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6 Michigan opinions name it 1 courts 2012–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2018For the reasons discussed below, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding neither his claims of trial court error nor his claim of ineffective assistance persuasive.4 Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered briefing on “whether a defendant’s failure to demonstrate plain error precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and, in particular, . . . whether the prejudice standard under the third prong of plain error . . . is the same as the Strickland [v Washington] prejudice standard . . . .”5 4 People v Randolph, unpublished per curi 2018For the reasons discussed below, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding neither his claims of trial court error nor his claim of ineffective assistance persuasive.4 Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered briefing on “whether a defendant’s failure to demonstrate plain error precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and, in particular, . . . whether the prejudice standard under the third prong of plain error . . . is the same as the Strickland [v Washington] prejudice standard . . . .”5 4 People v Randolph, unpublished per curi | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Dominguez Benitezgreen2 sentences2017See United States v Dominguez Benitez, 542 US 74, 83 (2004); People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515 , 537 n 16 (2011); People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 510 n 38 (2011). 2017See United States v Dominguez Benitez, 542 US 74, 83 (2004); People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515 , 537 n 16 (2011); People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 510 n 38 (2011). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Carinesgreen2 sentences2017The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether a defendant’s failure to demonstrate plain error precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and, in particular, (2) whether the prejudice standard under the third prong of plain error, People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764 (1999) (“affecting substantial rights”), is the same as the Strickland prejudice standard, Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694 (1984) (“reasonable probability” of a different outcome). 2017The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether a defendant’s failure to demonstrate plain error precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and, in particular, (2) whether the prejudice standard under the third prong of plain error, People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764 (1999) (“affecting substantial rights”), is the same as the Strickland prejudice standard, Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694 (1984) (“reasonable probability” of a different outcome). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Puckett v. United States
green
2 sentences2012For instance, the Court has repeatedly withheld judgment on whether a structural error automatically satisfies the third prong of plain-error analysis, Puckett v United States, 556 US 129, 140 ; 129 S Ct 1423 ; 173 L Ed 2d 266 (2009), implying that structural errors do not entirely defy plain-error analysis, even if they do defy harmless-error analysis. 2012For instance, the Court has repeatedly withheld judgment on whether a structural error automatically satisfies the third prong of plain-error analysis, Puckett v United States, 556 US 129, 140 ; 129 S Ct 1423 ; 173 L Ed 2d 266 (2009), implying that structural errors do not entirely defy plain-error analysis, even if they do defy harmless-error analysis. | 3 | 2012–2022 |
People v. Vaughn
green
2 sentences2022Further, this Court in Cain specifically rejected the majority opinion’s new burden- shifting framework, stating: The dissent’s theory that the structural nature of the error presumptively establishes the fourth prong is inconsistent with this Court’s recent holding in Vaughn, that even with regards to a structural error, a defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and that while any error that is structural is likely to have an effect on the fairness, integrity or public r 2022Further, this Court in Cain specifically rejected the majority opinion’s new burden- shifting framework, stating: The dissent’s theory that the structural nature of the error presumptively establishes the fourth prong is inconsistent with this Court’s recent holding in Vaughn, that even with regards to a structural error, a defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and that while any error that is structural is likely to have an effect on the fairness, integrity or public r | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2022Further, this Court in Cain specifically rejected the majority opinion’s new burden- shifting framework, stating: The dissent’s theory that the structural nature of the error presumptively establishes the fourth prong is inconsistent with this Court’s recent holding in Vaughn, that even with regards to a structural error, a defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and that while any error that is structural is likely to have an effect on the fairness, integrity or public r 2022Further, this Court in Cain specifically rejected the majority opinion’s new burden- shifting framework, stating: The dissent’s theory that the structural nature of the error presumptively establishes the fourth prong is inconsistent with this Court’s recent holding in Vaughn, that even with regards to a structural error, a defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and that while any error that is structural is likely to have an effect on the fairness, integrity or public r | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Weaver v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2022It means only that the government is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new trial by showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 17 As we stated in Vaughn, the Supreme Court of the United States “has expressly distinguished plain-error analysis from harmless-error analysis” by 16 See People v Davis, 507 Mich 853 (2021). 17 Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US ___ , ___; 137 S Ct 1899, 1910 ; 198 L Ed 2d 420 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added). 6 “repeatedly with[holding] judgment on whether a structural error automatically satisfies the third pro 2022It means only that the government is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new trial by showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 17 As we stated in Vaughn, the Supreme Court of the United States “has expressly distinguished plain-error analysis from harmless-error analysis” by 16 See People v Davis, 507 Mich 853 (2021). 17 Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US ___ , ___; 137 S Ct 1899, 1910 ; 198 L Ed 2d 420 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added). 6 “repeatedly with[holding] judgment on whether a structural error automatically satisfies the third pro | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Cain
green
2 sentences2022Further, this Court in Cain specifically rejected the majority opinion’s new burden- shifting framework, stating: The dissent’s theory that the structural nature of the error presumptively establishes the fourth prong is inconsistent with this Court’s recent holding in Vaughn, that even with regards to a structural error, a defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and that while any error that is structural is likely to have an effect on the fairness, integrity or public r 2022Further, this Court in Cain specifically rejected the majority opinion’s new burden- shifting framework, stating: The dissent’s theory that the structural nature of the error presumptively establishes the fourth prong is inconsistent with this Court’s recent holding in Vaughn, that even with regards to a structural error, a defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and that while any error that is structural is likely to have an effect on the fairness, integrity or public r | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Fackelman
green
2 sentences2017See United States v Dominguez Benitez, 542 US 74, 83 (2004); People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515 , 537 n 16 (2011); People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 510 n 38 (2011). 2017See United States v Dominguez Benitez, 542 US 74, 83 (2004); People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515 , 537 n 16 (2011); People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 510 n 38 (2011). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Kowalski
green
2 sentences2017See United States v Dominguez Benitez, 542 US 74, 83 (2004); People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515 , 537 n 16 (2011); People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 510 n 38 (2011). 2017See United States v Dominguez Benitez, 542 US 74, 83 (2004); People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515 , 537 n 16 (2011); People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488 , 510 n 38 (2011). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Duncan
green
2 sentences2012Nor does this Court’s opinion in People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47 ; 610 NW2d 551 (2000), compel the rule that the concurring justice would adopt. 2012Nor does this Court’s opinion in People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47 ; 610 NW2d 551 (2000), compel the rule that the concurring justice would adopt. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.