universally recognized rule in Missouri

2008This is true even though the payor makes the payment and expressly reserves his right to litigate his claim, or under protest, or un *882 der the impression that the demand was legal.” Missouri courts have uniformly followed that rule since 1868 when the Supreme Court first applied it in Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412 , stating: “The rule of law is well established, both in England and in this country, that a person who voluntarily pays money with full knowledge of all the facts in the case, and in the absence of fraud and duress, cannot recover it back, though the payment is made without a

1969This is true even though the payor makes the payment and expressly reserves his right to litigate his claim, or under protest, or under the impression that the demand was legal.” Missouri courts have uniformly followed that rule 1 since 1868 when the Supreme Court first applied it in Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412 , stating: “The rule of law is well established, both in England and in this country, that a person who voluntarily pays money with full knowledge of all the facts in the case, and in the absence of fraud and duress, cannot recover it back, though the payment is made without a suff

1964“There is a universally recognized rule of law that, at least in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a sane man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his intentional acts.” State v. Martin, Mo.Sup., 260 S.W. 2d 536, 539 .

1929This is a venerable and universally recognized rule of construction, and it has controlling application to the release now under review. [Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444 ; Blair v. Chicago Alton R.

1929Co., 89 Mo. 383 , 1 S.W. 350 .] The commissioner recommends that the judgment of the circuit court be affirmed.

1919The court said: “This is unavailing, for the universally recognized rule is that, though a member of an association may know that certain amendments to the by-laws have been passed, and he may even have voted for them, it does not follow from this that he consents that they may have retroactive force, modifying the contract which he holds with the society. ’ ’ In Massachusetts in the case of Newhall v. American Legion of Honor, 181 Mass. 111 , l. c. 117, the court said: “To state our opinion in a different form, whatever compliances with by-laws may be construed to mean, it does not mean absol

1919Eoyal League, 259 Mo. 92 , and like cases.

1918To the same effect are the following authorities: Book v. Beasley, 138 Mo. 455,1 . c. 461; Bobb v. Wolff, 148 Mo. 335, 1 . c. 344; Worley v. Dryden, 57 Mo. 226, 1 . c. 232.

1918To the same effect are the following authorities: Book v. Beasley, 138 Mo. 455,1 . c. 461; Bobb v. Wolff, 148 Mo. 335, 1 . c. 344; Worley v. Dryden, 57 Mo. 226, 1 . c. 232.

1918To the same effect are the following authorities: Book v. Beasley, 138 Mo. 455,1 . c. 461; Bobb v. Wolff, 148 Mo. 335, 1 . c. 344; Worley v. Dryden, 57 Mo. 226, 1 . c. 232.

1918There may be agreements for the performance of obligations other than the payment of money; but leaving; these out of view it is essential that there be an agreement, either express or implied, on the part of the mortgagor or some one in whose behalf he executes the mortgage, to pay to the mortgagee a sum of money, either on account of a pre-existing debt or a present loan.” Commenting on the above rule the court said: “This is the universally recognized doctrine applicable to the essential requisites of a mortgage.” [Ibid., 1. c. 668.] In the ease of Sheppard v. Wagner, 240 Mo. 409,1 . c. 433

1912Our Supreme Court long since held that it is a defense for the dramshop keeper, where the sale is made by his agent or clerk, to prove that it was made in his absence and against his instructions given in good faith. [State v. McCance, supra.] This is based upon the universally recognized rule that the letter of the statute must sometimes be cut down to conform to its evident spirit and intent. [Kane v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 34 , 20 S. W. 532 ; Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42 , 103 S. W. 946 .] Guided by the above rules, it seems to me that mot-withstanding the reading of the Act of 1907, that it is s

1912Our Supreme Court long since held that it is a defense for the dramshop keeper, where the sale is made by his agent or clerk, to prove that it was made in his absence and against his instructions given in good faith. [State v. McCance, supra.] This is based upon the universally recognized rule that the letter of the statute must sometimes be cut down to conform to its evident spirit and intent. [Kane v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 34 , 20 S. W. 532 ; Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42 , 103 S. W. 946 .] Guided by the above rules, it seems to me that mot-withstanding the reading of the Act of 1907, that it is s

1912Our Supreme Court long since held that it is a defense for the dramshop keeper, where the sale is made by his agent or clerk, to prove that it was made in his absence and against his instructions given in good faith. [State v. McCance, supra.] This is based upon the universally recognized rule that the letter of the statute must sometimes be cut down to conform to its evident spirit and intent. [Kane v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 34 , 20 S. W. 532 ; Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42 , 103 S. W. 946 .] Guided by the above rules, it seems to me that mot-withstanding the reading of the Act of 1907, that it is s

1912Our Supreme Court long since held that it is a defense for the dramshop keeper, where the sale is made by his agent or clerk, to prove that it was made in his absence and against his instructions given in good faith. [State v. McCance, supra.] This is based upon the universally recognized rule that the letter of the statute must sometimes be cut down to conform to its evident spirit and intent. [Kane v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 34 , 20 S. W. 532 ; Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42 , 103 S. W. 946 .] Guided by the above rules, it seems to me that mot-withstanding the reading of the Act of 1907, that it is s

1887Foster v. Evans, 51 Mo. 39 ; Kimmel v. Benna, 70 Mo. 52 ; Ekey v. Inge, 87 Mo. 493 .

1887Foster v. Evans, 51 Mo. 39 ; Kimmel v. Benna, 70 Mo. 52 ; Ekey v. Inge, 87 Mo. 493 .

1887Foster v. Evans, 51 Mo. 39 ; Kimmel v. Benna, 70 Mo. 52 ; Ekey v. Inge, 87 Mo. 493 .

1869This is the universally recognized principle in the doctrine of sales. (2 Kent’s Com., 11th ed., 664 ; Hening v. Powell, 33 Mo. 468 ; Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East. 614; Simmons v. Swift, 5 Barn. & Cres. 857; McDonald v. Hewitt, 15 Johns. 349 ; Scudder v. Worster, 11 Cush. 573 ; Hutchinson v. Hunter, 7 Barr, 140 ; Field v. Moore, Hill & Den., sup., 48.) But separation is enough to pass the; property, though weighing, measuring, or counting may after-. ward be necessary to adjust and determine the final amount othe price.

1869(Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo. 533 ; Bass v. Walsh, 39 Mo. 192 ; Macomber v. Parker, 13 Pick. 183 .) The -whole case shows that there was nothing said between the parties as to payment; and where no time is stipulated for payment it is understood to be a cash sale, and the payment and delivery are immediate and concurrent acts, and the vendor may refuse to deliver without payment; and if the payment be not immediately made, the contract becomes void.

1869This is the universally recognized principle in the doctrine of sales. (2 Kent’s Com., 11th ed., 664 ; Hening v. Powell, 33 Mo. 468 ; Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East. 614; Simmons v. Swift, 5 Barn. & Cres. 857; McDonald v. Hewitt, 15 Johns. 349 ; Scudder v. Worster, 11 Cush. 573 ; Hutchinson v. Hunter, 7 Barr, 140 ; Field v. Moore, Hill & Den., sup., 48.) But separation is enough to pass the; property, though weighing, measuring, or counting may after-. ward be necessary to adjust and determine the final amount othe price.