lawful claim in California

2026(See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 665 ; In re Lucero (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 38, 46 .) “Generally, ‘[a] party is not entitled to an instruction on a theory for which there is no supporting evidence.” [Citation.] ‘[A] trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of-right defense unless there is evidence to support an inference that [the defendant] acted with a subjective belief he or she had a lawful claim on the property.’ ” (People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 944 .) 15 Here, there was no such evidence.

2021In general, “‘[a] party is not entitled to an instruction on a theory for which there is no supporting evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of-right defense unless there is evidence to support an inference that [the defendant] acted with a subjective belief he or she had a lawful claim on the property.’ [Citations.]” ( Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at. p. 944, italics added.) “Whether or not the evidence provides the necessary support for drawing that particular inference is a question of law. [Citation.] Although a trial court should not measure the subs

2016(People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 .) The claim-of-right defense also is inapplicable where a defendant attempts to conceal the taking (id. at p. 141), where the claim of right to the property arises from ―notoriously illegal‖ activity (People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 ), or ―where an employee unilaterally determines that he or she is entitled to certain wages and thereafter, without authorization, appropriates the property of the employer in purported payment of such wages‖ (People v. Creath (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 312, 318 ). ―‗[A] trial court is not required to instruct

2013Before instructing a jury that it may draw the inference, the trial court must determine that there is evidence on the record which, if believed, will support it. [Citation.] Giving an instruction implies there are factual questions to which the instruction relates. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Creath (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 312, 319 .) “‘[A] trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of-right defense unless there is evidence to support an inference that appellant acted with a subjective belief he or she had a lawful claim on the property.’ [Citation.] Whether or not the evidence

2015(Quintana, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 369 .) In other words, it was an observation that the Legislature did not pursue the most hard-line option that it might have considered.

2015(Quintana, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 369 .) In other words, it was an observation that the Legislature did not pursue the most hardline option that it might have considered. 15 the venerable administrative and criminal penalties that were upheld against previous constitutional challenges in Hernandez and Quintana.

2008Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in a judicial action.' [Citations.] In United States v. Moorman [(1950)] 338 U.S. 457 [ 94 L.Ed. 256 , 70 S.Ct. 288 ] the United States Supreme Court, in upholding as final the arbitrator's determination, held that, whether the problem raised was one of law or of fact, the courts should not fritter away the arbitrator's powers under the guise

2008Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in a judicial action.' [Citations.] In United States v. Moorman [(1950)] 338 U.S. 457 [ 94 L.Ed. 256 , 70 S.Ct. 288 ] the United States Supreme Court, in upholding as final the arbitrator's determination, held that, whether the problem raised was one of law or of fact, the courts should not fritter away the arbitrator's powers under the guise

1982While donee's will makes general reference to powers of appointment, it makes no specific reference to donor, to his will, or to the power created by his will.... [D]onee's will failed to comply with donor's requirement and, therefore, failed to make an effective appointment of donor's property." ( 219 S.E.2d at p. 872 ; see also First Nat.

1982While donee’s will makes general reference to powers of appointment, it makes no specific reference to donor, to his will, or to the power created by his will. .. . [D]onee’s will failed to comply with donor’s requirement and, therefore, failed to make an effective appointment of donor’s property.” ( 219 S.E.2d at p. 872 ; see also First Nat.

1963Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in judicial action.’ (See also, Riley v. Pig’n Whistle Candy Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 650 [ 241 P.2d 294 ]; McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [ 243 P.2d 35 ]; Glesby v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., Ltd., 63 Cal.App.2d 414 [ 147 P.2d 60 ]; Jardine-Matheson Co., v. Pacific O.

1963Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in judicial action.’ (See also, Riley v. Pig’n Whistle Candy Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 650 [ 241 P.2d 294 ]; McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [ 243 P.2d 35 ]; Glesby v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., Ltd., 63 Cal.App.2d 414 [ 147 P.2d 60 ]; Jardine-Matheson Co., v. Pacific O.

1963Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in judicial action.’ (See also, Riley v. Pig’n Whistle Candy Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 650 [ 241 P.2d 294 ]; McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [ 243 P.2d 35 ]; Glesby v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., Ltd., 63 Cal.App.2d 414 [ 147 P.2d 60 ]; Jardine-Matheson Co., v. Pacific O.

1963Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in judicial action.’ (See also, Riley v. Pig’n Whistle Candy Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 650 [ 241 P.2d 294 ]; McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [ 243 P.2d 35 ]; Glesby v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., Ltd., 63 Cal.App.2d 414 [ 147 P.2d 60 ]; Jardine-Matheson Co., v. Pacific O.

1963Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in judicial action.’ (See also, Riley v. Pig’n Whistle Candy Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 650 [ 241 P.2d 294 ]; McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [ 243 P.2d 35 ]; Glesby v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., Ltd., 63 Cal.App.2d 414 [ 147 P.2d 60 ]; Jardine-Matheson Co., v. Pacific O.

1963Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in judicial action.’ (See also, Riley v. Pig’n Whistle Candy Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 650 [ 241 P.2d 294 ]; McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [ 243 P.2d 35 ]; Glesby v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., Ltd., 63 Cal.App.2d 414 [ 147 P.2d 60 ]; Jardine-Matheson Co., v. Pacific O.

1946But the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone. ’ “The pertinent principles governing the right of self-defense are explained in People v. Westlake (1882), 62 Cal. 303 , 307 : ‘The apprehension of danger to life or limb which justifies a man for taking the life of another must be an honest one—one that is well-grounded, and must arise out of a reasonable cause; . . .’ ” In People v. Jackson, 74 Cal.App.2d 22, 24 [ 167 P.2d 776 ], the appellant contended, after admitting the killi

1944But the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone.” The pertinent principles governing the right of self-defense are explained in People v. Westlake (1882), 62 Cal. 303 , 307: “The apprehension of danger to life or limb which justifies a man for taking the life of another must be an honest one—one that is well-grounded, and must arise out of a reasonable cause; but a cause which originates in the fault of the person himself—in a quarrel which he has provoked, or in a danger which he

1941(Matter of Jacobs, 38 Cal. App. 474 ( 176 Pac. 689 [698].) ” In conclusion, we might add that we have examined the entire record and are satisfied that petitioners were justly and fairly tried and convicted.

1919(Matter of Jacobs, 38 Cal. App. 474 , [ 176 Pac. 689 ].) It is proper to say that the transcript of the proceedings which took place before the magistrate at the preliminary hearing of the charge of which the petitioner was later convicted in the superior court and for which he is under the restraint of which he here complains discloses that, before the date of the examination, the prisoner exercised very little, if any, diligence in the matter of procuring the attendance of witnesses at the hearing to testify in his behalf.

2026(See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 665 ; In re Lucero (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 38, 46 .) “Generally, ‘[a] party is not entitled to an instruction on a theory for which there is no supporting evidence.” [Citation.] ‘[A] trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of-right defense unless there is evidence to support an inference that [the defendant] acted with a subjective belief he or she had a lawful claim on the property.’ ” (People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 944 .) 15 Here, there was no such evidence.

2026(See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 665 ; In re Lucero (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 38, 46 .) “Generally, ‘[a] party is not entitled to an instruction on a theory for which there is no supporting evidence.” [Citation.] ‘[A] trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of-right defense unless there is evidence to support an inference that [the defendant] acted with a subjective belief he or she had a lawful claim on the property.’ ” (People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 944 .) 15 Here, there was no such evidence.

2022(See People v. Bender, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 183 .) Lawful defense of self requires both a reasonable ground to apprehend a particular danger (§ 197) and an action occurring under the influence of such fears alone (§ 198; People v. Trevino (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 874 , 879- 880).

2022In People v. Shade (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 711 (Shade), for example, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 5.12 that “a killing is justified (1) if the circumstances are sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person that there is imminent danger of death 9 Section 197, subdivisions (2) and (3), in turn, provide that homicide is justifiable “(2) When committed in defense of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous

2021(See People v. Hardin (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 625 , 629–630 [“only that force which is necessary to repel an attack may be used in self-defense; . . . [and] deadly force or force likely to cause great bodily injury may be used only to repel an attack which is in itself deadly or likely to cause great bodily injury”]; People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 472 [rejecting application of section 197 where “the character and manner of the burglary [did] not reasonably create a fear of great bodily harm, [thus] there is no cause for exaction of human life, or for the use of deadly force”]; People v

2016(People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 .) The claim-of-right defense also is inapplicable where a defendant attempts to conceal the taking (id. at p. 141), where the claim of right to the property arises from ―notoriously illegal‖ activity (People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 ), or ―where an employee unilaterally determines that he or she is entitled to certain wages and thereafter, without authorization, appropriates the property of the employer in purported payment of such wages‖ (People v. Creath (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 312, 318 ). ―‗[A] trial court is not required to instruct

2016(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733 ; People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111 .) “In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of 12. law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 953 .) “Generally, ‘[a] party is not entitled to an instruction on a theory for which there is no supporting evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of- right defense unless there is evidence to suppo

2016Initially, we reject ICW’s argument that subrogation is an equitable remedy and therefore cannot constitute a cause of action “on the contract.” “In determining whether an action is ‘on the contract’ under section 1717, the proper focus is not on the nature of the remedy, but on the basis of the cause of action.” (Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 347 .) Although the remedy sought may be equitable, the claims may still be actions “‘on the contract.’” (Ibid.) “‘Subrogation, a legal fiction, is broadly defined as the substitution of one person in the place of another with referenc