loss of chance doctrine in Maryland

2021See Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 416 , where the Court stated, as one of its reasons, that it would not reconsider the Weimer decision because “the facts as alleged [did] not support a loss of chance claim.” Plaintiffs-appellants also contend that interpreting the wrongful death statute so as to deny recovery to the relatives of Mrs. Wadsworth is, under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, unconstitutional.

2020Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 415 (“Because [the decedent’s] alleged 8 In their brief, the Burtons claim that Dr. Pushkas did not say that Ms. Burton’s chance of recovery was “greater than 50%.” After reviewing the trial transcript, we note that at least at one point, Dr. Pushkas said that Stage III-A, triple negative patients like Ms. Burton had a sixty-six percent chance of survival over five years, after the cancer is diagnosed. 20 chance of survival exceeded 50 percent, the loss of chance doctrine is inapplicable to the [plaintiffs’] claims.”) Although he used words like “chance of survival,” an

2022Importantly, this Court made clear that the claim was not a loss of chance claim because Ms. Schaefer possessed “a chance of survival exceed[ing] 50 percent.” Id. at 415, 959 A.2d at 776.

2022Importantly, this Court made clear that the claim was not a loss of chance claim because Ms. Schaefer possessed “a chance of survival exceed[ing] 50 percent.” Id. at 415, 959 A.2d at 776.

2021See Cooper v. Hartman, 311 Md. 259, 263-66 (1987).

1990See Cooper v. Hartman, 311 Md. 259, 261 , 533 A.2d 1294, 1297 (1987) (even if loss of chance doctrine was to be recognized, facts of case did not warrant its application); Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 536, 554 , 525 A.2d 643, 652 (1987) (loss of chance damages not recoverable in wrongful death action), reversing 67 Md.

2008Based on this evidence, the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Marcantonios could not establish proximate causation because The Medical Providers' alleged negligence deprived Ms. Schaefer of, at most, a 30 percent chance of survival. [17] Although the Marcantonios do not allege a loss of chance claim in their complaint, The Medical Providers referred to the claim as one involving loss of chance at the summary judgment hearing and the Circuit Court also characterized the claim in that manner. [18] Moreover, we note that the legislature has not amended the wrongful

2008Based on this evidence, the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Marcantonios could not establish proximate causation because The Medical Providers' alleged negligence deprived Ms. Schaefer of, at most, a 30 percent chance of survival. [17] Although the Marcantonios do not allege a loss of chance claim in their complaint, The Medical Providers referred to the claim as one involving loss of chance at the summary judgment hearing and the Circuit Court also characterized the claim in that manner. [18] Moreover, we note that the legislature has not amended the wrongful

2008Based on this evidence, the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Marcantonios could not establish proximate causation because The Medical Providers' alleged negligence deprived Ms. Schaefer of, at most, a 30 percent chance of survival. [17] Although the Marcantonios do not allege a loss of chance claim in their complaint, The Medical Providers referred to the claim as one involving loss of chance at the summary judgment hearing and the Circuit Court also characterized the claim in that manner. [18] Moreover, we note that the legislature has not amended the wrongful

2008Based on this evidence, the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Marcantonios could not establish proximate causation because The Medical Providers' alleged negligence deprived Ms. Schaefer of, at most, a 30 percent chance of survival. [17] Although the Marcantonios do not allege a loss of chance claim in their complaint, The Medical Providers referred to the claim as one involving loss of chance at the summary judgment hearing and the Circuit Court also characterized the claim in that manner. [18] Moreover, we note that the legislature has not amended the wrongful

2008Based on this evidence, the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Marcantonios could not establish proximate causation because The Medical Providers' alleged negligence deprived Ms. Schaefer of, at most, a 30 percent chance of survival. [17] Although the Marcantonios do not allege a loss of chance claim in their complaint, The Medical Providers referred to the claim as one involving loss of chance at the summary judgment hearing and the Circuit Court also characterized the claim in that manner. [18] Moreover, we note that the legislature has not amended the wrongful

2008Based on this evidence, the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Marcantonios could not establish proximate causation because The Medical Providers' alleged negligence deprived Ms. Schaefer of, at most, a 30 percent chance of survival. [17] Although the Marcantonios do not allege a loss of chance claim in their complaint, The Medical Providers referred to the claim as one involving loss of chance at the summary judgment hearing and the Circuit Court also characterized the claim in that manner. [18] Moreover, we note that the legislature has not amended the wrongful

2008Based on this evidence, the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Marcantonios could not establish proximate causation because The Medical Providers' alleged negligence deprived Ms. Schaefer of, at most, a 30 percent chance of survival. [17] Although the Marcantonios do not allege a loss of chance claim in their complaint, The Medical Providers referred to the claim as one involving loss of chance at the summary judgment hearing and the Circuit Court also characterized the claim in that manner. [18] Moreover, we note that the legislature has not amended the wrongful

2008Moreover, we note that the legislature has not amended the wrongful death statute since our decision in Weimer and that under the principle of stare decisis the Court acts in a "constrained manner" when overruling precedent so as to ensure "stability and integrity in the law.” Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 1, 15 , 862 A.2d 33, 41 (2004) (quoting McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 355 (4th Cir.2004)); See also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 , 126 S.Ct. 514, 523 , 163 L.Ed.2d 288 (2005) ("Considerations of stare decisis are particularly forceful in the area of statutory const

2022Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hospital Center, Inc. Although Weimer did not directly address whether the loss of chance doctrine is recognized in survival actions, this Court considered that specific issue a few years later in Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hospital Center, Inc., 320 Md. 776 (1990).

2022Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hospital Center, Inc. Although Weimer did not directly address whether the loss of chance doctrine is recognized in survival actions, this Court considered that specific issue a few years later in Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hospital Center, Inc., 320 Md. 776 (1990).

2008Because Ms. Schaefer’s alleged chance of survival exceeded 50 percent, the loss of chance doctrine is inapplicable to the Marcantonios’ claims. 17 Moreover, this Court declines the Marcantonios’ invitation to revisit our decision in Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 536 , 525 A.2d 643 (1987), where we held that Maryland does not recognize the loss of chance doctrine in claims brought under the Maryland wrongful death statute, as codified under Md.

2008Because Ms. Schaefer’s alleged chance of survival exceeded 50 percent, the loss of chance doctrine is inapplicable to the Marcantonios’ claims. 17 Moreover, this Court declines the Marcantonios’ invitation to revisit our decision in Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 536 , 525 A.2d 643 (1987), where we held that Maryland does not recognize the loss of chance doctrine in claims brought under the Maryland wrongful death statute, as codified under Md.