universally recognized rule in Indiana

1969Hutchinson’s Estate v. Arnt (1936), 210 Ind. 509 , 1 N. E. (2d) 585, 108 A. L.

1965Hutchinson’s Estate v. Arnt (1936), 210 Ind. 509 , 1 N. E. (2d) 585, 108 ALR 530 .

1981Although short on reasoning and authority to support the rule of law it enunciates, Bostic does state clearly the universally recognized rule: “Zoning ordinances may not override state law and policy; enabling legislation is not merely precatory, but prescribes the parameters of conferred authority.” Id.

1980It does not, however, destroy the interest of other beneficiaries who are not parties to the spoliation, nor does it avoid unaltered provisions in the same will in favor of the spoliator.” (Emphasis added) We think it apparent that the arguments addressed in Diaz’s brief were not specifically stated in his Motion to Correct Errors and, although this Court prefers to decide cases on their merits whenever possible, Yerkes v. Washington Manufacturing Company, Inc., (1975) 163 Ind.App. 692 , 326 N.E.2d 629 ; Moore v. Funk, (1973) 155 Ind.App. 545 , 293 N.E.2d 534 , we cannot countenance the practi

1980It does not, however, destroy the interest of other beneficiaries who are not parties to the spoliation, nor does it avoid unaltered provisions in the same will in favor of the spoliator.” (Emphasis added) We think it apparent that the arguments addressed in Diaz’s brief were not specifically stated in his Motion to Correct Errors and, although this Court prefers to decide cases on their merits whenever possible, Yerkes v. Washington Manufacturing Company, Inc., (1975) 163 Ind.App. 692 , 326 N.E.2d 629 ; Moore v. Funk, (1973) 155 Ind.App. 545 , 293 N.E.2d 534 , we cannot countenance the practi

1980He contends that where spoliation of the will is committed by the beneficiary or one on his behalf it avoids the provision which is altered, citing the following language from Bohannon v. Tracy, (1943) 295 Ky. 456 , 174 S.W.2d 722 , 725: “A universally recognized principle is that partial spoliation of a will (defined as a change in the wording after execution by one who is neither the testator nor authorized by the testator to make the change) committed by the beneficiary or one acting in his behalf avoids the provision which is thus altered, if the alteration is material, as far as his inter

1980He contends that where spoliation of the will is committed by the beneficiary or one on his behalf it avoids the provision which is altered, citing the following language from Bohannon v. Tracy, (1943) 295 Ky. 456 , 174 S.W.2d 722 , 725: “A universally recognized principle is that partial spoliation of a will (defined as a change in the wording after execution by one who is neither the testator nor authorized by the testator to make the change) committed by the beneficiary or one acting in his behalf avoids the provision which is thus altered, if the alteration is material, as far as his inter

1980It does not, however, destroy the interest of other beneficiaries who are not parties to the spoliation, nor does it avoid unaltered provisions in the same will in favor of the spoliator.” (Emphasis added) We think it apparent that the arguments addressed in Diaz’s brief were not specifically stated in his Motion to Correct Errors and, although this Court prefers to decide cases on their merits whenever possible, Yerkes v. Washington Manufacturing Company, Inc., (1975) 163 Ind.App. 692 , 326 N.E.2d 629 ; Moore v. Funk, (1973) 155 Ind.App. 545 , 293 N.E.2d 534 , we cannot countenance the practi

1980It does not, however, destroy the interest of other beneficiaries who are not parties to the spoliation, nor does it avoid unaltered provisions in the same will in favor of the spoliator.” (Emphasis added) We think it apparent that the arguments addressed in Diaz’s brief were not specifically stated in his Motion to Correct Errors and, although this Court prefers to decide cases on their merits whenever possible, Yerkes v. Washington Manufacturing Company, Inc., (1975) 163 Ind.App. 692 , 326 N.E.2d 629 ; Moore v. Funk, (1973) 155 Ind.App. 545 , 293 N.E.2d 534 , we cannot countenance the practi

1969We ágree with this court’s reasoning in the case of Apple et al. v. Methodist Hosp. (1966), 138 Ind. App. 420, 422 , 206 N. E. 2d 625 (Transfer denied). “. . ; It is a universally recognized rule that the intention of the testator, when it is clearly expressed must be given effect in the construction of a will.

1969We ágree with this court’s reasoning in the case of Apple et al. v. Methodist Hosp. (1966), 138 Ind. App. 420, 422 , 206 N. E. 2d 625 (Transfer denied). “. . ; It is a universally recognized rule that the intention of the testator, when it is clearly expressed must be given effect in the construction of a will.

1924S. 1881; Roy v. Rowe (1883), 90 Ind. 54 ; Gibson v. Brown (1915), 62 Ind. App. 460 . ■ It is necessary then for us to determine what effect should be given to the part immediately following the above, namely, “provided, however, that if my said daughter should die without issue, then it is my will that the property she may have derived from my estate at the time of her death shall have descended to my nephews and nieces from my own blood.” It is the universally recognized rule that the intention of the testator, when it is clearly expressed, must be given effect, in the construction of a will.

1924S. 1881; Roy v. Rowe (1883), 90 Ind. 54 ; Gibson v. Brown (1915), 62 Ind. App. 460 . ■ It is necessary then for us to determine what effect should be given to the part immediately following the above, namely, “provided, however, that if my said daughter should die without issue, then it is my will that the property she may have derived from my estate at the time of her death shall have descended to my nephews and nieces from my own blood.” It is the universally recognized rule that the intention of the testator, when it is clearly expressed, must be given effect, in the construction of a will.

1890It is the universally recognized doctrine that it is no defence to a bill by an assignee for value against an accommodation acceptor, that the assignee knew he was an accommodation acceptor at the time of purchasing the bill. 2 Randolph Commercial Paper, section 561; Spurgin v. McPheeters, 42 Ind. 527 .