lawful claim in North Carolina

1953Liles v. Rogers, 113 N.C. 197 , 18 S.E. 104, 37 , Am.

1953Liles v. Rogers, 113 N.C. 197 , 18 S.E. 104, 37 , Am.

1992Our cases have held that the expense of litigating a caveat is not a lawful claim against another party; rather, such “expense is a cost of court taxable ‘against either party, or apportioned among the parties, in the discretion of the court.’ ” See In re Estate of Ward, 97 N.C.

1992App. 660 , 389 S.E.2d 441 (1990); N.C.

1963“Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right. [Citing authority.] The party who is subrogated is regarded as entitled to the same rights and, indeed, as constituting one and the same person whom he succeeds. [Citing authority.]” Dowdy v. R.R. and Burns v. R.R., 237 N.C. 519 , 75 S.E. 2d 639 ; Peek v. Trust Co., supra, p. 15.

1963“Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right. [Citing authority.] The party who is subrogated is regarded as entitled to the same rights and, indeed, as constituting one and the same person whom he succeeds. [Citing authority.]” Dowdy v. R.R. and Burns v. R.R., 237 N.C. 519 , 75 S.E. 2d 639 ; Peek v. Trust Co., supra, p. 15.

1926In Mahoney v. Tyler, 136, supra, p. 43, it is held: “There is no analogy between a proceeding like this and one for the assessment of *178 damages against a defendant where property has been seized under a requisition in claim and delivery (Hall v. Tillman, 110 N. C., 220 ), nor where the defendant has been arrested in a civil action and held to bail.

1910That too much regard is not to be had to the natural and proper signification of words and sentences, to prevent the simple intervention of the parties from taking effect, for the law is not nice in grants, and therefore it doth often transpose words, contrary to their order, to bring them to the intent of the parties.’ The rule of construction there laid down by the learned judge has been adopted by this Court and frequently applied in the construction of deeds, notably in the cases of Phillips v. Davis, 69 N. C., 117 ; Waugh v. Miller, 75 N. C., 127 ; Allen v. Bowen, 74 N. C., 155 ; Phillips

1910That too much regard is not to be had to the natural and proper signification of words and sentences, to prevent the simple intervention of the parties from taking effect, for the law is not nice in grants, and therefore it doth often transpose words, contrary to their order, to bring them to the intent of the parties.’ The rule of construction there laid down by the learned judge has been adopted by this Court and frequently applied in the construction of deeds, notably in the cases of Phillips v. Davis, 69 N. C., 117 ; Waugh v. Miller, 75 N. C., 127 ; Allen v. Bowen, 74 N. C., 155 ; Phillips

1910That too much regard is not to be had to the natural and proper signification of words and sentences, to prevent the simple intervention of the parties from taking effect, for the law is not nice in grants, and therefore it doth often transpose words, contrary to their order, to bring them to the intent of the parties.’ The rule of construction there laid down by the learned judge has been adopted by this Court and frequently applied in the construction of deeds, notably in the cases of Phillips v. Davis, 69 N. C., 117 ; Waugh v. Miller, 75 N. C., 127 ; Allen v. Bowen, 74 N. C., 155 ; Phillips

1910That too much regard is not to be had to the natural and proper signification of words and sentences, to prevent the simple intervention of the parties from taking effect, for the law is not nice in grants, and therefore it doth often transpose words, contrary to their order, to bring them to the intent of the parties.’ The rule of construction there laid down by the learned judge has been adopted by this Court and frequently applied in the construction of deeds, notably in the cases of Phillips v. Davis, 69 N. C., 117 ; Waugh v. Miller, 75 N. C., 127 ; Allen v. Bowen, 74 N. C., 155 ; Phillips

1910That too much regard is not to be had to the natural and proper signification of words and sentences, to prevent the simple intervention of the parties from taking effect, for the law is not nice in grants, and therefore it doth often transpose words, contrary to their order, to bring them to the intent of the parties.’ The rule of construction there laid down by the learned judge has been adopted by this Court and frequently applied in the construction of deeds, notably in the cases of Phillips v. Davis, 69 N. C., 117 ; Waugh v. Miller, 75 N. C., 127 ; Allen v. Bowen, 74 N. C., 155 ; Phillips