substantially doctrine (Missouri) · Go Syfert
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substantially doctrine in Missouri

8 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1874–1980 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Durenred
mo · 1977 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
1 sentence

1980In State v. Duren, supra at p. 20, it was stated: “ * * * severance is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court directed toward achieving a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense charged.

11
United States v. Louis K. Bohrgreen
ca8 · 1978 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
1 sentence

1980However, in considering the application of the Federal Rule in United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1978), the court stated that “A motion to sever is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” and the task of the appellate court is to determine whether denial of such a motion “resulted in clear prejudice.” We consider this to be substantially the rule in Missouri.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Fones v. Murdock green
or · 1916
1 sentence

1917The conclusion reached by the court in that case, in bur opinion, does, to a great extent, as that court said, seem ‘ to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the authorities, and states the rule which we think to be well grounded in reason, fair and just to both parties, and consistent with the principle on which the action for malicious prosecution is founded.’ ” [112 Va. l. c. 441.] This luminous and logical statement of the law after a review of all the authorities, is followed in Haddad v. Railroad, 88 S. E. 1038 , and Fones v. Murdock, 80 Ore. 340 — all rendered in 1916.

11917–1917
Haddad v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. green
wva · 1916
1 sentence

1917The conclusion reached by the court in that case, in bur opinion, does, to a great extent, as that court said, seem ‘ to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the authorities, and states the rule which we think to be well grounded in reason, fair and just to both parties, and consistent with the principle on which the action for malicious prosecution is founded.’ ” [112 Va. l. c. 441.] This luminous and logical statement of the law after a review of all the authorities, is followed in Haddad v. Railroad, 88 S. E. 1038 , and Fones v. Murdock, 80 Ore. 340 — all rendered in 1916.

11917–1917
State v. Walton green
mo · 1881
1 sentence

1905S. 1899).] Opinions formed, but not of a fixed character, and which readily yield to evidence, do not disqualify the juror. [State v. Walton, 74 Mo. 270 .] If he have such a bias or prejudice against a class of cases that his judgment will he warped, then he should he set aside and not accepted as a juror; but it ought to appear that his bias is such as to influence his judgment.

11905–1905
State v. Nueslein green
mo · 1857
1 sentence

1901If you have a reasonable doubt of his guilt you should acquit him, but a doubt, to authorize an acquittal on that ground, should be a substantial doubt founded upon the evidence and not a mere possibility of innocence.” This is substantially the instruction given in State v. Nueslein, 25 Mo. 111 , which has been so often comm ended by this court.

11901–1901
Thomas v. Davis neutral
mo · 1882
1 sentence

1891Thomas v. Davis, 76 Mo. 72 .

11891–1891
Foltz v. Wert green
ind · 1885
1 sentence

1890This is substantially the doctrine of the supreme courts of the states of Indiana (Peck v. Williams, 113 Ind. 256 ; Foltz v. Wert, 103 Ind. 404 ), Pennsylvania (McCand less’ Appeal, 98 Pa. St. 489) and New York (Scott v. Guernsey, 48 N. Y. 106 ).

11890–1890
Peck v. Williams green
ind · 1888
2 sentences

1890In the case of Peck v. Williams, supra, the plaintiff and one John A. Dyer were tenants in common of certain real estate.

1890This is substantially the doctrine of the supreme courts of the states of Indiana (Peck v. Williams, 113 Ind. 256 ; Foltz v. Wert, 103 Ind. 404 ), Pennsylvania (McCand less’ Appeal, 98 Pa. St. 489) and New York (Scott v. Guernsey, 48 N. Y. 106 ).

11890–1890
Scott v. . Guernsey green
ny · 1871
1 sentence

1890This is substantially the doctrine of the supreme courts of the states of Indiana (Peck v. Williams, 113 Ind. 256 ; Foltz v. Wert, 103 Ind. 404 ), Pennsylvania (McCand less’ Appeal, 98 Pa. St. 489) and New York (Scott v. Guernsey, 48 N. Y. 106 ).

11890–1890
Nicholson v. Walker neutral
moctapp · 1887
1 sentence

1890This is substantially the principle, on which the decisions in Ridge v. Olmstead, 73 Mo. 578 , and in Nicholson v. Walker, 25 Mo. App. 368 , rest.

11890–1890
Ridge v. Olmstead neutral
mo · 1881
1 sentence

1890This is substantially the principle, on which the decisions in Ridge v. Olmstead, 73 Mo. 578 , and in Nicholson v. Walker, 25 Mo. App. 368 , rest.

11890–1890
Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co. neutral
mo · 1869
1 sentence

1874Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 Mo., 380 .

11874–1874

Where else courts name it

NY 11 (1848–1909) MO 8 (1874–1980) PA 7 (1873–2014) IN 6 (1881–1887) IL 5 (1877–1981) WI 5 (1874–1962) TX 4 (1900–1985) KS 4 (1910–1970) MN 3 (1897–1921) CA 3 (1898–1979) OR 3 (1921–1959) SD 3 (1894–2008) NE 3 (1895–1962) VT 3 (1844–1869) AL 2 (1911–1916) AR 2 (1907–1952) VA 2 (1905–1905) MD 2 (1912–1928) CO 2 (1898–1898) NJ 2 (1977–1981) TN 2 (1907–1957)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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