universally recognized rule (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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universally recognized rule in Illinois

13 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2008 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co.green
ill · 1908 · cited in 8 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1929–2008
2 sentences

1993Our supreme court articulated this doctrine in Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co. (1908), 234 Ill. 535, 541 , 85 N.E. 200 , 201: “It has been a universally recognized rule that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment and with knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment cannot be recovered back on the ground that the claim was illegal.

1981In Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co. (1908), 234 Ill. 535, 541 , the voluntary-payment doctrine was rather fully stated: “It has been a universally recognized rule that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment and with knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment cannot be recovered back on the ground that the claim was illegal.

48
Getto v. City of Chicagogreen
ill · 1981 · cited in 5 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1993–2008
2 sentences

2008It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such compulsion.’ ” Getto, 86 Ill. 2d at 48-49 , quoting Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 541 (1908).

2008It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such compulsion.'" Getto, 86 Ill.2d at 48-49 , 55 Ill.Dec. 519 , 426 N.E.2d 844 , quoting Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 541 , 85 N.E. 200 (1908).

25
Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickumgreen
ill · 1994 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such compulsion.’ ” Getto v. City of Chicago , 86 Ill. 2d 39, 48-49 (1981), quoting Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co. , 234 Ill. 535, 541 (1908); Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum , 159 Ill. 2d 469, 497 (1994).

2005It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such compulsion.’ ” Getto v. City of Chicago, 86 Ill. 2d 39, 48-49 (1981), quoting Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 541 (1908); Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 497 (1994).

22
Barnum v. Reedgreen
ill · 1891 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1922–1922
1 sentence

1922See, also, Barnum v. Reed, 136 Ill. 388 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp. green
ill · 2005
1 sentence

2005King , 215 Ill. 2d at 27-28 .

12005–2005
Geary v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. green
ill · 1989
2 sentences

1993It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such compulsion.” The court reaffirmed the voluntary-payment doctrine in Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc. (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 389, 393 , 544 N.E.2d 344, 346 , and Getto v. City of Chicago (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 39, 48-49 , 426 N.E.2d 844, 849 .

1993It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such compulsion.” The court reaffirmed the voluntary-payment doctrine in Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc. (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 389, 393 , 544 N.E.2d 344, 346 , and Getto v. City of Chicago (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 39, 48-49 , 426 N.E.2d 844, 849 .

11993–1993
Adams v. Jewel Companies, Inc. green
ill · 1976
2 sentences

1981It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such complusion." ( Ross v. City of Geneva (1978), 71 Ill.2d 27 ; Adams v. Jewel Companies (1976), 63 Ill.2d 336 ; Hagerty v. General Motors Corp. (1974), 59 Ill.2d 52 ; Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co. (1908), 234 Ill. 535 .) First, failure to protest payments voluntarily made during the 10-year period is excused on the ground of lack of knowledge *57 t

1981It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such complusion.” (Ross v. City of Geneva (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 27 ; Adams v. Jewel Companies (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 336 ; Hagerty v. General Motors Corp. (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 52 ; Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co. (1908), 234 Ill. 535 .) First, failure to protest payments voluntarily made during the 10-year period is excused on the ground of lack of knowledge tha

11981–1981
Ross v. City of Geneva green
ill · 1978
2 sentences

1981It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such complusion." ( Ross v. City of Geneva (1978), 71 Ill.2d 27 ; Adams v. Jewel Companies (1976), 63 Ill.2d 336 ; Hagerty v. General Motors Corp. (1974), 59 Ill.2d 52 ; Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co. (1908), 234 Ill. 535 .) First, failure to protest payments voluntarily made during the 10-year period is excused on the ground of lack of knowledge *57 t

1981It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such complusion.” (Ross v. City of Geneva (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 27 ; Adams v. Jewel Companies (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 336 ; Hagerty v. General Motors Corp. (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 52 ; Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co. (1908), 234 Ill. 535 .) First, failure to protest payments voluntarily made during the 10-year period is excused on the ground of lack of knowledge tha

11981–1981
Hagerty v. General Motors Corp. green
ill · 1974
2 sentences

1981It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such complusion." ( Ross v. City of Geneva (1978), 71 Ill.2d 27 ; Adams v. Jewel Companies (1976), 63 Ill.2d 336 ; Hagerty v. General Motors Corp. (1974), 59 Ill.2d 52 ; Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co. (1908), 234 Ill. 535 .) First, failure to protest payments voluntarily made during the 10-year period is excused on the ground of lack of knowledge *57 t

1981It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such complusion.” (Ross v. City of Geneva (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 27 ; Adams v. Jewel Companies (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 336 ; Hagerty v. General Motors Corp. (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 52 ; Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co. (1908), 234 Ill. 535 .) First, failure to protest payments voluntarily made during the 10-year period is excused on the ground of lack of knowledge tha

11981–1981
Charles E. Harding Co. v. Harding green
ill · 1933
1 sentence

1979In People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 409-10 , the court gave a comprehensive statement of *431 this rule: "If a court has jurisdiction its judgment may be directly attacked for errors or irregularities, but however manifestly erroneous the decision may be, it is binding upon all parties and privies until it is reversed or set aside in a direct proceeding for that purpose. ( Harding Co. v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417 ; Markley v. People ex rel.

11979–1979
The People v. Kidd green
ill · 1947
1 sentence

1979In People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 409-10 , the court gave a comprehensive statement of *431 this rule: "If a court has jurisdiction its judgment may be directly attacked for errors or irregularities, but however manifestly erroneous the decision may be, it is binding upon all parties and privies until it is reversed or set aside in a direct proceeding for that purpose. ( Harding Co. v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417 ; Markley v. People ex rel.

11979–1979
Sando v. Smith neutral
illappct · 1925
1 sentence

1933The Supreme Court in its opinion, said: “It has been a universally recognized rule that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment and with knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment cannot be recovered back on the ground that the claim was illegal. ’ ’ Again: “Although the defendant could not legally require payment of more than $125 per year for the business telephone and the plaintiff was not legally bound to pay more, a larger sum was voluntarily paid without fraud, mistake of fact or other ground for annulling the contract. ’ ’ In the case of Sando v. Smith,

11933–1933
Bradford v. City of Chicago neutral
· 1861
1 sentence

1929Co., 234 Ill. 535 , it is said (p. 541) that “It has been a universally recognized rule that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment and with knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment cannot be recovered back on the ground that the claim was illegal”; that (p. 545) “The circumstances of different cases are so diverse . . . that, as before stated, no very precise rules can be laid down which will fit every case ’ ’; that ‘ ‘ Ordinarily, protest is the best evidence of compulsion or unwillingness to pay,” but that “where protest would be useless it is superfluo

11929–1929
Elston v. City of Chicago green
ill · 1866
1 sentence

1929On the other hand, in Elston v. City of Chicago, 40 Ill. 514 , where the assessment was void but the payment was made when there was no precept or execution in the hands of an officer by which the collection of the assessment could be enforced, it was held that the payment was not compulsory.

11929–1929
City of Chicago v. Martin green
· 1868
1 sentence

1921(City of Chicago v. Martin, 49 Ill. 241 ; Pearson v. Zehr, 138 id. 48.) In the absence of these elements the damages cannot exceed, and must be confined strictly to, compensation for the injury sustained.

11921–1921

Where else courts name it

OK 18 (1949–2023) KY 18 (1912–2025) AL 14 (1896–1993) WV 13 (1909–2025) IL 13 (1921–2008) MD 13 (1917–2020) CA 12 (1913–2012) TX 12 (1930–2015) MO 11 (1869–2018) GA 7 (1897–1983) MT 7 (1922–1984) KS 7 (1887–1949) LA 7 (1933–1999) ID 6 (1942–2010) IN 6 (1890–1981) AR 5 (1910–2005) OH 5 (1888–1991) NJ 4 (1942–1977) WY 4 (1923–1988) WA 4 (1903–1959) IA 4 (1902–2020) DE 4 (1956–2001) NY 3 (1913–1936) MN 3 (1926–1985) FL 3 (1939–1985) PA 3 (1915–1977) TN 3 (1960–2017) CO 3 (1951–2002) VT 2 (1853–2010) SD 2 (1953–1989) MS 2 (1922–1983) MA 2 (1910–1974) NV 2 (1867–1974) DC 2 (1988–1996) HI 2 (1926–1960) NC 2 (1896–1936) NM 2 (1940–1975) PR 2 (1933–1947) AZ 2 (1977–1995) NE 2 (1902–1987)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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