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6 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Ralph Marreragreen2 sentences2000However, federal jurisprudence has also held that "where a defendant puts a trial judge on notice of the alleged conflict before or during trial and the trial court fails to *57 inquire into the conflict, a reviewing court will presume prejudice upon a showing of possible prejudice." United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d 201, 205 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, Marrera v. United States, 475 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 1209 , 89 L.Ed.2d 321 (1986), citing Holloway, supra, and Cuyler, supra. Thus, "[t]o decide whether to apply the Holloway test and afford defendant a per se presumption of prejudice or to a 2000However, federal jurisprudence has also held that "where a defendant puts a trial judge on notice of the alleged conflict before or during trial and the trial court fails to *57 inquire into the conflict, a reviewing court will presume prejudice upon a showing of possible prejudice." United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d 201, 205 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, Marrera v. United States, 475 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 1209 , 89 L.Ed.2d 321 (1986), citing Holloway, supra, and Cuyler, supra. Thus, "[t]o decide whether to apply the Holloway test and afford defendant a per se presumption of prejudice or to a | 2 | 3 |
State v. Castanedagreen2 sentences2011See State v. Castaneda, 94-1118 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/95) , 658 So.2d 297, 305 . 2011See State v. Castaneda, 94-1118 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/95) , 658 So.2d 297, 305 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hughesgreen2 sentences1995See State v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 31, 40 (La.App.2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 1197 (1992). 1995See State v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 31, 40 (La.App.2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 1197 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hughesgreen2 sentences1995See State v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 31, 40 (La.App.2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 1197 (1992). 1995See State v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 31, 40 (La.App.2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 1197 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Carmouche
green
2 sentences2012Importantly, although the Holloway standard is often thought of as being triggered by a formal objection during trial, “a formal incantation is not required to make an objection in the trial court.” State v. Carmouche, 508 So.2d 792 , on reh’g, 508 So.2d 803 , 804 (La.1987). 2012Importantly, although the Holloway standard is often thought of as being triggered by a formal objection during trial, “a formal incantation is not required to make an objection in the trial court.” State v. Carmouche, 508 So.2d 792 , on reh’g, 508 So.2d 803 , 804 (La.1987). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mickens v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2012A consequence of the Holloway standard is that it relieves,a defendant from having to connect a conflict of inter est with “proof of effect upon representation.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 . 4 The reason reversal was automatic under Holloway , explained the Mickens Court, is a presumption “that the conflict, ‘which [the defendant] and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections ... ’ undermined the adversarial process.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 . 2012A consequence of the Holloway standard is that it relieves,a defendant from having to connect a conflict of inter est with “proof of effect upon representation.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 . 4 The reason reversal was automatic under Holloway , explained the Mickens Court, is a presumption “that the conflict, ‘which [the defendant] and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections ... ’ undermined the adversarial process.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Holloway v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2012A consequence of the Holloway standard is that it relieves,a defendant from having to connect a conflict of inter est with “proof of effect upon representation.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 . 4 The reason reversal was automatic under Holloway , explained the Mickens Court, is a presumption “that the conflict, ‘which [the defendant] and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections ... ’ undermined the adversarial process.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 . 2012A consequence of the Holloway standard is that it relieves,a defendant from having to connect a conflict of inter est with “proof of effect upon representation.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 . 4 The reason reversal was automatic under Holloway , explained the Mickens Court, is a presumption “that the conflict, ‘which [the defendant] and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections ... ’ undermined the adversarial process.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Cuyler v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2012Under Sullivan , the court had the duty to make a Holloway inquiry when it knew “a particular conflict existed.” Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 . 2012Under Sullivan , the court had the duty to make a Holloway inquiry when it knew “a particular conflict existed.” Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Marrera v. United States
green
2 sentences2000However, federal jurisprudence has also held that "where a defendant puts a trial judge on notice of the alleged conflict before or during trial and the trial court fails to *57 inquire into the conflict, a reviewing court will presume prejudice upon a showing of possible prejudice." United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d 201, 205 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, Marrera v. United States, 475 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 1209 , 89 L.Ed.2d 321 (1986), citing Holloway, supra, and Cuyler, supra. Thus, "[t]o decide whether to apply the Holloway test and afford defendant a per se presumption of prejudice or to a 2000However, federal jurisprudence has also held that "where a defendant puts a trial judge on notice of the alleged conflict before or during trial and the trial court fails to *57 inquire into the conflict, a reviewing court will presume prejudice upon a showing of possible prejudice." United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d 201, 205 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, Marrera v. United States, 475 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 1209 , 89 L.Ed.2d 321 (1986), citing Holloway, supra, and Cuyler, supra. Thus, "[t]o decide whether to apply the Holloway test and afford defendant a per se presumption of prejudice or to a | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.