Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Maryland opinions name it 1 courts 1966–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences2007The continuous course of treatment rule in medical malpractice cases apparently was abrogated in the later case of Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 700 , 501 A.2d 27, 32-33 (1985), where we said; "The provisions of § 5-109, and the intent underlying the enactment of that statute, are plainly inconsistent with the survival of the continuing treatment rule. 2007The continuous course of treatment rule in medical malpractice cases apparently was abrogated in the later case of Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 700 , 501 A.2d 27, 32-33 (1985), where we said; "The provisions of § 5-109, and the intent underlying the enactment of that statute, are plainly inconsistent with the survival of the continuing treatment rule. | 2 | 3 |
Waldman v. Rohrbaughgreen2 sentences1986FM & I undertakes to demonstrate the validity of its proposition by reference principally to decisions concerning *249 statute of limitations issues in medical malpractice cases. 2 In general these decisions represent a corollary to the continuing treatment rule which we described in Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 698 , 501 A.2d 27, 31 (1985) as operating in the following fashion: “[I]f the treatment by the doctor is a continuing course and the patient’s disease or condition is of such a nature as to impose on the doctor a duty of continuing treatment and care, the statute does not commence 1986FM & I undertakes to demonstrate the validity of its proposition by reference principally to decisions concerning *249 statute of limitations issues in medical malpractice cases. 2 In general these decisions represent a corollary to the continuing treatment rule which we described in Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 698 , 501 A.2d 27, 31 (1985) as operating in the following fashion: “[I]f the treatment by the doctor is a continuing course and the patient’s disease or condition is of such a nature as to impose on the doctor a duty of continuing treatment and care, the statute does not commence | 1 | 1 |
Betty Jean Brown, a Minor, by Owen Walter Brown, Her Guardian Ad Litem, and Owen Walter Brown v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985More specifically, the reason for the rule, as set forth in Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir.1965), “is that one is presumed to repose confidence in the individual doctor to whom he entrusts his medical problems and that the confidential relationship excuses the making of inquiry which questions the care which has been or is being given during the existence of the relationship.” Where applicable, the continuing treatment rule simply tolls the statute of limitations by delaying the accrual date of undiscoverable medical malpractice until the termination of treatment. 1985More specifically, the reason for the rule, as set forth in Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir.1965), "is that one is presumed to repose confidence in the individual doctor to whom he entrusts his medical problems and that the confidential relationship excuses the making of inquiry which questions the care which has been or is being given during the existence of the relationship." Where applicable, the continuing treatment rule simply tolls the statute of limitations by delaying the accrual date of undiscoverable medical malpractice until the termination of treatment. | 1 | 1 |
Decker v. Finkgreen2 sentences1985The doctrine of continuing treatment provides that when there is a continuing course of treatment, the statute does not begin to run until the treatment is terminated, Decker v. Fink, 47 Md.App. 202, 209 [ 422 A.2d 389 ] (1980). 1985The doctrine of continuing treatment provides that when there is a continuing course of treatment, the statute does not begin to run until the treatment is terminated, Decker v. Fink, 47 Md.App. 202, 209 [ 422 A.2d 389 ] (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Shives v. Chamberlaingreen1 sentence1966See Shives v. Chamberlain (Ore.), 126 P. 2d 28 ; Hotelling v. Walther (Ore.), 130 P. 2d 944 ; Williams v. Elias (Neb.), 1 N. W. 2d 121 ; Peteler v. Robison (Utah), 17 P. 2d 244 ; Schmit v. Esser (Minn.), 236 N. W. 622 (ankle fracture); Thatcher v. DeTar (Mo.), 173 S. W. 2d 760 ; Hundley v. St. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Elias
green
1 sentence1966See Shives v. Chamberlain (Ore.), 126 P. 2d 28 ; Hotelling v. Walther (Ore.), 130 P. 2d 944 ; Williams v. Elias (Neb.), 1 N. W. 2d 121 ; Peteler v. Robison (Utah), 17 P. 2d 244 ; Schmit v. Esser (Minn.), 236 N. W. 622 (ankle fracture); Thatcher v. DeTar (Mo.), 173 S. W. 2d 760 ; Hundley v. St. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Schmit v. Esser
green
1 sentence1966See Shives v. Chamberlain (Ore.), 126 P. 2d 28 ; Hotelling v. Walther (Ore.), 130 P. 2d 944 ; Williams v. Elias (Neb.), 1 N. W. 2d 121 ; Peteler v. Robison (Utah), 17 P. 2d 244 ; Schmit v. Esser (Minn.), 236 N. W. 622 (ankle fracture); Thatcher v. DeTar (Mo.), 173 S. W. 2d 760 ; Hundley v. St. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Thatcher v. De Tar
green
1 sentence1966See Shives v. Chamberlain (Ore.), 126 P. 2d 28 ; Hotelling v. Walther (Ore.), 130 P. 2d 944 ; Williams v. Elias (Neb.), 1 N. W. 2d 121 ; Peteler v. Robison (Utah), 17 P. 2d 244 ; Schmit v. Esser (Minn.), 236 N. W. 622 (ankle fracture); Thatcher v. DeTar (Mo.), 173 S. W. 2d 760 ; Hundley v. St. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Peteler v. Robinson
green
1 sentence1966See Shives v. Chamberlain (Ore.), 126 P. 2d 28 ; Hotelling v. Walther (Ore.), 130 P. 2d 944 ; Williams v. Elias (Neb.), 1 N. W. 2d 121 ; Peteler v. Robison (Utah), 17 P. 2d 244 ; Schmit v. Esser (Minn.), 236 N. W. 622 (ankle fracture); Thatcher v. DeTar (Mo.), 173 S. W. 2d 760 ; Hundley v. St. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Hotelling v. Walther
green
1 sentence1966See Shives v. Chamberlain (Ore.), 126 P. 2d 28 ; Hotelling v. Walther (Ore.), 130 P. 2d 944 ; Williams v. Elias (Neb.), 1 N. W. 2d 121 ; Peteler v. Robison (Utah), 17 P. 2d 244 ; Schmit v. Esser (Minn.), 236 N. W. 622 (ankle fracture); Thatcher v. DeTar (Mo.), 173 S. W. 2d 760 ; Hundley v. St. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.