weighing factors in California

2016However, as to the weighing test under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), in which the juvenile court balances the parent-child relationship against the benefits the child would derive from adoption, the appellate court opined that the abuse of discretion test may apply to evaluate this " ' " 'quintessentially' " discretionary decision.' " (In re J.C., supra, at p. 531; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) Based on the respective showings, the court must balance "the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the securi

2015However, as to the weighing test under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), in which the juvenile court balances the parent-child relationship against the benefits the child would derive from adoption, the appellate court opined that the abuse of discretion test may apply to evaluate this " ' " 'quintessentially' " discretionary decision.' " (In re J.C., supra, at p. 531; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) Based on the respective showings, the court must balance "the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the securi

2000Co. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 978, 989 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 22 ]; South Tahoe Gas Co. v. Hofmann Land Improvement Co. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 750, 759 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) The “appropriate remedy would depend upon a weighing of these factors.” (Adoption of Matthew B., supra, at p. 1257.) In the present case, it is part of the remedy—specific performance of the contract or damages for emotional harm—rather than the object or consideration of the agreement that is unenforceable on public policy grounds.

2000Co. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 978, 989 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 22 ]; South Tahoe Gas Co. v. Hofmann Land Improvement Co. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 750, 759 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) The “appropriate remedy would depend upon a weighing of these factors.” (Adoption of Matthew B., supra, at p. 1257.) In the present case, it is part of the remedy—specific performance of the contract or damages for emotional harm—rather than the object or consideration of the agreement that is unenforceable on public policy grounds.

2006(See § 190.3; former § 190.3, added by Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 11, pp. 1258-1260.) Under both laws, the jury must consider the aggravating and mitigating factors and has the “responsibility to decide what penalty is appropriate under all the relevant circumstances.” (People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 544 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 726 P.2d 516 ].) The weighing requirement simply makes clear that jurors are to limit their consideration to the factors listed in the statute.

2006(See § 190.3; former § 190.3, added by Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 11, pp. 1258-1260.) Under both laws, the jury must consider the aggravating and mitigating factors and has the “responsibility to decide what penalty is appropriate under all the relevant circumstances.” (People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 544 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 726 P.2d 516 ].) The weighing requirement simply makes clear that jurors are to limit their consideration to the factors listed in the statute.

2016However, as to the weighing test under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), in which the juvenile court balances the parent-child relationship against the benefits the child would derive from adoption, the appellate court opined that the abuse of discretion test may apply to evaluate this " ' " 'quintessentially' " discretionary decision.' " (In re J.C., supra, at p. 531; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) Based on the respective showings, the court must balance "the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the securi

2015However, as to the weighing test under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), in which the juvenile court balances the parent-child relationship against the benefits the child would derive from adoption, the appellate court opined that the abuse of discretion test may apply to evaluate this " ' " 'quintessentially' " discretionary decision.' " (In re J.C., supra, at p. 531; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) Based on the respective showings, the court must balance "the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the securi

2015(In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643 ["Overcoming the statutory preference for adoption and avoiding the termination of parental rights requires the parent to show both that he or she has maintained regular visitation with the child and that the child would benefit from continuing the 9 The statutory phrase "benefit from continuing the relationship" (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) refers to a parent-child relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.

2015The Basis for the Juvenile Court's Ruling As we have explained, there are two parts to establishing the beneficial relationship exception, namely that the parent "has maintained regular visitation with the child and that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643 , italics added.) In this case, focusing on Monique's and Lionel's visitation history, the juvenile court noted it was "questionable" whether visitation was "regular and consistent."6 However, choosing instead to base its ruling on the second part of the beneficial rela

2015In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503 concluded that the substantial evidence standard of review applied to the factual issues of whether the parent maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and whether the parent proved he or she had a beneficial parental relationship with the child, but as to the weighing test, in which the juvenile court balances the strength of the parent-child relationship against the benefits the child would derive from adoption to decide whether the relationship is a compelling reason to chose a permanent plan other than adoption, the court applied the ab

2015(Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-577; In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 .) This reviewing court makes presumptions in favor of the judgment, views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (the Agency), and gives the judgment the benefit of all reasonable inferences.

2011Co. of America v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 814, 828 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 ]; accord, Best Buy, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 779 ; see CashCall, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 290 [putative class representative who never had standing should not necessarily be treated less favorably than class representative who once had but then lost standing; the weighing test articulated in Parris should apply in either situation to evaluate precertification discovery intended to identify potential class members].) Yet, as our colleagues in Division Three of the Fourth Appell

2009(CashCall, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 299 .) CashCall rejected the argument that, in cases where the plaintiffs have never been class members, a bright-line rule precluding precertification discovery to identify class members should apply and the weighing test from Parris, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 285 , should be inapplicable. ( CashCall, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 285-286, 290-291.) Citing the general rule liberally allowing amendments of complaints to substitute new plaintiffs with standing (id. at pp. 287-288), CashCall stated that a class action plaintiff without standing should be allo

2000Co. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 978, 989 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 22 ]; South Tahoe Gas Co. v. Hofmann Land Improvement Co. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 750, 759 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) The “appropriate remedy would depend upon a weighing of these factors.” (Adoption of Matthew B., supra, at p. 1257.) In the present case, it is part of the remedy—specific performance of the contract or damages for emotional harm—rather than the object or consideration of the agreement that is unenforceable on public policy grounds.

2000Co. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 978, 989 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 22 ]; South Tahoe Gas Co. v. Hofmann Land Improvement Co. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 750, 759 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 286 ].) The “appropriate remedy would depend upon a weighing of these factors.” (Adoption of Matthew B., supra, at p. 1257.) In the present case, it is part of the remedy—specific performance of the contract or damages for emotional harm—rather than the object or consideration of the agreement that is unenforceable on public policy grounds.

2023(See, e.g., In re Caitlin B. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1190 [holding that a mother challenging an order terminating the parental rights of both herself and the child’s alleged fathers lacked standing to contend the alleged fathers failed to receive proper notice of the section 366.26 hearing]; In re Jasmine J. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1806 [parent may not raise issues on appeal which do not affect his or her own rights].) Regardless, and even considering such an argument, we would conclude the court’s findings as to Mother were supported by substantial evidence and not an abuse of discretion. 9

2018Ultimately, the court modified the standard instruction to add the following: "Each of you remains obligated to decide for yourself, based upon the weighing of the factors in aggravation and mitigation, whether death or life without possibility of parole is the appropriate penalty, despite testimony offered by the defendant suggesting a preference for a particular penalty." This instruction was sufficient to protect defendant from an unreliable verdict. ( People v. Webb , supra , 6 Cal.4th at p. 535 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 , 862 P.2d 779 .) Indeed, we have upheld death verdicts *51 even absent su

2018Ultimately, the court modified the standard instruction to add the following: "Each of you remains obligated to decide for yourself, based upon the weighing of the factors in aggravation and mitigation, whether death or life without possibility of parole is the appropriate penalty, despite testimony offered by the defendant suggesting a preference for a particular penalty." This instruction was sufficient to protect defendant from an unreliable verdict. ( People v. Webb , supra , 6 Cal.4th at p. 535 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 , 862 P.2d 779 .) Indeed, we have upheld death verdicts *51 even absent su

2018First, “when the challenged determination involves the trial court’s weighing of interrelated factors, the result of that weighing process generally will be upheld on appeal so long as the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason or contravene the uncontradicted evidence.” (County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 301, 316 (T.C.E.F.) [grant of preliminary injunction was discretionary determination requiring the weighing of factors]; see Bank of America, N.A. v. Superior Court (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1076 , 1089 9Courts are not required to take judicial notice of the recomm

2018First, “when the challenged determination involves the trial court’s weighing of interrelated factors, the result of that weighing process generally will be upheld on appeal so long as the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason or contravene the uncontradicted evidence.” (County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 301, 316 (T.C.E.F.) [grant of preliminary injunction was discretionary determination requiring the weighing of factors]; see Bank of America, N.A. v. Superior Court (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1076 , 1089 9Courts are not required to take judicial notice of the recomm

2018Ultimately, the court modified the standard instruction to add the following: "Each of you remains obligated to decide for yourself, based upon the weighing of the factors in aggravation and mitigation, whether death or life without possibility of parole is the appropriate penalty, despite testimony offered by the defendant suggesting a preference for a particular penalty." This instruction was sufficient to protect defendant from an unreliable verdict. ( People v. Webb , supra , 6 Cal.4th at p. 535 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 , 862 P.2d 779 .) Indeed, we have upheld death verdicts *51 even absent su

2018Ultimately, the court modified the standard instruction to add the following: "Each of you remains obligated to decide for yourself, based upon the weighing of the factors in aggravation and mitigation, whether death or life without possibility of parole is the appropriate penalty, despite testimony offered by the defendant suggesting a preference for a particular penalty." This instruction was sufficient to protect defendant from an unreliable verdict. ( People v. Webb , supra , 6 Cal.4th at p. 535 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 , 862 P.2d 779 .) Indeed, we have upheld death verdicts *51 even absent su

2017Only obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest. ( Hill , at p. 34, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 .) To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. , supra , 7 Cal.4th 1 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 , they are disapproved. 8 **88 *558 In addition to placing an unduly onerous burden on Williams by requiring proof of a compell

2017Only obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest. ( Hill , at p. 34, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 .) To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. , supra , 7 Cal.4th 1 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 , they are disapproved. 8 **88 *558 In addition to placing an unduly onerous burden on Williams by requiring proof of a compell

2016(See, e.g., Frazier, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 42 [declining to find undue consumption of time where three victims’ testimony of past uncharged offenses consumed 182 pages of reporter’s transcript, or 27 percent of the total trial transcript].) In sum, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s weighing analysis under section 352.

2016(See, e.g., Frazier, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 42 [declining to find undue consumption of time where three victims’ testimony of past uncharged offenses consumed 182 pages of reporter’s transcript, or 27 percent of the total trial transcript].) In sum, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s weighing analysis under section 352.