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6 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lester
green
2 sentences1995As this Court held in People v Lester, 406 Mich 252, 254-255 ; 277 NW2d 633 (1979): [W]hen . . . the defense theory is accidental homicide, the defense requests an instruction on the theory, and there is evidence to support the theory, the trial court must properly instruct the jury on the defense theory. [Citation omitted.] Because accident was a plausible defense theory that was supported by the evidence, it was error requiring reversal for the trial court to refuse to give the defendant’s requested instruction. 1995As this Court held in People v Lester, 406 Mich 252, 254-255 ; 277 NW2d 633 (1979): [W]hen . . . the defense theory is accidental homicide, the defense requests an instruction on the theory, and there is evidence to support the theory, the trial court must properly instruct the jury on the defense theory. [Citation omitted.] Because accident was a plausible defense theory that was supported by the evidence, it was error requiring reversal for the trial court to refuse to give the defendant’s requested instruction. | 3 | 1980–1995 |
People v. Perry
green
2 sentences2018Thus, while Judge BANDSTRA is correct that “[i]f defendant had been originally charged as an accessory after the fact in this case, the evidence adduced at trial would clearly have supported a guilty verdict with regard to that charge,” it does not follow that “[d]efendant was entitled to the requested instruction regarding accessory after the fact, and the trial court erred in failing to grant that request.” [People v Perry,] 218 Mich App [520, 551-552; 554 NW2d 362 (1996) (BANDSTRA, J., dissenting)]. [Perry, 460 Mich at 63-64 .] It is certainly true that where the evidence supports a particu 2018Thus, while Judge BANDSTRA is correct that “[i]f defendant had been originally charged as an accessory after the fact in this case, the evidence adduced at trial would clearly have supported a guilty verdict with regard to that charge,” it does not follow that “[d]efendant was entitled to the requested instruction regarding accessory after the fact, and the trial court erred in failing to grant that request.” [People v Perry,] 218 Mich App [520, 551-552; 554 NW2d 362 (1996) (BANDSTRA, J., dissenting)]. [Perry, 460 Mich at 63-64 .] It is certainly true that where the evidence supports a particu | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Perry
green
2 sentences2018Thus, while Judge BANDSTRA is correct that “[i]f defendant had been originally charged as an accessory after the fact in this case, the evidence adduced at trial would clearly have supported a guilty verdict with regard to that charge,” it does not follow that “[d]efendant was entitled to the requested instruction regarding accessory after the fact, and the trial court erred in failing to grant that request.” [People v Perry,] 218 Mich App [520, 551-552; 554 NW2d 362 (1996) (BANDSTRA, J., dissenting)]. [Perry, 460 Mich at 63-64 .] It is certainly true that where the evidence supports a particu 2018Thus, while Judge BANDSTRA is correct that “[i]f defendant had been originally charged as an accessory after the fact in this case, the evidence adduced at trial would clearly have supported a guilty verdict with regard to that charge,” it does not follow that “[d]efendant was entitled to the requested instruction regarding accessory after the fact, and the trial court erred in failing to grant that request.” [People v Perry,] 218 Mich App [520, 551-552; 554 NW2d 362 (1996) (BANDSTRA, J., dissenting)]. [Perry, 460 Mich at 63-64 .] It is certainly true that where the evidence supports a particu | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2018People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 472-473 ; 620 NW2d 13 (2000). 2018People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 472-473 ; 620 NW2d 13 (2000). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Hoskins
green
2 sentences1979People v Hoskins, 403 Mich 95 ; 267 NW2d 417 (1978). 1979People v Hoskins, 403 Mich 95 ; 267 NW2d 417 (1978). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.