decisional principle in New Jersey

2024Let's get the f[*]ck out of here. 'Cause y'all got me hold – y'all holding me up, like. .... [DETECTIVE]: So Mr. Ford said he wasn't doing it[?] ROBERTS: He ain't with that sh[*]t. [Emphasis added.] We agree with Judge Ravin's determination that this exchange does not constitute exculpatory evidence pursuant to the decisional factors set forth in Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237-38 .

2024A "prosecutor's duty arises only if the evidence satisfies two requirements: it must directly negate guilt and must also be clearly exculpatory." Id. at 237 . "[U]nless the exculpatory evidence at issue squarely refutes an element of the crime in question, that evidence is not within the prosecutorial duty we have set forth." Ibid. (emphasis omitted).

2000Previously, according to the court in Horn , "the First Amendment protections afforded to public employees [from removal for political reasons] under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 , 100 S.Ct. 1287 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 574 (1980) were not applicable to the New Jersey [motor vehicle] agents[,]" Communications Workers I, supra, 298 N.J.Super. at 167 , 689 A. 2d 166 , because "under New Jersey decisional law [they were] independent contractors rather than public employees[.]" Ibid.

2000Previously, according to the court in Horn , "the First Amendment protections afforded to public employees [from removal for political reasons] under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 , 100 S.Ct. 1287 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 574 (1980) were not applicable to the New Jersey [motor vehicle] agents[,]" Communications Workers I, supra, 298 N.J.Super. at 167 , 689 A. 2d 166 , because "under New Jersey decisional law [they were] independent contractors rather than public employees[.]" Ibid.

2000James Stewart Polshek & Assocs. v. Bergen County Iron Works, 142 N.J.Super. 516 , 362 A. 2d 63 (Ch.Div.1976), a case on which Judge Conway relied, also involved three parties.

2000James Stewart Polshek & Assocs. v. Bergen County Iron Works, 142 N.J.Super. 516 , 362 A. 2d 63 (Ch.Div.1976), a case on which Judge Conway relied, also involved three parties.

2000Judge Shuster framed the issues before him on remand, noting as we had that the decisional principle of Horn v. Kean, 796 F. 2d 668 (3d Cir.1986)—on which we perceived Judge Carchman had previously relied in reaching the trial court result which generated the earlier appeal—had been effectively overruled in Umbehr and O'Hare.

2000Previously, according to the court in Horn , "the First Amendment protections afforded to public employees [from removal for political reasons] under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 , 100 S.Ct. 1287 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 574 (1980) were not applicable to the New Jersey [motor vehicle] agents[,]" Communications Workers I, supra, 298 N.J.Super. at 167 , 689 A. 2d 166 , because "under New Jersey decisional law [they were] independent contractors rather than public employees[.]" Ibid.

2000Previously, according to the court in Horn , "the First Amendment protections afforded to public employees [from removal for political reasons] under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 , 100 S.Ct. 1287 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 574 (1980) were not applicable to the New Jersey [motor vehicle] agents[,]" Communications Workers I, supra, 298 N.J.Super. at 167 , 689 A. 2d 166 , because "under New Jersey decisional law [they were] independent contractors rather than public employees[.]" Ibid.

2000Previously, according to the court in Horn , "the First Amendment protections afforded to public employees [from removal for political reasons] under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 , 100 S.Ct. 1287 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 574 (1980) were not applicable to the New Jersey [motor vehicle] agents[,]" Communications Workers I, supra, 298 N.J.Super. at 167 , 689 A. 2d 166 , because "under New Jersey decisional law [they were] independent contractors rather than public employees[.]" Ibid.

2000Previously, according to the court in Horn , "the First Amendment protections afforded to public employees [from removal for political reasons] under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 , 96 S.Ct. 2673 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 , 100 S.Ct. 1287 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 574 (1980) were not applicable to the New Jersey [motor vehicle] agents[,]" Communications Workers I, supra, 298 N.J.Super. at 167 , 689 A. 2d 166 , because "under New Jersey decisional law [they were] independent contractors rather than public employees[.]" Ibid.

1998We do not view the requirements of the law of the case doctrine, Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 192 , 594 A.2d 1309 (1991); State v. Hale, 127 N.J.Super. 407, 410-11 , 317 A.2d 731 (App.Div.1974), to have precluded the result the trial judge reached or the way in which he reached it.

1998We do not view the requirements of the law of the case doctrine, Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 192 , 594 A.2d 1309 (1991); State v. Hale, 127 N.J.Super. 407, 410-11 , 317 A.2d 731 (App.Div.1974), to have precluded the result the trial judge reached or the way in which he reached it.

1998We do not view the requirements of the law of the case doctrine, Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 192 , 594 A.2d 1309 (1991); State v. Hale, 127 N.J.Super. 407, 410-11 , 317 A.2d 731 (App.Div.1974), to have precluded the result the trial judge reached or the way in which he reached it.

1998We do not view the requirements of the law of the case doctrine, Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 192 , 594 A.2d 1309 (1991); State v. Hale, 127 N.J.Super. 407, 410-11 , 317 A.2d 731 (App.Div.1974), to have precluded the result the trial judge reached or the way in which he reached it.

1997Such a situation is obviously not in the public interest. [Town of West New York v. Bock, supra, 38 N.J. at 526 , 186 A.2d 97 .] We can see no basis for divining, in this connection, a different decisional standard for non-civil-service municipalities than applies to those which have elected to be governed by the Civil Service Act.

1997Such a situation is obviously not in the public interest. [Town of West New York v. Bock, supra, 38 N.J. at 526 , 186 A.2d 97 .] We can see no basis for divining, in this connection, a different decisional standard for non-civil-service municipalities than applies to those which have elected to be governed by the Civil Service Act.