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6 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1894–1911 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
First National Bank v. Guardian Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1911As was held by our own Supreme Court, in First National Bank of Kansas City v. Guardian Trust Co., 187 Mo. 494 , 86 S. W. 109 , the defense of ultra vires should not, as a general rule prevail, whether interposed for or against a corporation, when it- would not advance justice, but on the contrary would accomplish a legal wrong; that the defense is never sustained out of regard for a defendant, but only where an imperative rule of public policy requires it; that a contract merely in excess of the power granted to a private corporation, but which is not expressly forbidden either by its charter 1911As was held by our own Supreme Court, in First National Bank of Kansas City v. Guardian Trust Co., 187 Mo. 494 , 86 S. W. 109 , the defense of ultra vires should not, as a general rule prevail, whether interposed for or against a corporation, when it- would not advance justice, but on the contrary would accomplish a legal wrong; that the defense is never sustained out of regard for a defendant, but only where an imperative rule of public policy requires it; that a contract merely in excess of the power granted to a private corporation, but which is not expressly forbidden either by its charter | 2 | 1905–1911 |
Matt v. Roman Catholic Mutual Protective Society
green
2 sentences1905Protective Soc., 70 Iowa 455 , 30 N. W. 799 .] The Supreme Court of Illinois said of an insurance contract: “Where the contract has been fully performed by the party contracting with the corporation, and the corporation has received the benefit's from such contract, it can not invoke the doctrine of ultra vires to defeat an action brought against it on such contract.” [Benefit Association v. Blue, 120 Ill. l. c. 128.] In the recent case of First National Bank of Kansas City v. Guardian Trust Company, 187 Mo. 494 , it was said that the defense of ultra vires is never sustained out of regard for 1905Protective Soc., 70 Iowa 455 , 30 N. W. 799 .] The Supreme Court of Illinois said of an insurance contract: “Where the contract has been fully performed by the party contracting with the corporation, and the corporation has received the benefit's from such contract, it can not invoke the doctrine of ultra vires to defeat an action brought against it on such contract.” [Benefit Association v. Blue, 120 Ill. l. c. 128.] In the recent case of First National Bank of Kansas City v. Guardian Trust Company, 187 Mo. 494 , it was said that the defense of ultra vires is never sustained out of regard for | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Union Trust Co. v. Provident Washington Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1904Co., 79 Mo. App. 362 .] There was, therefore, substantial evidence in justification of his refusal to make prompt payment of the accrued payment and having declined to continue the performance on his part by reason of the existing and continuing breach by appellant, he was excused and still entitled to recover as if for full performance, and the imperative instruction was properly rejected. 2. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Maguire v. St. Louis Transit Co.
neutral
2 sentences1904It was incumbent on defendant to stop the car for a period reasonably sufficient to afford plaintiff an opportunity to board the car, in the exercise of ordinary diligence on his part, with due regard to his evident advanced age and apparent physical infirmity, and the attempt made by him to get on the car under the circumstances detailed was not in itself conclusive of contributory negligence debarring recovery, but a question for the jury. [Maguire v. Transit Co., 103 Mo. App. 459 , 78 S. W. 838 ; Bertram v. Railway, 154 Mo. 639 , 55 S. W. 1040 .] Nor is plaintiff precluded from recovery by 1904It was incumbent on defendant to stop the car for a period reasonably sufficient to afford plaintiff an opportunity to board the car, in the exercise of ordinary diligence on his part, with due regard to his evident advanced age and apparent physical infirmity, and the attempt made by him to get on the car under the circumstances detailed was not in itself conclusive of contributory negligence debarring recovery, but a question for the jury. [Maguire v. Transit Co., 103 Mo. App. 459 , 78 S. W. 838 ; Bertram v. Railway, 154 Mo. 639 , 55 S. W. 1040 .] Nor is plaintiff precluded from recovery by | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Donohue v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1904It was incumbent on defendant to stop the car for a period reasonably sufficient to afford plaintiff an opportunity to board the car, in the exercise of ordinary diligence on his part, with due regard to his evident advanced age and apparent physical infirmity, and the attempt made by him to get on the car under the circumstances detailed was not in itself conclusive of contributory negligence debarring recovery, but a question for the jury. [Maguire v. Transit Co., 103 Mo. App. 459 , 78 S. W. 838 ; Bertram v. Railway, 154 Mo. 639 , 55 S. W. 1040 .] Nor is plaintiff precluded from recovery by | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Bertram v. Peoples Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1904It was incumbent on defendant to stop the car for a period reasonably sufficient to afford plaintiff an opportunity to board the car, in the exercise of ordinary diligence on his part, with due regard to his evident advanced age and apparent physical infirmity, and the attempt made by him to get on the car under the circumstances detailed was not in itself conclusive of contributory negligence debarring recovery, but a question for the jury. [Maguire v. Transit Co., 103 Mo. App. 459 , 78 S. W. 838 ; Bertram v. Railway, 154 Mo. 639 , 55 S. W. 1040 .] Nor is plaintiff precluded from recovery by 1904It was incumbent on defendant to stop the car for a period reasonably sufficient to afford plaintiff an opportunity to board the car, in the exercise of ordinary diligence on his part, with due regard to his evident advanced age and apparent physical infirmity, and the attempt made by him to get on the car under the circumstances detailed was not in itself conclusive of contributory negligence debarring recovery, but a question for the jury. [Maguire v. Transit Co., 103 Mo. App. 459 , 78 S. W. 838 ; Bertram v. Railway, 154 Mo. 639 , 55 S. W. 1040 .] Nor is plaintiff precluded from recovery by | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Buckley v. Kansas City
neutral
1 sentence1903Buckley v. Kansas City, 156 Mo. 16 ; Young v. Webb City, 150 Mo. 333 . 2. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Young v. City of Webb City
green
1 sentence1903Buckley v. Kansas City, 156 Mo. 16 ; Young v. Webb City, 150 Mo. 333 . 2. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
O'Reilly v. Nicholson
neutral
1 sentence1894Tivmer v. Babb, 60 Mo. 342 ; O’Reiley v. Nicholson, 45 Mo. 160 . | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Turner v. Babb
neutral
1 sentence1894Tivmer v. Babb, 60 Mo. 342 ; O’Reiley v. Nicholson, 45 Mo. 160 . | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.