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11 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gibsongreen2 sentences2023See State v. Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, 324, ¶ 17 (2002) (“Because [Rule 403 entails] a weighing of factors that cannot easily be quantified, substantial discretion is accorded the trial judge.”) (citation omitted). 2018Girouard v. Skyline Steel, Inc., 215 Ariz. 126, 129, ¶ 11 (App. 2007). ¶24 “Because this is a weighing of factors that cannot easily be quantified, substantial discretion is accorded the trial judge.” Gibson, 202 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 17 (internal quotations omitted); see also Sprint/United Mgmt. | 2 | 2 |
Pullen v. Pullengreen2 sentences2019Id. at 295-96, ¶ 9 ; State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281 , 297 n.18 (1983) (“Something is discretionary because it is based on an assessment of conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations which vary from case to case . . . . 2019Id. at 295-96, ¶ 9 ; State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281 , 297 n.18 (1983) (“Something is discretionary because it is based on an assessment of conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations which vary from case to case . . . . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Harveygreen1 sentence2020See State v. Harvey, 193 Ariz. 472, 477, ¶ 25 (App. 1998) (holding that when the trial court considers aggravating and mitigating factors, the weighing of those factors is a matter within its sound discretion). | 1 | 1 |
Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohngreen1 sentence2018Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008) (“[Q]uestions of relevance and prejudice are for the District Court to determine in the first instance.”). | 1 | 1 |
Girouard v. Skyline Steel, Inc.green1 sentence2018Girouard v. Skyline Steel, Inc., 215 Ariz. 126, 129, ¶ 11 (App. 2007). ¶24 “Because this is a weighing of factors that cannot easily be quantified, substantial discretion is accorded the trial judge.” Gibson, 202 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 17 (internal quotations omitted); see also Sprint/United Mgmt. | 1 | 1 |
Cal Fed Partners v. Heersgreen2 sentences2009This is because “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Gates Learjet, 743 F.2d at 1334-35 (quotation omitted); see also Cal Fed, 156 Ariz. at 246 , 751 P.2d at 562 (“since it is for the plaintiff to choose the place of suit, his choice of forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 84 emt. c (1971)). 4 ¶ 11 Our resolution of this appeal hinges on the second analysis, that is, the weighing of the factors of convenience. 2009This is because “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Gates Learjet, 743 F.2d at 1334-35 (quotation omitted); see also Cal Fed, 156 Ariz. at 246 , 751 P.2d at 562 (“since it is for the plaintiff to choose the place of suit, his choice of forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 84 emt. c (1971)). 4 ¶ 11 Our resolution of this appeal hinges on the second analysis, that is, the weighing of the factors of convenience. | 1 | 1 |
Gates Learjet Corporation v. Jensengreen1 sentence2009This is because “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Gates Learjet, 743 F.2d at 1334-35 (quotation omitted); see also Cal Fed, 156 Ariz. at 246 , 751 P.2d at 562 (“since it is for the plaintiff to choose the place of suit, his choice of forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 84 emt. c (1971)). 4 ¶ 11 Our resolution of this appeal hinges on the second analysis, that is, the weighing of the factors of convenience. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ruizgreen2 sentences2004Draper, 162 Ariz. at 438 , 784 P.2d at 264 ; Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 , 122 S.Ct. at 2456 , 153 L.Ed.2d at 596 . [10] I dissent because the majority neglects to engage in that weighing process at all and, in resolving the claim against Secord, trivializes Secord's need to view the videotape in making a knowing and intelligent decision whether to accept the plea offer. ¶ 26 During oral argument, the state asserted that Ruiz does not endorse a weighing test but, rather, precludes any federal due process claim anchored on the deprivation of a defendant's right to examine certain disclosure materials 2004Draper, 162 Ariz. at 438 , 784 P.2d at 264 ; Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 , 122 S.Ct. at 2456 , 153 L.Ed.2d at 596 . [10] I dissent because the majority neglects to engage in that weighing process at all and, in resolving the claim against Secord, trivializes Secord's need to view the videotape in making a knowing and intelligent decision whether to accept the plea offer. ¶ 26 During oral argument, the state asserted that Ruiz does not endorse a weighing test but, rather, precludes any federal due process claim anchored on the deprivation of a defendant's right to examine certain disclosure materials | 1 | 1 |
Readenour v. Marion Power Shovelgreen2 sentences1997Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, 149 Ariz. 442, 449-50 , 719 P.2d 1058,1065-66 (1986). 1997Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, 149 Ariz. 442, 449-50 , 719 P.2d 1058,1065-66 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arnold Nelson Mahler and Dean H. Ubbengreen1 sentence1980We would stress, however, the importance of making “an on-the-record finding based on specific facts and circumstances that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.” State v. Ellerson, supra, citing United States v. Mahler, 579 F.2d 730, 734 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 872 , 99 S.Ct. 592 , 58 L.Ed.2d 666 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chapple
red
2 sentences2019Id. at 295-96, ¶ 9 ; State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281 , 297 n.18 (1983) (“Something is discretionary because it is based on an assessment of conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations which vary from case to case . . . . 2019Id. at 295-96, ¶ 9 ; State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281 , 297 n.18 (1983) (“Something is discretionary because it is based on an assessment of conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations which vary from case to case . . . . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. MacHado
green
2 sentences2011The court of appeals concluded that “evidence about the telephone call had obvious, substantial probative value,” Machado, 224 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 39, 230 P.3d at 1173 , and the trial court acknowledged that the call might even be “super relevant,” id. at ¶ 39 n. 13. 2011The court of appeals concluded that “evidence about the telephone call had obvious, substantial probative value,” Machado, 224 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 39, 230 P.3d at 1173 , and the trial court acknowledged that the call might even be “super relevant,” id. at ¶ 39 n. 13. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Draper
green
2 sentences2004Draper, 162 Ariz. at 438 , 784 P.2d at 264 ; Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 , 122 S.Ct. at 2456 , 153 L.Ed.2d at 596 . [10] I dissent because the majority neglects to engage in that weighing process at all and, in resolving the claim against Secord, trivializes Secord's need to view the videotape in making a knowing and intelligent decision whether to accept the plea offer. ¶ 26 During oral argument, the state asserted that Ruiz does not endorse a weighing test but, rather, precludes any federal due process claim anchored on the deprivation of a defendant's right to examine certain disclosure materials 2004Draper, 162 Ariz. at 438 , 784 P.2d at 264 ; Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 , 122 S.Ct. at 2456 , 153 L.Ed.2d at 596 . [10] I dissent because the majority neglects to engage in that weighing process at all and, in resolving the claim against Secord, trivializes Secord's need to view the videotape in making a knowing and intelligent decision whether to accept the plea offer. ¶ 26 During oral argument, the state asserted that Ruiz does not endorse a weighing test but, rather, precludes any federal due process claim anchored on the deprivation of a defendant's right to examine certain disclosure materials | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Thomas P. Bowling v. George A. Vose, Director of the Department of Corrections, State of Rhode Island
green
2 sentences1995The dissent correctly cites Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559 , 561 n. 4 (1st Cir.1993), for the proposition that the weighing of factors identified in Taylor is a legal question that should be reviewed de novo. 1995The dissent correctly cites Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559 , 561 n. 4 (1st Cir.1993), for the proposition that the weighing of factors identified in Taylor is a legal question that should be reviewed de novo. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Matthews v. United States
green
1 sentence1980We would stress, however, the importance of making “an on-the-record finding based on specific facts and circumstances that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.” State v. Ellerson, supra, citing United States v. Mahler, 579 F.2d 730, 734 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 872 , 99 S.Ct. 592 , 58 L.Ed.2d 666 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.