inequitable situation by examining the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 and the loss of chance doctrine. 6 Id. at 1387-88. *597 Relying on McKellips v. Saint Francis Hospital, Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla.1987), the Mayhue Court adopted § 323 because it “established] a more procedurally-oriented response to such claims” and was the approach that was “most consistent with Indiana law, particularly our strong faith in the ability of the jury to decide such complex questions.” Id. at 1388-89.

1999It adopted § 323 as “the preferable and most rational theory” ( 741 P.2d at 474 ) in the context of the proximate cause problem, but it also incorporated the loss of chance doctrine in its analysis of the recoverable damages. 16 I see no procedural or substantive impediment to such reasoning.

21999–2007
Harry J. Hicks, Administrator of the Estate of Carol Greitens, Deceased v. United States green
ca4 · 1966
2 sentences

2005Under the loss of chance doctrine, "[the com-pensable injury is not the result, which is usually death, but the reduction in the probability that the patient would recover or obtain better results if the defendant had not been negligent." Id.

2005Under the loss of chance doctrine, "[t]he compensable injury is not the result, which is usually death, but the reduction in the probability that the patient would recover or obtain better results if the defendant had not been negligent." Id.

21994–2005
Jablonski v. Inland Steel Co. green
indctapp · 1991
2 sentences

1994We concluded that even if the court were to adopt the loss of chance theory and apply it to plaintiff's case, plaintiff could not recover because the evidence demonstrated, at best, that the decedent "may have had a slightly less than 50% chance of survival." Id. (citing Watson, 532 N.E.2d 1191 ) In Jablonski, we did not consider the alternative approaches to the loss of chance doctrine that we consider today.

1994We concluded that even if the court were to adopt the loss of chance theory and apply it to plaintiff's case, plaintiff could not recover because the evidence demonstrated, at best, that the decedent "may have had a slightly less than 50% chance of survival." Id. (citing Watson, 532 N.E.2d 1191 ) In Jablonski , we did not consider the alternative approaches to the loss of chance doctrine that we consider today.

11994–1994
Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc. green
insd · 1992
2 sentences

1994Although we do not necessarily agree with Gary's assessment of the Estate's evidence, Gary's argument focuses on the Estate's inability to meet the threshold admissibility requirements pursuant to Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, (1992), S.D.Ind., 791 F.Supp. 1335, 1342 .

1994Although we do not necessarily agree with Gary's assessment of the Estate's evidence, Gary's argument focuses on the Estate's inability to meet the threshold admissibility requirements pursuant to Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, (1992), S.D.Ind., 791 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 .

11994–1994
Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Center green
nev · 1991
2 sentences

1994The court concluded, "Since the uncontradicted testimony was that with prompt surgery she would have survived, the conclusion follows that the dispensary doe-tor's negligence nullified whatever chance of recovery she might have had and was the proximate cause of the death." Id. at 633 . 3 Notwithstanding criticism of the Hicks decision, the loss of chance doctrine has been adopted by courts across the country. 4 In Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Center (1991), 107 Nev. 1 , 805 P.2d 589 , the court adopted the rule that "the plaintiff must present evidence tending to show, to a reasonable medical p

1994The court concluded, "Since the uncontradicted testimony was that with prompt surgery she would have survived, the conclusion follows that the dispensary doe-tor's negligence nullified whatever chance of recovery she might have had and was the proximate cause of the death." Id. at 633 . 3 Notwithstanding criticism of the Hicks decision, the loss of chance doctrine has been adopted by courts across the country. 4 In Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Center (1991), 107 Nev. 1 , 805 P.2d 589 , the court adopted the rule that "the plaintiff must present evidence tending to show, to a reasonable medical p

11994–1994
Watson v. Medical Emergency Services, Corp. green
indctapp · 1989
2 sentences

1994We concluded that even if the court were to adopt the loss of chance theory and apply it to plaintiff's case, plaintiff could not recover because the evidence demonstrated, at best, that the decedent "may have had a slightly less than 50% chance of survival." Id. (citing Watson, 532 N.E.2d 1191 ) In Jablonski, we did not consider the alternative approaches to the loss of chance doctrine that we consider today.

1994We concluded that even if the court were to adopt the loss of chance theory and apply it to plaintiff's case, plaintiff could not recover because the evidence demonstrated, at best, that the decedent "may have had a slightly less than 50% chance of survival." Id. (citing Watson, 532 N.E.2d 1191 ) In Jablonski , we did not consider the alternative approaches to the loss of chance doctrine that we consider today.

11994–1994
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc. red
ohio · 1971
2 sentences

1994Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 103 ; see also Dumas v. Cooney (1991), 235 Cal.App.3d 1593 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 , review denied (1992); Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hosp.

1994Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 103 ; see also Dumas v. Cooney (1991), 235 Cal. App.3d 1593 , 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 584 , review denied (1992); Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hosp.

11994–1994
Dayton Walther Corp. v. Caldwell green
ind · 1980
2 sentences

1994Dayton Walther Corp. v. Caldwell (1980), 273 Ind. 191 , 402 N.E.2d 1252 .

1994Dayton Walther Corp. v. Caldwell (1980), 273 Ind. 191 , 402 N.E.2d 1252 .

11994–1994

Where else courts name it

IL 15 (1995–2024) OH 11 (1999–2026) MD 9 (1990–2022) TX 8 (1992–2008) CT 7 (1996–2008) WA 6 (2000–2023) IN 6 (1994–2007) NE 4 (2008–2019) RI 4 (2004–2012) NY 4 (2004–2013) IA 4 (1998–2014) TN 3 (1993–2012) NV 3 (1993–2021) DE 3 (1988–1995) MN 3 (1992–2013) NC 3 (2020–2020) SD 3 (2000–2023) VT 2 (2003–2015) NM 2 (2018–2025) WY 2 (2004–2010) KS 2 (1994–2002) SC 2 (1995–2000) MA 2 (2008–2011) LA 2 (1996–2019) OK 2 (1992–1996)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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