jurors factors in California

2022Confrontation Clause Claim Defendant contends that the trial court impermissibly allowed the prosecution’s gang expert to relay testimonial hearsay to the jurors in violation the confrontation clause and Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 .

2018Confrontation Clause Claim Defendant contends that the trial court impermissibly allowed the prosecution's *179 gang expert to relay testimonial hearsay to the jurors in violation the confrontation clause and Crawford, supra , 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .

2025Regarding the drawing of an adverse inference from the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the relevant section of the Benchbook cited by the trial court states: “On the request of a party who may be adversely affected by an unfavorable inference that may be drawn by the jurors from the exercise of the privilege, the judge must instruct the jurors that no presumption arises because of the exercise of the privilege, and that they may not draw any inference from the exercise of the privilege. [Citations.] The judge should give CACI 215 (Exercise of a Communication Privilege) and 216 (Ex

2015(People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 152-153 .) The court also instructed the jurors on the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

2020Our partial reversal requires that the case be reopened, with an actual trial if necessary; furthermore, our partial reversal reflected our view that the trial judge erred in a crucial decision of law.” (Id. at p. 766.) As discussed, resolution 13 We also find instructive the Peracchi court’s consideration of the fact “a defendant’s interest in a full and fair sentencing hearing usually is best served when the hearing is presided over by the same judge who heard the evidence at trial.” (Peracchi, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1261 .) The same policy consideration weighs in favor of having Judge Mohr

2020Our partial reversal requires that the case be reopened, with an actual trial if necessary; furthermore, our partial reversal reflected our view that the trial judge erred in a crucial decision of law.” (Id. at p. 766.) As discussed, resolution 13 We also find instructive the Peracchi court’s consideration of the fact “a defendant’s interest in a full and fair sentencing hearing usually is best served when the hearing is presided over by the same judge who heard the evidence at trial.” (Peracchi, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1261 .) The same policy consideration weighs in favor of having Judge Mohr

2014Further, the court instructed the jurors as to the factors they could consider when weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony." (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Contreras argues "that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court [Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ] supports his contention that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification violated his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity 6 to present a complete defense . . . ." (People v. Goodwillie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 727 .) After a l

2014Further, the court instructed the jurors as to the factors they could consider when weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony." (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Contreras argues "that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court [Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ] supports his contention that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification violated his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity 6 to present a complete defense . . . ." (People v. Goodwillie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 727 .) After a l

2014Further, the court instructed the jurors as to the factors they could consider when weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony." (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Contreras argues "that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court [Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ] supports his contention that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification violated his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity 6 to present a complete defense . . . ." (People v. Goodwillie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 727 .) After a l

2014Further, the court instructed the jurors as to the factors they could consider when weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony." (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Contreras argues "that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court [Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ] supports his contention that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification violated his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity 6 to present a complete defense . . . ." (People v. Goodwillie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 727 .) After a l

2026He relies on Riley v. Deeds (9th Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 1117, 1121 , in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s absence during jury deliberations and the law clerk’s reading back of trial testimony amounted to a “complete 175 PEOPLE v. BERTSCH and HRONIS Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C.

2024The court provided those transcripts but instructed the jury that “[t]he recording is the evidence” and the transcripts were to be used only to assist the jurors in hearing the words spoken on the video. 12 Defense counsel initially objected to the trial court providing the jury with a “dictionary definition” of “permanent.” However, when the trial court stated that it would respond to the jury with the definition described above, defense counsel replied, “That’s fine.” 12 ‘paralysis’ means a major or complete loss of motor function resulting from injury to the nervous system or to a muscular

2024Under these circumstances, the trial court reasonably concluded there were no grounds for believing good cause might exist to excuse any of the jurors and no inquiry was necessary. ( Cowan, supra, at 508 .) 26 Defendant contends the trial court must inquire of jurors “even when the possibility of bias [is] essentially speculative.” Defendant relies on People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207 , in which the defendant argued jurors may have read news reports in which the prosecution allegedly discussed the trial.

2024Under these circumstances, the trial court reasonably concluded there were no grounds for believing good cause might exist to excuse any of the jurors and no inquiry was necessary. ( Cowan, supra, at 508 .) 26 Defendant contends the trial court must inquire of jurors “even when the possibility of bias [is] essentially speculative.” Defendant relies on People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207 , in which the defendant argued jurors may have read news reports in which the prosecution allegedly discussed the trial.

2024(See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 419 .) 17 Here, the prosecution requested the instruction, claiming the jury may perceive its failure to call R.J. as a witness as a failure of proof.

2022(See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 .) F. Prosecutor Told the Jury “We’re Beyond” that Now Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when she “told the jurors that the presumption of innocence lasted until the start of the evidentiary portion of the trial, but now that all the evidence has been taken, ‘we’re beyond that now.’” The defendant contends the prosecutor erred when she told the jury “we’re beyond” the 27. presumption of innocence before the start of deliberations, suggesting to “‘the jury it need no longer apply the presumption because it is no longe

2022“The fact the jury was able to reach a verdict relatively quickly after being further instructed reflects the court properly exercised its discretion.” (Moore, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1122 .) That progress was not enough to warrant still further deliberations, argues Ramos, because when the foreperson reported two verdicts had been reached, she also stated she did not think additional deliberations would 8 result in agreement on the other 27 counts.

2022(Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 419 .) In fact, this assumption is incorporated into Evidence Code section 1109’s definition of domestic violence.

2022She was merely disagreeing with the argument of Ritter’s counsel that the reasonable doubt standard applied to “the type of decision you really got to be sure about, like when you decided who[m] to marry.” The disagreement was apt. “[S]ince the decision to marry is often based on a standard far less than reasonable doubt, as reflected in statistics indicating 33 to 60 percent of all marriages end in divorce,” this court “strongly disapprove[d] of arguments suggesting the reasonable doubt standard is used in daily life to decide such questions as whether to . . . marry.” (People v. Nguyen (1995

2022(Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 14-15 ; People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1033 ; see CALCRIM No. 220.) In thus taking exception to Ritter’s counsel’s marriage analogy, the prosecutor did nothing likely to mislead the jury on the applicable burden of proof.

2021Brady, found at 129 Cal.App.4th 1314 , which is a 2005 case, and in that case, while this Court’s not going to review the facts with counsel since both counsel are familiar with the fact pattern in that case, in that case the trial court did instruct the jurors with an instruction that has been reviewed on appeal and has, more importantly, been affirmed on appeal, finding that the instruction provided in that case did adequately instruct the jurors on the applicable law in this area given a fact pattern that while it is not necessarily similar to this case, it is similar enough as it relates t

2021This Court is far more 16 People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290 . 28. comfortable with providing law to this jury that has been tested, reviewed, and, most importantly, affirmed in properly instructing the jurors about the law in a particular area that is a factual issue in dispute.

2021This Court is far more 16 People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290 . 28. comfortable with providing law to this jury that has been tested, reviewed, and, most importantly, affirmed in properly instructing the jurors about the law in a particular area that is a factual issue in dispute.

2021(Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1287 .) The record demonstrates that voir dire in defendant’s case was not so cursory that it constituted an abuse of discretion or deprived her of a fundamentally fair trial.

2015(People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965 , 989- 990.) When a defendant is charged with a sex offense, Evidence Code section 1108 5 In his opening brief on appeal, defendant mistakenly assumed the uncharged sex offense evidence was presented to the jury under both Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1101, subdivision (b), and he challenged its admissibility under both of these sections.

2013The trial court denied the motion for new trial, stating there was no evidence the alleged misconduct " 'effected [sic] the finding of their guilt.' " (Von Villas, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 253 .) The Von Villas court, noting that "a series of errors on all sides . . . brought about an untenable situation for the trial judge who, in turn, committed error by applying an incorrect legal analysis of the jury misconduct issue" (id. at p. 257), held (relying on Perez) the appropriate remedy was to remand for a new hearing at which the trial court would examine the jurors to test their credibility