doubtful claim in Mississippi

2011On July 21, 2008, the Guardians, with new counsel, filed a petition to set aside the settlement under "Rule 60(b)." They argued that the settlement agreement was no longer in the child's best interest under J & J Timber Co. v. Broome, 932 So.2d 1 (Miss.2006), which held that settlement with a tortfeasor precluded recovery against the tortfeasor's employer under a theory of vicarious liability. [5] But the Guardians abandoned this argument after this Court decided Whitaker v. T & M Foods, 7 So.3d 893 (Miss. 2009), which held that the retroactive application of J & J Timber to the releases at is

2011On July 21, 2008, the Guardians, with new counsel, filed a petition to set aside the settlement under “Rule 60(b).” They argued that the settlement agreement was no longer in the child’s best interest under J & J Timber Co. v. Broome, 932 So.2d 1 (Miss.2006), which held that settlement with a tortfeasor precluded recovery against the tortfeasor’s employer under a theory of vicarious liability. 5 But the Guardians abandoned this argument after this Court decided Whitaker v. T & M Foods, 7 So.3d 893 (Miss.2009), which held that the retroactive application of J & J Timber to the releases at issue

2011Id. at 634 .

2011Id. at 634 .

2011On July 21, 2008, the Guardians, with new counsel, filed a petition to set aside the settlement under "Rule 60(b)." They argued that the settlement agreement was no longer in the child's best interest under J & J Timber Co. v. Broome, 932 So.2d 1 (Miss.2006), which held that settlement with a tortfeasor precluded recovery against the tortfeasor's employer under a theory of vicarious liability. [5] But the Guardians abandoned this argument after this Court decided Whitaker v. T & M Foods, 7 So.3d 893 (Miss. 2009), which held that the retroactive application of J & J Timber to the releases at is

2011On July 21, 2008, the Guardians, with new counsel, filed a petition to set aside the settlement under “Rule 60(b).” They argued that the settlement agreement was no longer in the child’s best interest under J & J Timber Co. v. Broome, 932 So.2d 1 (Miss.2006), which held that settlement with a tortfeasor precluded recovery against the tortfeasor’s employer under a theory of vicarious liability. 5 But the Guardians abandoned this argument after this Court decided Whitaker v. T & M Foods, 7 So.3d 893 (Miss.2009), which held that the retroactive application of J & J Timber to the releases at issue

1974Since the decree of the chancellor must be reversed on the first ground, we do not find it necessary to reach the second ground because the requirements for an evidentiary hearing to settle doubtful claims are set forth in Estate of Jones v. Culley, 242 Miss. 822 , 134 So.2d 723 (1961) and Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816 , 138 So. 593 (1932).

1974Since the decree of the chancellor must be reversed on the first ground, we do not find it necessary to reach the second ground because the requirements for an evidentiary hearing to settle doubtful claims are set forth in Estate of Jones v. Culley, 242 Miss. 822 , 134 So.2d 723 (1961) and Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816 , 138 So. 593 (1932).

1974Since the decree of the chancellor must be reversed on the first ground, we do not find it necessary to reach the second ground because the requirements for an evidentiary hearing to settle doubtful claims are set forth in Estate of Jones v. Culley, 242 Miss. 822 , 134 So.2d 723 (1961) and Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816 , 138 So. 593 (1932).

1974Since the decree of the chancellor must be reversed on the first ground, we do not find it necessary to reach the second ground because the requirements for an evidentiary hearing to settle doubtful claims are set forth in Estate of Jones v. Culley, 242 Miss. 822 , 134 So.2d 723 (1961) and Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816 , 138 So. 593 (1932).

1950A similar contention was rejected by this Court in the case of Daniels v. Jordan, 161 Miss. 78 , 134 So. 903, 904 , in which the facts presented were very similar to the facts that we have before us.

1950A similar contention was rejected by this Court in the case of Daniels v. Jordan, 161 Miss. 78 , 134 So. 903, 904 , in which the facts presented were very similar to the facts that we have before us.

1939See Boone v. Boone, 58 Miss. 820 ; Stanley v. Sumrall, 167 Miss. 714 , 147 So. 786 .

1939See Boone v. Boone, 58 Miss. 820 ; Stanley v. Sumrall, 167 Miss. 714 , 147 So. 786 .

1930In the case of Gunter v Henderson Molpus Co., 149 Miss. 603 , 115 So. 720 , it was held that a guardian may be empowered to compromise and settle his ward’s claim, or right of action, for damages on the same proceedings, and under the same circumstances prescribed in reference to the compromise by an administrator of claims belonging to the estate of a deceased person, and the statute granting the chancery court power to authorize administrators to compromise claims belonging to the estate, which could not be readily collected, was discussed, and the conclusion was reached that the chancery co

1930In the case of Gunter v Henderson Molpus Co., 149 Miss. 603 , 115 So. 720 , it was held that a guardian may be empowered to compromise and settle his ward’s claim, or right of action, for damages on the same proceedings, and under the same circumstances prescribed in reference to the compromise by an administrator of claims belonging to the estate of a deceased person, and the statute granting the chancery court power to authorize administrators to compromise claims belonging to the estate, which could not be readily collected, was discussed, and the conclusion was reached that the chancery co

1930In the case of Gunter v Henderson Molpus Co., 149 Miss. 603 , 115 So. 720 , it was held that a guardian may be empowered to compromise and settle his ward’s claim, or right of action, for damages on the same proceedings, and under the same circumstances prescribed in reference to the compromise by an administrator of claims belonging to the estate of a deceased person, and the statute granting the chancery court power to authorize administrators to compromise claims belonging to the estate, which could not be readily collected, was discussed, and the conclusion was reached that the chancery co

1930In the case of Gunter v Henderson Molpus Co., 149 Miss. 603 , 115 So. 720 , it was held that a guardian may be empowered to compromise and settle his ward’s claim, or right of action, for damages on the same proceedings, and under the same circumstances prescribed in reference to the compromise by an administrator of claims belonging to the estate of a deceased person, and the statute granting the chancery court power to authorize administrators to compromise claims belonging to the estate, which could not be readily collected, was discussed, and the conclusion was reached that the chancery co