Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lynch v. Andrewgreen2 sentences2003As the court observed in Lynch v. Andrew, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 626 (1985): “Unless otherwise qualified by express language, a financing condition clause presupposes that the buyers will accept commercially reasonable loan terms. 1999It is established that “[u]nless otherwise qualified by express language, a financing condition clause presupposes that the buyers will accept commercially reasonable loan terms.” Lynch v. Andrew, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 626 (1985). | 3 | 3 |
Stabile v. McCarthygreen2 sentences2003Cf. Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399, 404 (1957) and Sechrest v. Safiol, 383 Mass. 568, 571 (1981), which require, to trigger a contingency in an agreement, conduct reasonably calculated to fulfill the condition by action or expenditure proportionate to the circumstances.” Whether the buyer in a given case has acted diligently is ordinarily a question of fact for the trial court. 1985Cf. Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399, 404 (1957), and Sechrest v. Safiol, 383 Mass. 568, 571 (1981), which require, to trigger a contingency in an agreement, conduct reasonably calculated to fulfill the condition by action or expenditure proportionate to the circumstances. | 2 | 2 |
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.green1 sentence1995Co. v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 70, 73 (1980), it is not too much to ask that a party adhere closely to the notice of cancellation provision of a financing condition clause. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sechrest v. Safiol
green
2 sentences2003Cf. Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399, 404 (1957) and Sechrest v. Safiol, 383 Mass. 568, 571 (1981), which require, to trigger a contingency in an agreement, conduct reasonably calculated to fulfill the condition by action or expenditure proportionate to the circumstances.” Whether the buyer in a given case has acted diligently is ordinarily a question of fact for the trial court. 1985Cf. Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399, 404 (1957), and Sechrest v. Safiol, 383 Mass. 568, 571 (1981), which require, to trigger a contingency in an agreement, conduct reasonably calculated to fulfill the condition by action or expenditure proportionate to the circumstances. | 2 | 1985–2003 |
Churgin v. Hobbie
green
1 sentence2000For the same reasons that optionees are required to turn their corners squarely in exercising option rights, it is not too much to ask that a party adhere closely to the notice of cancellation provision of a financing condition clause.” Id., 39 Mass.App.Ct. at 307 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Tremouliaris v. Pina
green
1 sentence2000For the same reasons that optionees are required to turn their corners squarely in exercising option rights, it is not too much to ask that a party adhere closely to the notice of cancellation provision of a financing condition clause.” Id., 39 Mass.App.Ct. at 307 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |