labeling claim in California

2017Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 .) We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) “If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.]” (Hylton, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272 .)

2017Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 .) We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) “If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.]” (Hylton, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272 .)

2017A. Wayans’s burden In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, “ ‘we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiffs cause of action [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiffs claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activit

2017A. WAYANS’S BURDEN In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, “ ‘we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . . .” . . . [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’’ [Citation.] If the core injury- producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions t

2021Thus, “it is the defendant’s burden in an anti-SLAPP motion to initially show the suit is within the class of suits subject to a motion to strike under section 425.16.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 186 , citing Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 .) In examining the complaint to ascertain whether it seeks to chill protected activity, “ ‘ “we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead ‘examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . .’ . . . .

2016(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90-92 .) Accordingly, we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead ‘examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies’ and whether the trial court correctly ruled on the anti-SLAPP motion. [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury- 7 producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) If the core injury-producing con

2021Thus, “it is the defendant’s burden in an anti-SLAPP motion to initially show the suit is within the class of suits subject to a motion to strike under section 425.16.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 186 , citing Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 .) In examining the complaint to ascertain whether it seeks to chill protected activity, “ ‘ “we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead ‘examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . .’ . . . .

2016(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90-92 .) Accordingly, we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead ‘examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies’ and whether the trial court correctly ruled on the anti-SLAPP motion. [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury- 7 producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) If the core injury-producing con

2017A. Wayans’s burden In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, “ ‘we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiffs cause of action [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiffs claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activit

2017A. WAYANS’S BURDEN In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, “ ‘we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . . .” . . . [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’’ [Citation.] If the core injury- producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions t

2015(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90-92 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 ] (Navellier).) Accordingly, we disregard the labeling of the claim (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 522 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 381 ]) and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies” and whether the trial court correctly ruled on the anti-SLAPP motion (id. at pp. 519-522).

2015(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90-92 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 ] (Navellier).) Accordingly, we disregard the labeling of the claim (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 522 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 381 ]) and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies” and whether the trial court correctly ruled on the anti-SLAPP motion (id. at pp. 519-522).

2021It does not, however, pre-empt any state rules that are fully consistent with federal requirements.”8 (Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 452 , fn. omitted.) Cases interpreting the PPIA have acknowledged the identical distinction.

2021Instead, she argues that her claim falls under the concurrent jurisdiction provision of the PPIA’s preemption clause, by citing to cases discussing concurrent jurisdiction under other statutes.7 (See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) 544 U.S. 431, 434 [the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA] did not preempt equivalent state labeling laws; only state laws that were “in addition to or different from” the federal labeling and packaging rules were preempted]; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470 [same test under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976]; Quesa

2017(Ibid.; Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 143 [writer's use of plaintiffs' names in draft script of television show is protected activity because it helped to advance or assist in creating, casting, and broadcasting a television show]; Lieberman, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 31 164 [allegedly unlawful newsgathering technique was protected activity because it aided in the reporting of news].)15 Here, the trial court correctly determined SDOG's lawsuit arises from defendants' protected activity. "'In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, "'we disregard the labeli

2017(Ibid.; Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 143 [writer's use of plaintiffs' names in draft script of television show is protected activity because it helped to advance or assist in creating, casting, and broadcasting a television show]; Lieberman, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 31 164 [allegedly unlawful newsgathering technique was protected activity because it aided in the reporting of news].)15 Here, the trial court correctly determined SDOG's lawsuit arises from defendants' protected activity. "'In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, "'we disregard the labeli

2016(Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1113 .) 11 only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.' " (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 .) II The First Four Causes of Action Arise from Protected Activity In determining whether a claim arises from the protected activity, a court must "disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead 'examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies' and whether the

2016Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant's evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.' " (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 .) II The Complaint Against First American Arises from Protected Activity In determining whether a claim arises from protected activity, a court must "disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead 'examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SL

2016The complaint’s plain allegations establish Word for Today’s claims do not arise from those broadcasts, and therefore the trial court properly denied the motion. 8 “[T]he statutory phrase ‘cause of action . . . arising from’ means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. [Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.” (City of Cot

2016Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 ].) ‘“[T]he gravamen of an action is the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct,” i.e., “ ‘the acts on which liability is based,’ ” ‘“not the damage which flows from said conduct.” (Renewable Resources Coalition, Inc. v. Pebble Mines Corp. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 384, 387, 396 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 901 ] (Pebble Mines).) The trial court must ‘“distinguish between (1) speech or petitioning activity that is mere evidence related to liability and (2) liability that is based on speech or petitioning activity.

2017A. Wayans’s burden In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, “ ‘we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiffs cause of action [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiffs claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activit

2017A. WAYANS’S BURDEN In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, “ ‘we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . . .” . . . [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’’ [Citation.] If the core injury- producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions t

2017(Ibid.; Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 143 [writer's use of plaintiffs' names in draft script of television show is protected activity because it helped to advance or assist in creating, casting, and broadcasting a television show]; Lieberman, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 31 164 [allegedly unlawful newsgathering technique was protected activity because it aided in the reporting of news].)15 Here, the trial court correctly determined SDOG's lawsuit arises from defendants' protected activity. "'In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, "'we disregard the labeli

2017(Ibid.; Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 143 [writer's use of plaintiffs' names in draft script of television show is protected activity because it helped to advance or assist in creating, casting, and broadcasting a television show]; Lieberman, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 31 164 [allegedly unlawful newsgathering technique was protected activity because it aided in the reporting of news].)15 Here, the trial court correctly determined SDOG's lawsuit arises from defendants' protected activity. "'In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, "'we disregard the labeli

2016(Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1113 .) 11 only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.' " (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 .) II The First Four Causes of Action Arise from Protected Activity In determining whether a claim arises from the protected activity, a court must "disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead 'examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies' and whether the

2014Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 , italics omitted.) We consider the pleadings together with the supporting and opposing affidavits, “stating the facts upon which the liability . . . is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 .) The protected activities described in subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16 include statements or writings made “in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law . . . .” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2); see Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local

2014(Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169 , 1190–1191.) In making this analysis, “we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead ‘examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . .’ . . . [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protec

2014Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 (Hylton).) In City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751 , the court summarized the law to be applied in analyzing a claim that contains allegations pertaining to acts that are protected under the anti-SLAPP statute as well as nonprotected acts: "When a [complaint] presents a mixed cause of action that involves protected and nonprotected activities . . . the question presented is 'whether the gravamen of the cause of action targets protected activity. [Citation.] If liability is not based on protected activity, the cause of actio

2016Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 (Hylton).) “‘In deciding whether an action is a SLAPP, the trial court should distinguish between (1) speech or petitioning activity that is mere evidence related to liability and (2) liability that is based on speech or petitioning activity.’” (City of Alhambra, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307 ; see Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1537 [“A claim ‘arises from’ an act when the act ‘“‘forms the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action’”’”].) “If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s

2016Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 (Hylton).) “‘In deciding whether an action is a SLAPP, the trial court should distinguish between (1) speech or petitioning activity that is mere evidence related to liability and (2) liability that is based on speech or petitioning activity.’” (City of Alhambra, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307 ; see Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1537 [“A claim ‘arises from’ an act when the act ‘“‘forms the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action’”’”].) “If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s

2014If he fails to do so, the argument is forfeited.”].) 7 733.)” (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 107-108 (McGarry).) “In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, ‘“we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead ‘examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . . .’ . . .

2014Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 , italics omitted.) We consider the pleadings together with the supporting and opposing affidavits, “stating the facts upon which the liability . . . is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 .) The protected activities described in subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16 include statements or writings made “in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law . . . .” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2); see Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local

2013Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 .) “The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is [on] the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 .) “If the core injury-producing conduct by the defendant that allegedly gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim is properly described with only collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity, then the claim does not arise out of protected speech or petitioning activity. [Citation.]” (You

2013Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 .) “The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is [on] the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 .) “If the core injury-producing conduct by the defendant that allegedly gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim is properly described with only collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity, then the claim does not arise out of protected speech or petitioning activity. [Citation.]” (You