5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1925–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sullivan v. Stategreen1 sentence2021“If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.” Sullivan, 308 Ga. at 510 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). (a) Appellant first contends that his trial counsel rendered 14 constitutionally ineffective assistance by relying on Appellant’s PTSD diagnosis to argue defenses that are prohibited by law, i.e., to negate intent for malice murder, to mitigate intent for voluntary manslaughter, and to support self-defense.6 Appellant, citing Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516 ( 591 SE2d 824 ) ( | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Biswellgreen1 sentence1982But see United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (92 SC 1593, 32 LE2d 87); Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 (87 SC 1727, 18 LE2d 930); and 18 ALRFed 734, on administrative searches (although this was not a search but an inspection of records). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Benham v. State
green
2 sentences2021“If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.” 14 Sullivan, 308 Ga. at 510 (2) (citation omitted). (a) Appellant first contends that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by relying on Appellant’s PTSD diagnosis to argue defenses that are prohibited by law, i.e., to negate intent for malice murder, to mitigate intent for voluntary manslaughter, and to support self-defense.6 Appellant, citing Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516 (591 SE2d 824) (2004), argues that 2021“If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.” 14 Sullivan, 308 Ga. at 510 (2) (citation omitted). (a) Appellant first contends that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by relying on Appellant’s PTSD diagnosis to argue defenses that are prohibited by law, i.e., to negate intent for malice murder, to mitigate intent for voluntary manslaughter, and to support self-defense.6 Appellant, citing Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516 (591 SE2d 824) (2004), argues that | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Jackson v. Miller
green
2 sentences1985This court's recent decision in Jackson v. Miller, 176 Ga. App. 220 ( 335 SE2d 438 ) (1985) (cert. den.), is neither in conflict with Hennessy nor authority for a contrary ruling in the present case. 1985This court's recent decision in Jackson v. Miller, 176 Ga. App. 220 ( 335 SE2d 438 ) (1985) (cert. den.), is neither in conflict with Hennessy nor authority for a contrary ruling in the present case. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Hennessy v. Webb
green
2 sentences1985Each of the defendants must be considered immune from liability pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329 ( 264 SE2d 878 ) (1980), wherein it was held that, in the absence of a lawful waiver of such immunity or a showing of wilful, wanton, or malicious misconduct, governmental officers or agents are exempt from liability for actions undertaken in their official capacity and within the scope of their official duties. 1985Each of the defendants must be considered immune from liability pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329 ( 264 SE2d 878 ) (1980), wherein it was held that, in the absence of a lawful waiver of such immunity or a showing of wilful, wanton, or malicious misconduct, governmental officers or agents are exempt from liability for actions undertaken in their official capacity and within the scope of their official duties. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Bumper v. North Carolina
green
1 sentence1982Thus, there was no “claim of lawful authority” as in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543 , supra, where the police appeared at the defendant’s house, announced that they had a search warrant — although none was produced, and the defendant acquiesced to the lawful claim of authority. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco
green
1 sentence1982But see United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (92 SC 1593, 32 LE2d 87); Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 (87 SC 1727, 18 LE2d 930); and 18 ALRFed 734, on administrative searches (although this was not a search but an inspection of records). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Smith v. Board of Education
green
1 sentence1925If it was a lawful claim, its payment could have been enforced by mandamus.' See Smith v. Board of Education of Washington County, 153 Ga. 758 ( 113 S. E. 147 ). | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence1925If it was a lawful claim, its payment could have been enforced by mandamus.' See Smith v. Board of Education of Washington County, 153 Ga. 758 ( 113 S. E. 147 ). | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.