date of the evidentiary hearing in Virginia

1998In Mitchell, 4 Va.App. at 118, 355 S.E.2d at 21 , a pre-amendment case, this Court held that the trial court should generally value assets as of the date of the evidentiary hearing and not as of the date of separation, because “the date of trial will usually be the most current and accurate value available.” Following the 1988 statutory amendment, we held in Gaynor v. Hird, 11 Va.App. 588 , 593 n. 1, 400 S.E.2d 788 , 791 *271 n. 1 (1991), that “the 1988 amendments to Code § 20-107.3(A) codified the rule announced in Mitchell.” The adoption of the statutory rule fixing the evidentiary hearing a

1998In Mitchell, 4 Va.App. at 118, 355 S.E.2d at 21 , a pre-amendment case, this Court held that the trial court should generally value assets as of the date of the evidentiary hearing and not as of the date of separation, because “the date of trial will usually be the most current and accurate value available.” Following the 1988 statutory amendment, we held in Gaynor v. Hird, 11 Va.App. 588 , 593 n. 1, 400 S.E.2d 788 , 791 *271 n. 1 (1991), that “the 1988 amendments to Code § 20-107.3(A) codified the rule announced in Mitchell.” The adoption of the statutory rule fixing the evidentiary hearing a

2020“If the party is unable to offer sufficient proof, the court must value the property at a date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing so as to achieve an equitable result.” Id. at 587 (emphasizing that “the burden is on the party who last had the funds” to establish proper purpose); see also Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 28 (1988) (“[E]quity can only be accomplished if the party who last had the funds is held accountable for them.”). - 16 - In Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 402 (1992), husband was similarly the party who last had the funds, so he had to establish that the funds we

2020“If the party is unable to offer sufficient proof, the court must value the property at a date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing so as to achieve an equitable result.” Id. at 587 (emphasizing that “the burden is on the party who last had the funds” to establish proper purpose); see also Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 28 (1988) (“[E]quity can only be accomplished if the party who last had the funds is held accountable for them.”). - 16 - In Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 402 (1992), husband was similarly the party who last had the funds, so he had to establish that the funds we

1998In Mitchell, 4 Va.App. at 118, 355 S.E.2d at 21 , a pre-amendment case, this Court held that the trial court should generally value assets as of the date of the evidentiary hearing and not as of the date of separation, because “the date of trial will usually be the most current and accurate value available.” Following the 1988 statutory amendment, we held in Gaynor v. Hird, 11 Va.App. 588 , 593 n. 1, 400 S.E.2d 788 , 791 *271 n. 1 (1991), that “the 1988 amendments to Code § 20-107.3(A) codified the rule announced in Mitchell.” The adoption of the statutory rule fixing the evidentiary hearing a

1998In Mitchell, 4 Va.App. at 118, 355 S.E.2d at 21 , a pre-amendment case, this Court held that the trial court should generally value assets as of the date of the evidentiary hearing and not as of the date of separation, because “the date of trial will usually be the most current and accurate value available.” Following the 1988 statutory amendment, we held in Gaynor v. Hird, 11 Va.App. 588 , 593 n. 1, 400 S.E.2d 788 , 791 *271 n. 1 (1991), that “the 1988 amendments to Code § 20-107.3(A) codified the rule announced in Mitchell.” The adoption of the statutory rule fixing the evidentiary hearing a

2004Rowe v. Rowe, 33 Va. App. 250, 263-64 , 532 S.E.2d 908, 915 (2000). -4- Here, wife moved the court to value her practice as of the date of the parties’ separation, November 19, 1999, rather than the date of the evidentiary hearing, held two years later on November 20, 2001.2 Thus, pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(A), she bore the burden of establishing good cause for her request.

2004Rowe v. Rowe, 33 Va. App. 250, 263-64 , 532 S.E.2d 908, 915 (2000). -4- Here, wife moved the court to value her practice as of the date of the parties’ separation, November 19, 1999, rather than the date of the evidentiary hearing, held two years later on November 20, 2001.2 Thus, pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(A), she bore the burden of establishing good cause for her request.

2005See Kaufman v. Kaufman, 7 Va. App. 488, 499-500 , 375 S.E.2d 374, 380 (1988).

2005See Kaufman v. Kaufman, 7 Va. App. 488, 499-500 , 375 S.E.2d 374, 380 (1988).

2011“Code § 20-107.3(A) directs that the trial court value all property of the parties, but it does not define the term, ‘value,’ for equitable distribution purposes.” Howell v. Howell, 31 Va. App. 332, 338 , 523 S.E.2d 514, 518 (2000). - 15 - The court shall determine the value of any such property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the evaluation issue.

2011“Code § 20-107.3(A) directs that the trial court value all property of the parties, but it does not define the term, ‘value,’ for equitable distribution purposes.” Howell v. Howell, 31 Va. App. 332, 338 , 523 S.E.2d 514, 518 (2000). - 15 - The court shall determine the value of any such property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the evaluation issue.

2022Corp. v. Kiritsis, 281 Va. 384, 392 (2011)), and thus, we will disturb that determination only if it is not “supported by evidence in the record[,]” id. (quoting Stephens v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 157, 163 (2007)).

2022Corp. v. Kiritsis, 281 Va. 384, 392 (2011)), and thus, we will disturb that determination only if it is not “supported by evidence in the record[,]” id. (quoting Stephens v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 157, 163 (2007)).

2022Corp. v. Kiritsis, 281 Va. 384, 392 (2011)), and thus, we will disturb that determination only if it is not “supported by evidence in the record[,]” id. (quoting Stephens v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 157, 163 (2007)).

2013Corp. v. Kiritsis, 281 Va. 384, 392 , 707 S.E.2d 820, 824 (2011) (citing Stephens v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 157, 162 , 645 S.E.2d 276, 278 (2007)); see also, e.g., Emrich v. Emrich, 9 Va.App. 288, 292 , 387 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1989). “[A] circuit court’s determination” on the presence or absence of good cause “must be supported by evidence in the record.” Stephens, 274 Va. at 163 , 645 S.E.2d at 278 ; see Goodhand v. Kildoo, 37 Va.App. 591, 599 , 560 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2002) (explaining that, “when a court hears evidence at an ore tenus hearing, its decision is entitled to great weight and will not

2025“A trial court has broad discretion to determine the value of assets,” so long as the valuation is not based on “mere guesswork.” Hoebelheinrich v. Hoebelheinrich, 43 Va. App. 543, 556 (2004); Bosserman v. Bosserman, 9 Va. App. 1, 5 (1989). “[T]he particular method of valuing and the precise application of that method to the singular facts of the case must vary with the myriad situations that exist among married couples.” Howell v. Howell, 31 Va. App. 332, 339 (2000).

2023The trial court’s valuation cannot be based on “mere guesswork.”’” Stratton v. Stratton, 16 Va. App. 878, 883 (1993) (quoting Bosserman v. Bosserman, 9 Va. App. 1, 5 (1989)).

2017If the party is unable to offer sufficient proof, the court must value the property at a date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing so as to achieve an equitable result. -7- Id. at 587 , 397 S.E.2d at 261 (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 29 Va. App. 673, 694-95 , 514 S.E.2d 369, 380 (1999) (“As husband . . . withdrew the marital funds at issue and put them into an account under his sole dominion and control, husband had the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the funds were used for a proper purpose.”).

2017If the party is unable to offer sufficient proof, the court must value the property at a date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing so as to achieve an equitable result. -7- Id. at 587 , 397 S.E.2d at 261 (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 29 Va. App. 673, 694-95 , 514 S.E.2d 369, 380 (1999) (“As husband . . . withdrew the marital funds at issue and put them into an account under his sole dominion and control, husband had the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the funds were used for a proper purpose.”).

2020“If the party is unable to offer sufficient proof, the court must value the property at a date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing so as to achieve an equitable result.” Id. at 587 (emphasizing that “the burden is on the party who last had the funds” to establish proper purpose); see also Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 28 (1988) (“[E]quity can only be accomplished if the party who last had the funds is held accountable for them.”). - 16 - In Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 402 (1992), husband was similarly the party who last had the funds, so he had to establish that the funds we

2020“If the party is unable to offer sufficient proof, the court must value the property at a date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing so as to achieve an equitable result.” Id. at 587 (emphasizing that “the burden is on the party who last had the funds” to establish proper purpose); see also Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 28 (1988) (“[E]quity can only be accomplished if the party who last had the funds is held accountable for them.”). - 16 - In Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 402 (1992), husband was similarly the party who last had the funds, so he had to establish that the funds we

2020“If the party is unable to offer sufficient proof, the court must value the property at a date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing so as to achieve an equitable result.” Id. at 587 (emphasizing that “the burden is on the party who last had the funds” to establish proper purpose); see also Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 28 (1988) (“[E]quity can only be accomplished if the party who last had the funds is held accountable for them.”). - 16 - In Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 402 (1992), husband was similarly the party who last had the funds, so he had to establish that the funds we

2020“If the party is unable to offer sufficient proof, the court must value the property at a date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing so as to achieve an equitable result.” Id. at 587 (emphasizing that “the burden is on the party who last had the funds” to establish proper purpose); see also Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 28 (1988) (“[E]quity can only be accomplished if the party who last had the funds is held accountable for them.”). - 16 - In Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 402 (1992), husband was similarly the party who last had the funds, so he had to establish that the funds we

2013Corp. v. Kiritsis, 281 Va. 384, 392 , 707 S.E.2d 820, 824 (2011) (citing Stephens v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 157, 162 , 645 S.E.2d 276, 278 (2007)); see also, e.g., Emrich v. Emrich, 9 Va.App. 288, 292 , 387 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1989). “[A] circuit court’s determination” on the presence or absence of good cause “must be supported by evidence in the record.” Stephens, 274 Va. at 163 , 645 S.E.2d at 278 ; see Goodhand v. Kildoo, 37 Va.App. 591, 599 , 560 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2002) (explaining that, “when a court hears evidence at an ore tenus hearing, its decision is entitled to great weight and will not

2013Corp. v. Kiritsis, 281 Va. 384, 392 , 707 S.E.2d 820, 824 (2011) (citing Stephens v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 157, 162 , 645 S.E.2d 276, 278 (2007)); see also, e.g., Emrich v. Emrich, 9 Va.App. 288, 292 , 387 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1989). “[A] circuit court’s determination” on the presence or absence of good cause “must be supported by evidence in the record.” Stephens, 274 Va. at 163 , 645 S.E.2d at 278 ; see Goodhand v. Kildoo, 37 Va.App. 591, 599 , 560 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2002) (explaining that, “when a court hears evidence at an ore tenus hearing, its decision is entitled to great weight and will not

2000"We have stressed that the trial judge in evaluating marital property should select a valuation 'that will provide the Court with the most current and accurate information available which avoids inequitable results.'" Gaynor v. Hird, 11 Va. App. 588, 593 , 400 S.E.2d 788, 790-91 (1991) (quoting Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 118 , 355 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1987)); see also Wagner v. Wagner, 16 Va. App. 529, 531 , 431 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1993) (en banc) (stating that "the reasons for re-valuation on remand are the same as in the original hearing -- to obtain the most accurate valuation and equitable

2000"We have stressed that the trial judge in evaluating marital property should select a valuation 'that will provide the Court with the most current and accurate information available which avoids inequitable results.'" Gaynor v. Hird, 11 Va. App. 588, 593 , 400 S.E.2d 788, 790-91 (1991) (quoting Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 118 , 355 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1987)); see also Wagner v. Wagner, 16 Va. App. 529, 531 , 431 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1993) (en banc) (stating that "the reasons for re-valuation on remand are the same as in the original hearing -- to obtain the most accurate valuation and equitable

1990Although the court may utilize a valuation date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing when the equities of the case demand it, see Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 232, 355 S.E.2d 905, 910 (1987), on this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to value these accounts at the time of the evidentiary hearing.

1990Although the court may utilize a valuation date other than the date of the evidentiary hearing when the equities of the case demand it, see Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 232, 355 S.E.2d 905, 910 (1987), on this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to value these accounts at the time of the evidentiary hearing.

1989Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 118, 355 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1987); see also Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 406, 358 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1987); but see Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 232 n.6, 355 S.E.2d 905 , 909-10 n.6 (1987). 1 Our review of the record indicates, however, that the wife at no time requested the trial judge to use the date of the evidentiary hearing as the date for valuation of the marital assets.

1989Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 118, 355 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1987); see also Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 406, 358 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1987); but see Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 232 n.6, 355 S.E.2d 905 , 909-10 n.6 (1987). 1 Our review of the record indicates, however, that the wife at no time requested the trial judge to use the date of the evidentiary hearing as the date for valuation of the marital assets.

2025“A trial court has broad discretion to determine the value of assets,” so long as the valuation is not based on “mere guesswork.” Hoebelheinrich v. Hoebelheinrich, 43 Va. App. 543, 556 (2004); Bosserman v. Bosserman, 9 Va. App. 1, 5 (1989). “[T]he particular method of valuing and the precise application of that method to the singular facts of the case must vary with the myriad situations that exist among married couples.” Howell v. Howell, 31 Va. App. 332, 339 (2000).

2023The trial court’s valuation cannot be based on “mere guesswork.”’” Stratton v. Stratton, 16 Va. App. 878, 883 (1993) (quoting Bosserman v. Bosserman, 9 Va. App. 1, 5 (1989)).

2021Code § 20-107.3 addresses equitable distribution of marital property and requires a court to “determine the value of any such property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the evaluation issue” unless “for good cause shown, in order to attain the ends of justice, [the court] order[s] that a different valuation date be used.” Code § 20-107.3(A). “[W]e review the court’s determination of a valuation date for abuse of discretion.” Wright, 61 Va. App. at 463 (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 40 Va. App. 639, 647 (2003)).

2020See also Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 Va. App. 264, 270-71 (1998).

2018See Rickman v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 531, 537 , 808 S.E.2d 395, 398 (2017) (explaining that both mandatory and directory statutes use the word “shall”).

2018See Rickman v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 531, 537 , 808 S.E.2d 395, 398 (2017) (explaining that both mandatory and directory statutes use the word “shall”).

2018See Code § 20-107.3(A); Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 617 , 359 S.E.2d 546, 550 (1987). - 10 - determine “the extent to which such debt has increased or decreased from the date of separation until the date of the evidentiary hearing.” Id.5 We are called upon to decide if the provision in Code § 20-107.3(A) that the court value debts of divorcing parties is mandatory or directory.

2018See Code § 20-107.3(A); Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 617 , 359 S.E.2d 546, 550 (1987). - 10 - determine “the extent to which such debt has increased or decreased from the date of separation until the date of the evidentiary hearing.” Id.5 We are called upon to decide if the provision in Code § 20-107.3(A) that the court value debts of divorcing parties is mandatory or directory.

2018Pursuant to Gilliam v. McGrady, 279 Va. 703, 710 , 691 S.E.2d 797, 800 (2010), we recognize that no presumption exists with respect to the classification of debts incurred by spouses during marriage, individually or jointly.

2018Pursuant to Gilliam v. McGrady, 279 Va. 703, 710 , 691 S.E.2d 797, 800 (2010), we recognize that no presumption exists with respect to the classification of debts incurred by spouses during marriage, individually or jointly.

2017“The value of property is an issue of fact, not of law [and] we are bound by this finding on appeal, unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Patel v. Patel, 61 Va. App. 714, 722 , 740 S.E.2d 35, 39 (2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2017“The value of property is an issue of fact, not of law [and] we are bound by this finding on appeal, unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Patel v. Patel, 61 Va. App. 714, 722 , 740 S.E.2d 35, 39 (2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2016In Virginia, “no decree of equitable distribution can be made before the parties are divorced.” Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 124 , 336 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1985) (emphasis in original).

2016In Virginia, “no decree of equitable distribution can be made before the parties are divorced.” Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 124 , 336 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1985) (emphasis in original).

2016“General principles for the valuation and division of property in equitable distribution proceedings also apply to the valuation and division of retirement benefits, including the principle that ‘[t]he court shall determine the value of any such property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the evaluation issue.’” Cusack v. Cusack, 53 Va. App. 315, 320 , 671 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2009) (quoting Code § 20-107.3(A)).

2016“General principles for the valuation and division of property in equitable distribution proceedings also apply to the valuation and division of retirement benefits, including the principle that ‘[t]he court shall determine the value of any such property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the evaluation issue.’” Cusack v. Cusack, 53 Va. App. 315, 320 , 671 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2009) (quoting Code § 20-107.3(A)).

2014Considering the separate subsections of Code § 20-107.3 together, we hold that when ordering reimbursement of *87 contributed separate property under subsection (A)(3)(g), a court shall determine the value of the contributed property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing. 2 See, e.g., Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 498 , 621 S.E.2d 48, 53 (2005) (construing together subsections A and B of Code § 8.01-581.18); Hart v. Hart, 27 Va.App. 46, 66 , 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (1998) (holding that in determining the value of a party’s non-marital contribution to hybrid property under Code § 20-107.3(A)(

2014Considering the separate subsections of Code § 20-107.3 together, we hold that when ordering reimbursement of *87 contributed separate property under subsection (A)(3)(g), a court shall determine the value of the contributed property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing. 2 See, e.g., Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 498 , 621 S.E.2d 48, 53 (2005) (construing together subsections A and B of Code § 8.01-581.18); Hart v. Hart, 27 Va.App. 46, 66 , 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (1998) (holding that in determining the value of a party’s non-marital contribution to hybrid property under Code § 20-107.3(A)(

2014Considering the separate subsections of Code § 20-107.3 together, we hold that when ordering reimbursement of *87 contributed separate property under subsection (A)(3)(g), a court shall determine the value of the contributed property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing. 2 See, e.g., Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 498 , 621 S.E.2d 48, 53 (2005) (construing together subsections A and B of Code § 8.01-581.18); Hart v. Hart, 27 Va.App. 46, 66 , 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (1998) (holding that in determining the value of a party’s non-marital contribution to hybrid property under Code § 20-107.3(A)(

2014Considering the separate subsections of Code § 20-107.3 together, we hold that when ordering reimbursement of *87 contributed separate property under subsection (A)(3)(g), a court shall determine the value of the contributed property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing. 2 See, e.g., Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 498 , 621 S.E.2d 48, 53 (2005) (construing together subsections A and B of Code § 8.01-581.18); Hart v. Hart, 27 Va.App. 46, 66 , 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (1998) (holding that in determining the value of a party’s non-marital contribution to hybrid property under Code § 20-107.3(A)(