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15 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Holton v. Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2024See Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center, 2021 IL 126748, ¶ 50 (“the loss of chance doctrine comports with the traditional proximate cause standard” and “requires a plaintiff to prove that defendant’s negligence more probably than not caused plaintiff’s injury”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d at 120 (“the loss of chance concept, when properly analyzed, does not relax or lower plaintiffs’ burden of proving causation”). ¶ 20 To show a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation, Quintana needed to present evidence that Defendan 2024See Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center, 2021 IL 126748, ¶ 50 (“the loss of chance doctrine comports with the traditional proximate cause standard” and “requires a plaintiff to prove that defendant’s negligence more probably than not caused plaintiff’s injury”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d at 120 (“the loss of chance concept, when properly analyzed, does not relax or lower plaintiffs’ burden of proving causation”). ¶ 20 To show a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation, Quintana needed to present evidence that Defendan | 6 | 6 |
Dillon v. Evanston Hospitalgreen2 sentences2021See Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 507 (“[t]he function of jury instructions is to convey to the jury the correct principles of law applicable to the submitted evidence”). 2020See Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 507 (“[t]he function of jury instructions is to convey to the jury the correct principles of law applicable to the submitted evidence”). | 2 | 2 |
Netto v. Goldenbergred2 sentences1997In Illinois, most of the controversy stems from a divergence in viewpoint as to whether the loss of chance doctrine relaxes the traditional proximate cause standard in medical malpractice actions (see, e.g., Netto v. Goldenberg, 266 Ill. 1997The Second District of the Appellate Court, in Netto, adopted the Hare court’s view that the loss of chance doctrine lessened plaintiffs’ burden of proving proximate cause and further expressed its belief that "the Northern Trust Co. and Chambers courts removed the proximate cause element from medical negligence actions.” (Emphasis added.) Netto, 266 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Centergreen1 sentence2024See Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center, 2021 IL 126748, ¶ 50 (“the loss of chance doctrine comports with the traditional proximate cause standard” and “requires a plaintiff to prove that defendant’s negligence more probably than not caused plaintiff’s injury”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d at 120 (“the loss of chance concept, when properly analyzed, does not relax or lower plaintiffs’ burden of proving causation”). ¶ 20 To show a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation, Quintana needed to present evidence that Defendan | 1 | 1 |
Vanderhoof v. Berkgreen1 sentence2024See Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center, 2021 IL 126748, ¶ 50 (“the loss of chance doctrine comports with the traditional proximate cause standard” and “requires a plaintiff to prove that defendant’s negligence more probably than not caused plaintiff’s injury”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d at 120 (“the loss of chance concept, when properly analyzed, does not relax or lower plaintiffs’ burden of proving causation”). ¶ 20 To show a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation, Quintana needed to present evidence that Defendan | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Centergreen2 sentences2021App. 3d at 45 ; see also Gretencord-Szobar v. Kokoszka, 2021 IL App (3d) 200015, ¶ 47 (declining to follow the appellate court decision presently under review and, instead, following Cetera when IPI Civil No. 15.01 is provided to the jury). ¶ 55 Here, however, the appellate court rejected this uniform precedent to conclude that the circuit court denied plaintiff a fair trial when it refused her nonpattern instruction on the loss of chance doctrine even when the jury was provided pattern jury instruction IPI Civil No. 15.01 on proximate cause. 2020 IL App (1st) 182702 , ¶ 108. 2021The appellate court answered that question in the affirmative, reversed the circuit court’s judgment in part, and remanded for a new trial against certain defendants. 2020 IL App (1st) 182702 . | 1 | 1 |
Gretencord-Szobar v. Kokoszkagreen1 sentence2021App. 3d at 45 ; see also Gretencord-Szobar v. Kokoszka, 2021 IL App (3d) 200015, ¶ 47 (declining to follow the appellate court decision presently under review and, instead, following Cetera when IPI Civil No. 15.01 is provided to the jury). ¶ 55 Here, however, the appellate court rejected this uniform precedent to conclude that the circuit court denied plaintiff a fair trial when it refused her nonpattern instruction on the loss of chance doctrine even when the jury was provided pattern jury instruction IPI Civil No. 15.01 on proximate cause. 2020 IL App (1st) 182702 , ¶ 108. | 1 | 1 |
Scardina v. Shin II Eugene Namgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Scardina v. Nam, 333 Ill.App.3d 260, 269 , 266 Ill.Dec. 454 , 775 N.E.2d 16 (2002). 2009See, e.g., Scardina v. Nam, 333 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Alm v. Loyola University Medical Centergreen2 sentences2009See Alm, 373 Ill.App.3d at 5 , 310 Ill.Dec. 641 , 866 N.E.2d 1243 (if threshold requirements have not been met, expert testimony must be disallowed). 2009See Alm, 373 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hajian v. Holy Family Hospital
green
2 sentences1997Finally, in Hajian v. Holy Family Hospital, 273 Ill.App.3d 932 , 210 Ill.Dec. 156 , 652 N.E.2d 1132 (1995), a panel of the First District of the Appellate Court engaged in a thorough analysis of the loss of chance doctrine and followed the reasoning of Pumala . 1997Finally, in Hajian v. Holy Family Hospital, 273 Ill.App.3d 932 , 210 Ill.Dec. 156 , 652 N.E.2d 1132 (1995), a panel of the First District of the Appellate Court engaged in a thorough analysis of the loss of chance doctrine and followed the reasoning of Pumala . | 3 | 1995–1997 |
McDaniel v. Ong
green
2 sentences2003After considering the doctrine of loss of chance, the court found that “[t]he fact that [the plaintiffs] have not asserted that different action would have been undertaken to end the pregnancy if the pregnancy had been detected sooner [i.e. an abortion] leaves a gap in the proof as to proximate cause.” McDaniel , 311 Ill. 2003After considering the doctrine of loss of chance, the court found that “[t]he fact that [the plaintiffs] have not asserted that different action would have been undertaken to end the pregnancy if the pregnancy had been detected soonerf, i.e., an abortion,] leaves a gap in the proof as to proximate cause.” McDaniel, 311 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Townsend v. University of Chicago Hospitals
green
2 sentences2002Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95 , Ill. 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1209 (1997); Townsend v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 318 Ill. 2002Holton v. Memorial Hospital , 176 Ill. 2d 95, 111 , 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1209 (1997); Townsend v. University of Chicago Hospitals , 318 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Pumala v. Sipos
green
2 sentences1997The court in Hajian stated, "We do not agree with [ Netto `s] interpretation of Northern Trust and its progeny, but rather, would resolve the conflict by harmonizing the language of Northern Trust and Borowski as was attempted in Pumala [v. Sipos, 163 Ill. 1997The court in Hajian stated, "We do not agree with [Netto's] interpretation of Northern Trust and its progeny, but rather, would resolve the conflict by harmonizing the language of Northern Trust and Borowski as was attempted in Pumala [v. Sipos, 163 Ill. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hospital
green
2 sentences1997McGaw Hospital, 192 Ill.App.3d 1031, 1038 , 140 Ill.Dec. 127 , 549 N.E.2d 778 (1989)) or whether the traditional principles of proximate cause are satisfied by and can be harmonized with the loss of chance concept (see, e.g, Hajian v. Holy Family Hospital, 273 Ill.App.3d 932, 940 , 210 Ill.Dec. 156 , 652 N.E.2d 1132 (1995); Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. 1997Apparently believing that the Borowski standard of proximate cause would be undermined by recognition of the loss of chance concept, the Hare court expressly declined to follow the lead of such cases as Northern Trust Co. and Chambers, stating, "[A]ny alteration in the burden of proof regarding proximate cause as was done in [Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280 (1978)] would have to come from the supreme court.” Hare, 192 Ill. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Hamil v. Bashline
green
2 sentences1997Apparently believing that the Borowski standard of proximate cause would be undermined by recognition of the loss of chance concept, the Hare court expressly declined to follow the lead of such cases as Northern Trust Co. and Chambers, stating, "[A]ny alteration in the burden of proof regarding proximate cause as was done in [Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280 (1978)] would have to come from the supreme court.” Hare, 192 Ill. 1997Apparently believing that the Borowski standard of proximate cause would be undermined by recognition of the loss of chance concept, the Hare court expressly declined to follow the lead of such cases as Northern Trust Co. and Chambers, stating, "[A]ny alteration in the burden of proof regarding proximate cause as was done in [Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280 (1978)] would have to come from the supreme court.” Hare, 192 Ill. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences1995(See generally Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital (Tex.1993), 858 S.W.2d 397 .) The version which the plaintiff asks us to adopt recognizes a lost chance of survival as a distinct injury, apart from death, for which compensation may be sought. 1995(See generally Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital (Tex. 1993), 858 S.W.2d 397 .) The version which the plaintiff asks us to adopt recognizes a lost chance of survival as a distinct injury, apart from death, for which compensation may be sought. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Sinclair v. Berlin
green
1 sentence2021As the appellate court in Sinclair explained, “lost chance is not a separate theory of recovery but rather a concept that enters into proximate cause analysis in medical malpractice cases when a plaintiff alleges a defendant’s negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment has lessened the effectiveness of treatment.” Sinclair, 325 Ill. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Heastie v. Roberts
green
1 sentence2021Heastie, - 10 - 226 Ill. 2d at 543 . ¶ 43 A. Nonpattern Jury Instruction on Loss of Chance Doctrine ¶ 44 Defendants first argue that the appellate court erred in concluding that the circuit court denied plaintiff a fair trial when it refused to give her proposed nonpattern jury instruction on the loss of chance doctrine. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Borowski v. Von Solbrig
green
1 sentence2021Instead, we concluded that the loss of chance doctrine comports with the traditional proximate cause standard articulated in Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 60 Ill. 2d 418 (1975), which requires a plaintiff to prove that defendant’s negligence “ ‘more probably than not’ ” caused plaintiff’s injury. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Cetera v. DiFilippo
green
1 sentence2021Cetera, 404 Ill. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.