5 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1945–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. McGreeveygreen2 sentences2019Although it is generally true that there is no requirement to retreat in order to claim self-defense (see ICJI 1519; see generally State v. McGreevey, 17 Idaho 453 , 105 P. 1047 (1909)), section 18-4009.3 establishes an exception when one is the initial aggressor. 2019Although it is generally true that there is no requirement to retreat in order to claim self-defense (see ICJI 1519; see generally State v. McGreevey, 17 Idaho 453 , 105 P. 1047 (1909)), section 18-4009.3 establishes an exception when one is the initial aggressor. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2001State v. Rodriguez, 98 Idaho 286 , 291, 460 P.2d 711, 716 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Howard v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co.
green
2 sentences1963The rule is well stated in Howard v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189, 197 , 340 P.2d 103 , as follows: “It is the lawful privilege of the parties to a contract for the sale of real property to make time of perform *129 anee of the essence of their agreement. 1963The rule is well stated in Howard v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189, 197 , 340 P.2d 103 , as follows: “It is the lawful privilege of the parties to a contract for the sale of real property to make time of perform *129 anee of the essence of their agreement. | 2 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Shepherd
green
2 sentences2019When committed in the lawful defense of such person . . . but such person . . . if he was the assailant or engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed[.] I.C. § 18-4009.3 (1972) (italics added) (amended 2018). 5 Pursuant to this statute, the Court of Appeals has held that a defendant “is not entitled to claim self-defense or justify a homicide when he or she was the aggressor or the one who provoked the altercation in which another person is killed, unless such person in good faith first withdraws fro 2019When committed in the lawful defense of such person . . . but such person . . . if he was the assailant or engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed[.] I.C. § 18-4009.3 (1972) (italics added) (amended 2018). 5 Pursuant to this statute, the Court of Appeals has held that a defendant “is not entitled to claim self-defense or justify a homicide when he or she was the aggressor or the one who provoked the altercation in which another person is killed, unless such person in good faith first withdraws fro | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Turner
green
2 sentences2019When committed in the lawful defense of such person . . . but such person . . . if he was the assailant or engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed[.] I.C. § 18-4009.3 (1972) (italics added) (amended 2018). 5 Pursuant to this statute, the Court of Appeals has held that a defendant “is not entitled to claim self-defense or justify a homicide when he or she was the aggressor or the one who provoked the altercation in which another person is killed, unless such person in good faith first withdraws fro 2019When committed in the lawful defense of such person . . . but such person . . . if he was the assailant or engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed[.] I.C. § 18-4009.3 (1972) (italics added) (amended 2018). 5 Pursuant to this statute, the Court of Appeals has held that a defendant “is not entitled to claim self-defense or justify a homicide when he or she was the aggressor or the one who provoked the altercation in which another person is killed, unless such person in good faith first withdraws fro | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Owen
green
2 sentences2019When committed in the lawful defense of such person . . . but such person . . . if he was the assailant or engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed[.] I.C. § 18-4009.3 (1972) (italics added) (amended 2018). 5 Pursuant to this statute, the Court of Appeals has held that a defendant “is not entitled to claim self-defense or justify a homicide when he or she was the aggressor or the one who provoked the altercation in which another person is killed, unless such person in good faith first withdraws fro 2019When committed in the lawful defense of such person . . . but such person . . . if he was the assailant or engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed[.] I.C. § 18-4009.3 (1972) (italics added) (amended 2018). 5 Pursuant to this statute, the Court of Appeals has held that a defendant “is not entitled to claim self-defense or justify a homicide when he or she was the aggressor or the one who provoked the altercation in which another person is killed, unless such person in good faith first withdraws fro | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Co.
green
2 sentences1945St. 201; Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Co., 160 U.S. 303 , 16 S. Ct. 282 , 40 L. ed. 436.) In Nicholls v. Lewis, etc., Co., supra, the court held that “Where the exterior boundaries of a mineral location include such an unreasonably excessive area that such boundary lines cannot be said to impart notice to a prospector of a mineral location or discovery within the reasonable distance of a lawful claim as located under the statute, such location will be held void on the ground that the boundaries of the claim have never been marked and established as required by law.” ■ In the later case of Fl 1945St. 201; Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Co., 160 U.S. 303 , 16 S. Ct. 282 , 40 L. ed. 436.) In Nicholls v. Lewis, etc., Co., supra, the court held that “Where the exterior boundaries of a mineral location include such an unreasonably excessive area that such boundary lines cannot be said to impart notice to a prospector of a mineral location or discovery within the reasonable distance of a lawful claim as located under the statute, such location will be held void on the ground that the boundaries of the claim have never been marked and established as required by law.” ■ In the later case of Fl | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.