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6 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Cottergreen1 sentence2013The defendants argue that our analysis whether the parties’ arbitration agreement remains in force should be informed by a “presumption of arbitrability.” Cf. Miller v. Cotter, supra at 680 (agreement to arbitrate not unconscionable, resting in part on the fact that the “purpose of submitting disputes to binding arbitration is heavily favored by statute and by case law”). | 1 | 1 |
Teresita J. Dumais v. American Golf Corporation, Doing Business as Paradise Hills Golf Club, a Foreign Corporation and William Winklergreen1 sentence2013Contrast Dumais v. American Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The presumption in favor of arbitration is properly applied in interpreting the scope of an arbitration agreement,” and it “disappears when the parties dispute the existence of a valid arbitration agreement”). | 1 | 1 |
Szalla v. Lockegreen1 sentence2007“It is well established that disputes between parties in the same venture do not fall within the scope of G.L.c. 93A, §11.” Szalla v. Locke, 421 Mass. 448, 451 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Newton v. Moffiegreen1 sentence2007The defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because the transactions between the parties were “strictly private in nature,” rather than “in the ordinary course of a trade or business.” Newton v. Moffie, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 462, 468 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Shea v. Emmanuel Collegegreen1 sentence2002The defendants argue that the exception must be viewed so narrowly to include only those instances where a plaintiff can point to a violation of a “well-established public policy” as set forth in Shea v. Emmanual College, 425 Mass. 761, 762 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Robert G. Hayduk v. Vincent T. Lannagreen1 sentence1998This may be true where the complaint charges conspiracy to defraud, see Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 443-444 (1st Cir. 1985), but the defendants cite no authority applying the pleading standard of Mass.R.Civ.P. 9(b), 365 Mass. 751 (1974), to civil conspiracy claims generally. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Connor
green
2 sentences2005The defendants argue that the instruction failed to comport with the requirement that a judge, after dismissing a “problem” juror, inform the jury as provided in Commonwealth v. Connor, supra, “that the reason for discharge is entirely personal and has nothing to do with the discharged juror’s views on the case or his relationship with his fellow jurors.” Id. at 846 . 2005The defendants argue that the instruction failed to comport with the requirement that a judge, after dismissing a “problem” juror, inform the jury as provided in Commonwealth v. Connor, supra, “that the reason for discharge is entirely personal and has nothing to do with the discharged juror’s views on the case or his relationship with his fellow jurors.” Id. at 846 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Commonwealth v. Marini
green
1 sentence1987Therefore, the appropriate test is stringent, requiring reversal unless any “spillover” resulting from imperfect interlock “was without effect on the jury and did not contribute to the verdict.” Id. at 520 . 8 The defendants argue that this standard is not met because the spillover as to malice may have been accepted by the jury *873 “as corroborating elements of the testimony of witnesses to which they might have otherwise granted less credence.” The Commonwealth replies that such effect was merely cumulative of other evidence properly considered by the jury. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.