continuing treatment rule in Virginia

2011For instance, the circuit court relied on Baker v. Radiology Associates, P.A., 72 Ark.

2009The Court was also guided by the persuasive authority of Baker v. Radiology Associates, P.A., 72 Ark.

1996Meier v. Huntington Hosp., 588 N.Y.S.2d 421 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1992) (plaintiffs subsequent admissions as directed by her attending physician was a renewal rather than a continuation of the hospital-patient relationship); Rodrigo v. Brookdale Hosp., 599 N.Y.S.2d 626 (N.Y.

1994Meier v. Huntington Hosp., 588 N.Y.S.2d 421 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1992) (plaintiff’s subsequent admissions as directed by her attending physician was a renewal rather than a continuation of the hospital-patient relationship); Rodrigo v. Brookdale Hosp., 599 N.Y.S.2d 626 (N.Y.

1996Similarly, in Coakley v. Orr, 6 Va. Cir. 170 (Loudoun County 1984), the Court held that the relationship between a pharmacist and a customer did not justify application of the continuing treatment rule since the “pharmacist does not know whether he will ever see a particular customer again.” Id. at 172 .

1996Similarly, in Coakley v. Orr, 6 Va. Cir. 170 (Loudoun County 1984), the Court held that the relationship between a pharmacist and a customer did not justify application of the continuing treatment rule since the “pharmacist does not know whether he will ever see a particular customer again.” Id. at 172 .

1996The Plaintiff relies on Johnson v. Capital Area Permanente Group, 30 Va. Cir. 107 (Fairfax 1993), in which the court held that the continuing treatment rule was applicable to a medical testing service that performed tests misdiagnosing the Plaintiff as HIV-positive, but this court respectfully disagrees with the conclusion reached in that case.

1994The Plaintiff relies on Johnson v. Capital Area Permanente Group, 30 Va. Cir. 107 (Fairfax County 1993), in which the court held that the continuing treatment rule was applicable to a medical testing service that performed tests misdiagnosing the Plaintiff as HIV-positive, but this court respectfully disagrees with the conclusion reached in that case.

1979On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant’s regular “treatment of Farley up to the year 1976,... constituted continuing negligence and thus, Farley should be entitled to ... present her claim for full damages as a result of the cumulative effect thereof . . . .” She contends that her “case falls within the . . . rules of continuing treatment, or continuing negligence or continuing service ..., and that so far as her proofs will allow, [she should] have her damages determined from the time of initial negligence . . . .” Responding to that argument, defendant contends that to apply a continuing

1979On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant’s regular “treatment of Farley up to the year 1976,... constituted continuing negligence and thus, Farley should be entitled to ... present her claim for full damages as a result of the cumulative effect thereof . . . .” She contends that her “case falls within the . . . rules of continuing treatment, or continuing negligence or continuing service ..., and that so far as her proofs will allow, [she should] have her damages determined from the time of initial negligence . . . .” Responding to that argument, defendant contends that to apply a continuing

2002The Court quoted Schmil v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354 , 236 N.W. 622 (1931), agreeing that “[s]o long as the relation of physician and patient continues as to the particular injury or malady . .. and the physician continues to attend ... it cannot be said that the treatment has ceased.” Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 977 (1979).

2002The Court quoted Schmil v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354 , 236 N.W. 622 (1931), agreeing that “[s]o long as the relation of physician and patient continues as to the particular injury or malady . .. and the physician continues to attend ... it cannot be said that the treatment has ceased.” Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 977 (1979).

1987Even assuming that the parties oral agreement is unenforceable, the statute of limitations would not be a bar because the three year period should be measured from the last date of service under the continuing treatment rule of Wood v. Carwile, 231 Va. 320 , 343 S.E.2d 346 (1986).

1987Even assuming that the parties oral agreement is unenforceable, the statute of limitations would not be a bar because the three year period should be measured from the last date of service under the continuing treatment rule of Wood v. Carwile, 231 Va. 320 , 343 S.E.2d 346 (1986).

1979This conclusion was based on our language in Hawks in which we said, after deciding that the limitation there began at the time the wrong was committed, that: “There are cases to the contrary, fixing the discovery of damage or other events as the time when *981 the limitation begins, e.g., Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc., (W.Va.), 144 S.E.2d 156 ;____” 206 Va. at 814 , 146 S.E.2d at 189 (emphasis added by the court in Schlanger, 374 F.2d at 240 ).

1979But the only discussion in Morgan of any form of a continuing treatment rule came at one point in the opinion when the court in passing noted the “various exceptions to or qualifications of the rule that the period of limitation commences to run from the date of the act of malpractice rather than from the date of its discovery.” 149 W.Va. at 786 , 144 S.E.2d at 158 .

1979The court said that “it is just to the physician and surgeon that he may not be harassed by premature litigation instituted in order to save the right of the patient in the event there should be substantial malpractice.” 140 Neb. at 662 , 1 N.W.2d at 124 .

1979The court said that “it is just to the physician and surgeon that he may not be harassed by premature litigation instituted in order to save the right of the patient in the event there should be substantial malpractice.” 140 Neb. at 662 , 1 N.W.2d at 124 .

1979The court concluded that “Virginia would not, in an appropriate case, embrace the continuing treatment rule.” 374 F.2d at 240 .

1979Particularly is this so because the West Virginia Morgan case, which the Virginia case rejected, discussed, inter alia, the continuing treatment rule. 374 F.2d at 240 .

1979After citing several of their previous cases such as Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810 , 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966), Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 195 Va. 827 , 80 S.E.2d 574 (1954), and Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11 , 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969), the Virginia Supreme Court stated that none of these cases controlled its decision in the Farley case.

1979After citing several of their previous cases such as Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810 , 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966), Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 195 Va. 827 , 80 S.E.2d 574 (1954), and Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11 , 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969), the Virginia Supreme Court stated that none of these cases controlled its decision in the Farley case.