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17 California opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kechter v. City of Downeygreen2 sentences1975(Cf. Akins v. County of Sonoma, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 199 ; Kechter v. City of Downey, 265 Cal.App.2d 877, 880 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 844 ].) The problem is not pivotal in this case. 1975(Cf. Akins v. County of Sonoma, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 199 ; Kechter v. City of Downey, 265 Cal.App.2d 877, 880 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 844 ].) The problem is not pivotal in this case. | 2 | 2 |
Rogers v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CTY.green2 sentences1998Citing the decisional requirement of a “specific and focused request” (Rogers v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 469, 481 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 ]), the Governor complains that CFAC’s request lacks the required focus and is a “model of ambiguity,” thereby justifying its denial. 1998Citing the decisional requirement of a “specific and focused request” (Rogers v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 469, 481 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 ]), the Governor complains that CFAC’s request lacks the required focus and is a “model of ambiguity,” thereby justifying its denial. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Broomegreen2 sentences1990Under Franks , if the defendant makes a “substantial *1292 preliminary showing” that an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains a false statement which was necessary to a finding of probable cause, the defendant is entitled under the Fourth Amendment to a hearing. ( Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156 [ 57 L.Ed.2d at p. 672 ]; People v. Broome (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1479, 1490 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 854 ].) Appellant suggests that a defendant cannot meet the burden of making a “substantial preliminary showing” if a large part or all of an affidavit is sealed. 1990Under Franks , if the defendant makes a “substantial *1292 preliminary showing” that an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains a false statement which was necessary to a finding of probable cause, the defendant is entitled under the Fourth Amendment to a hearing. ( Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156 [ 57 L.Ed.2d at p. 672 ]; People v. Broome (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1479, 1490 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 854 ].) Appellant suggests that a defendant cannot meet the burden of making a “substantial preliminary showing” if a large part or all of an affidavit is sealed. | 1 | 1 |
Archer v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1988Club v. Los Angeles (1920) 182 Cal. 392, 404 [ 188 P. 554 , 9 A.L.R. 1200 ]; see also Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 19 Cal.2d 19, 24-25 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]; Ellison v. City of San Buenaventura, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 457 .) The immunity provided by this decisional rule is inapplicable where the upstream improvements divert water out of the natural channel. 1988Club v. Los Angeles (1920) 182 Cal. 392, 404 [ 188 P. 554 , 9 A.L.R. 1200 ]; see also Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 19 Cal.2d 19, 24-25 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]; Ellison v. City of San Buenaventura, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 457 .) The immunity provided by this decisional rule is inapplicable where the upstream improvements divert water out of the natural channel. | 1 | 1 |
San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1988Club v. Los Angeles (1920) 182 Cal. 392, 404 [ 188 P. 554 , 9 A.L.R. 1200 ]; see also Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 19 Cal.2d 19, 24-25 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]; Ellison v. City of San Buenaventura, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 457 .) The immunity provided by this decisional rule is inapplicable where the upstream improvements divert water out of the natural channel. 1988Club v. Los Angeles (1920) 182 Cal. 392, 404 [ 188 P. 554 , 9 A.L.R. 1200 ]; see also Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 19 Cal.2d 19, 24-25 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]; Ellison v. City of San Buenaventura, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 457 .) The immunity provided by this decisional rule is inapplicable where the upstream improvements divert water out of the natural channel. | 1 | 1 |
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co.green2 sentences1984(Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 829 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ].) It is neither unfair nor against public policy to accord retroactive application to the Moran decision, for a defendant is not entitled to have the plaintiff’s action dismissed under the five-year provision of section 583 if that period in fact has not run. 1984(Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 829 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ].) It is neither unfair nor against public policy to accord retroactive application to the Moran decision, for a defendant is not entitled to have the plaintiff’s action dismissed under the five-year provision of section 583 if that period in fact has not run. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Colegreen2 sentences1974(See People v. Cole, 47 Cal.2d 99, 105 [ 301 P.2d 854 , 56 A.L.R.2d 1435 ].) In cases not involving sex offenses California courts usually reject attempts to impeach a witness by means of psychiatric testimony. 1974(See People v. Cole, 47 Cal.2d 99, 105 [ 301 P.2d 854 , 56 A.L.R.2d 1435 ].) In cases not involving sex offenses California courts usually reject attempts to impeach a witness by means of psychiatric testimony. | 1 | 1 |
Spinelli v. United Statesred2 sentences1970Code, § 311.) [*] (Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) Proceedings Before Trial, § 144, p. 137.) Only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause. ( Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 645 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ].) [7] It is noted that the Legislature appears to take cognizance of the decisional rule that a pretrial on-the-merits consideration of the character of the involved material (obscene or not obscene) is available to a defendant. ( Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, supra, 59 Cal.2d 901 ; Aday v. Municipal Court, supr 1970Code, § 311.) [*] (Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) Proceedings Before Trial, § 144, p. 137.) Only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause. ( Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 645 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ].) [7] It is noted that the Legislature appears to take cognizance of the decisional rule that a pretrial on-the-merits consideration of the character of the involved material (obscene or not obscene) is available to a defendant. ( Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, supra, 59 Cal.2d 901 ; Aday v. Municipal Court, supr | 1 | 1 |
Harvey v. D & L Construction Co.green2 sentences1969Co. (1967) 251 Cal.App. 2d 48, 51 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 255 ]; see 6 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice (3d ed. 1966) pp. 166-171; Annots. 52 A.L.R.2d 287 -346, 52 A.L.R.2d 350 -402.) Generally, the rule declares that an employee is not within the scope of his employment while he is going to or returning from his place of work. 1969Co. (1967) 251 Cal.App. 2d 48, 51 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 255 ]; see 6 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice (3d ed. 1966) pp. 166-171; Annots. 52 A.L.R.2d 287 -346, 52 A.L.R.2d 350 -402.) Generally, the rule declares that an employee is not within the scope of his employment while he is going to or returning from his place of work. | 1 | 1 |
Boynton v. McKalesgreen2 sentences1969Exposition Co. (1918) 37 Cal.App. 715, 717-719 [ 174 P. 400 ]; Nussbaum v. Traung Label etc. Co. (1920) 46 Cal.App. 561, 571-572 [ 189 P. 728 ].) Later, it crystallized as a decisional rule under the sobriquet “going and coming.” (Robinson v. George (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ]; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788-789 [ 294 P.2d 733 ]; Vivion v. National Cash Register Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 597, 605 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] ; Harvey v. D & L Constr. 1969Exposition Co. (1918) 37 Cal.App. 715, 717-719 [ 174 P. 400 ]; Nussbaum v. Traung Label etc. Co. (1920) 46 Cal.App. 561, 571-572 [ 189 P. 728 ].) Later, it crystallized as a decisional rule under the sobriquet “going and coming.” (Robinson v. George (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ]; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788-789 [ 294 P.2d 733 ]; Vivion v. National Cash Register Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 597, 605 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] ; Harvey v. D & L Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Vivion v. National Cash Register Co.green2 sentences1969Exposition Co. (1918) 37 Cal.App. 715, 717-719 [ 174 P. 400 ]; Nussbaum v. Traung Label etc. Co. (1920) 46 Cal.App. 561, 571-572 [ 189 P. 728 ].) Later, it crystallized as a decisional rule under the sobriquet “going and coming.” (Robinson v. George (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ]; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788-789 [ 294 P.2d 733 ]; Vivion v. National Cash Register Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 597, 605 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] ; Harvey v. D & L Constr. 1969Exposition Co. (1918) 37 Cal.App. 715, 717-719 [ 174 P. 400 ]; Nussbaum v. Traung Label etc. Co. (1920) 46 Cal.App. 561, 571-572 [ 189 P. 728 ].) Later, it crystallized as a decisional rule under the sobriquet “going and coming.” (Robinson v. George (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ]; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788-789 [ 294 P.2d 733 ]; Vivion v. National Cash Register Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 597, 605 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] ; Harvey v. D & L Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Flamer v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1969The opinion further states: ‘1 Each case must be decided on its own particular facts, and no fixed rule can be prescribed to guide the court in its exercise of this discretionary power under all circumstances. ’ ’ These statements of principle constitute dictum in that they are not decisive of the case as the court’s action there turns on one of the express exceptions contained in the code section, rather than on a decisional exception; however, these announcements are explicit and we note the viewpoint of the Second Appellate District, Division 3, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Moss (Fl 1969The opinion further states: ‘1 Each case must be decided on its own particular facts, and no fixed rule can be prescribed to guide the court in its exercise of this discretionary power under all circumstances. ’ ’ These statements of principle constitute dictum in that they are not decisive of the case as the court’s action there turns on one of the express exceptions contained in the code section, rather than on a decisional exception; however, these announcements are explicit and we note the viewpoint of the Second Appellate District, Division 3, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Moss (Fl | 1 | 1 |
Nussbaum v. Traung Label & Lithograph Co.green2 sentences1969Exposition Co. (1918) 37 Cal.App. 715, 717-719 [ 174 P. 400 ]; Nussbaum v. Traung Label etc. Co. (1920) 46 Cal.App. 561, 571-572 [ 189 P. 728 ].) Later, it crystallized as a decisional rule under the sobriquet “going and coming.” (Robinson v. George (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ]; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788-789 [ 294 P.2d 733 ]; Vivion v. National Cash Register Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 597, 605 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] ; Harvey v. D & L Constr. 1969Exposition Co. (1918) 37 Cal.App. 715, 717-719 [ 174 P. 400 ]; Nussbaum v. Traung Label etc. Co. (1920) 46 Cal.App. 561, 571-572 [ 189 P. 728 ].) Later, it crystallized as a decisional rule under the sobriquet “going and coming.” (Robinson v. George (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ]; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788-789 [ 294 P.2d 733 ]; Vivion v. National Cash Register Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 597, 605 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] ; Harvey v. D & L Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Mauchle v. Panama-Pacific Internatonal Exposition Co.green2 sentences1969Exposition Co. (1918) 37 Cal.App. 715, 717-719 [ 174 P. 400 ]; Nussbaum v. Traung Label etc. Co. (1920) 46 Cal.App. 561, 571-572 [ 189 P. 728 ].) Later, it crystallized as a decisional rule under the sobriquet “going and coming.” (Robinson v. George (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ]; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788-789 [ 294 P.2d 733 ]; Vivion v. National Cash Register Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 597, 605 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] ; Harvey v. D & L Constr. 1969Exposition Co. (1918) 37 Cal.App. 715, 717-719 [ 174 P. 400 ]; Nussbaum v. Traung Label etc. Co. (1920) 46 Cal.App. 561, 571-572 [ 189 P. 728 ].) Later, it crystallized as a decisional rule under the sobriquet “going and coming.” (Robinson v. George (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 244 [ 105 P.2d 914 ]; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 788-789 [ 294 P.2d 733 ]; Vivion v. National Cash Register Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 597, 605 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] ; Harvey v. D & L Constr. | 1 | 1 |
| Robinson v. Georgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dittus v. Cranstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center
green
2 sentences2023Dr. Donald Miller applied to join a hospital staff, but the hospital rejected his application because he supposedly lacked an “ability to work with others.” ( Miller, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 620- 621, 627.) The evidence was Miller was “flamboyant,” “a little 8 impetuous,” and “a controversial person” who expressed himself “forcefully and vigorously.” (Id. at pp. 621, 631.) Other evidence was that Miller created “dissension” and that he had “relatively few friends in the community.” (Id. at p. 622.) The Supreme Court clarified the proper decisional standard and remanded the case to the hospital 2023Dr. Donald Miller applied to join a hospital staff, but the hospital rejected his application because he supposedly lacked an “ability to work with others.” ( Miller, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 620- 621, 627.) The evidence was Miller was “flamboyant,” “a little 8 impetuous,” and “a controversial person” who expressed himself “forcefully and vigorously.” (Id. at pp. 621, 631.) Other evidence was that Miller created “dissension” and that he had “relatively few friends in the community.” (Id. at p. 622.) The Supreme Court clarified the proper decisional standard and remanded the case to the hospital | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Akins v. County of Sonoma
green
2 sentences1975(Cf. Akins v. County of Sonoma, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 199 ; Kechter v. City of Downey, 265 Cal.App.2d 877, 880 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 844 ].) The problem is not pivotal in this case. 1975(Cf. Akins v. County of Sonoma, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 199 ; Kechter v. City of Downey, 265 Cal. App.2d 877, 880 [ 71 Cal. Rptr. 844 ].) The problem is not pivotal in this case. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
County of Los Angeles v. Ranger Insurance
green
1 sentence2010(Id. at p. 125.) The court explained the difference between a lack of jurisdiction over the cause and an act in excess of jurisdiction, and observed that “[t]he correct rule—i.e., that a litigant who has stipulated or otherwise consented to a procedure in excess of jurisdiction may be estopped to question it—has been applied in factual and procedural circumstances materially indistinguishable from those before us.” (National Automobile, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 126 , citing Ranger, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 10 .) 9 The court thus concluded that, “although the trial court had acted in excess of | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. National Automobile & Casualty Ins.
green
1 sentence2010(Id. at p. 125.) The court explained the difference between a lack of jurisdiction over the cause and an act in excess of jurisdiction, and observed that “[t]he correct rule—i.e., that a litigant who has stipulated or otherwise consented to a procedure in excess of jurisdiction may be estopped to question it—has been applied in factual and procedural circumstances materially indistinguishable from those before us.” (National Automobile, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 126 , citing Ranger, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 10 .) 9 The court thus concluded that, “although the trial court had acted in excess of | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Troxel v. Granville
green
1 sentence2003(Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 68 .) Further, the decisional framework employed by the trial court does not permit us to infer that the court considered the presumption in reaching its decision. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Clemons v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences1993In rejecting Mississippi’s argument, the high court held that with respect to the Mississippi capital punishment scheme, neither Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S. 356 , nor Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, 494 U.S. 738 , had announced a new rule, and therefore Stringer was not' foreclosed under Teague from relying on the authority of those cases in his federal habeas corpus proceeding. 1993In rejecting Mississippi's argument, the high court held that with respect to the Mississippi capital punishment scheme, neither Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S. 356 , nor Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, 494 U.S. 738 , had announced a new rule, and therefore Stringer was not foreclosed under Teague from relying on the authority of those cases in his federal habeas corpus proceeding. ( Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. ___ [117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 376-378, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1135-1136].) In the course of explaining why Clemons was not a new rule under Teague v. Lane, supra, 489 U.S. 288 , | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Teague v. Lane
green
1 sentence1993In rejecting Mississippi's argument, the high court held that with respect to the Mississippi capital punishment scheme, neither Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S. 356 , nor Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, 494 U.S. 738 , had announced a new rule, and therefore Stringer was not foreclosed under Teague from relying on the authority of those cases in his federal habeas corpus proceeding. ( Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. ___ [117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 376-378, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1135-1136].) In the course of explaining why Clemons was not a new rule under Teague v. Lane, supra, 489 U.S. 288 , | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Godfrey v. Georgia
green
1 sentence1993In rejecting Mississippi's argument, the high court held that with respect to the Mississippi capital punishment scheme, neither Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S. 356 , nor Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, 494 U.S. 738 , had announced a new rule, and therefore Stringer was not foreclosed under Teague from relying on the authority of those cases in his federal habeas corpus proceeding. ( Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. ___ [117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 376-378, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1135-1136].) In the course of explaining why Clemons was not a new rule under Teague v. Lane, supra, 489 U.S. 288 , | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Maynard v. Cartwright
green
2 sentences1993In rejecting Mississippi’s argument, the high court held that with respect to the Mississippi capital punishment scheme, neither Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S. 356 , nor Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, 494 U.S. 738 , had announced a new rule, and therefore Stringer was not' foreclosed under Teague from relying on the authority of those cases in his federal habeas corpus proceeding. 1993In rejecting Mississippi's argument, the high court held that with respect to the Mississippi capital punishment scheme, neither Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S. 356 , nor Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, 494 U.S. 738 , had announced a new rule, and therefore Stringer was not foreclosed under Teague from relying on the authority of those cases in his federal habeas corpus proceeding. ( Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. ___ [117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 376-378, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1135-1136].) In the course of explaining why Clemons was not a new rule under Teague v. Lane, supra, 489 U.S. 288 , | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
1 sentence1990Contrary to one of appellant’s arguments, these well-defined principles comprise a decisional exception to the statutory requirement that court documents relating to a warrant become a public record after the warrant is executed. (§ 1534, subd. (a).) Opportunity to Traverse Appellant argues, however, that the sealing of affidavits is inconsistent with his right to raise questions concerning the legal sufficiency of the warrant under Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. 213 , and his due process right protected by the Franks decision to attack the veracity of the facts alleged in the affidavit. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Franks v. Delaware
green
1 sentence1990Under Franks , if the defendant makes a “substantial *1292 preliminary showing” that an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains a false statement which was necessary to a finding of probable cause, the defendant is entitled under the Fourth Amendment to a hearing. ( Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156 [ 57 L.Ed.2d at p. 672 ]; People v. Broome (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1479, 1490 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 854 ].) Appellant suggests that a defendant cannot meet the burden of making a “substantial preliminary showing” if a large part or all of an affidavit is sealed. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ellison v. City of San Buenaventura
green
1 sentence1988Club v. Los Angeles (1920) 182 Cal. 392, 404 [ 188 P. 554 , 9 A.L.R. 1200 ]; see also Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 19 Cal.2d 19, 24-25 [ 119 P.2d 1 ]; Ellison v. City of San Buenaventura, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 457 .) The immunity provided by this decisional rule is inapplicable where the upstream improvements divert water out of the natural channel. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Zeitlin v. Arnebergh
green
2 sentences1970Code, § 311.) [*] (Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) Proceedings Before Trial, § 144, p. 137.) Only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause. ( Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 645 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ].) [7] It is noted that the Legislature appears to take cognizance of the decisional rule that a pretrial on-the-merits consideration of the character of the involved material (obscene or not obscene) is available to a defendant. ( Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, supra, 59 Cal.2d 901 ; Aday v. Municipal Court, supr 1970(Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, supra, 59 Cal.2d 901 ; Aday v. Municipal Court, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d 229 .) Subparagraph (n) thereof states that nothing contained in section 1538.5 “shall prohibit a person making a motion, otherwise permitted by law, to return property [subparagraph (n) does not mention suppression of evidence], brought on the ground that the property obtained is protected by the free speech . . . provisions of the . . . constitutions.” and that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed as altering . . . the law relating to the burden of proof regarding . . . seizure . . . .” Sect | 1 | 1970–1970 |
People v. De Renzy
green
2 sentences1970The second case is People v. de Renzy, * 275 Cal.App.2d 380 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 777 ]. 1970The second case is People v. de Renzy, * 275 Cal.App.2d 380 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 777 ]. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Aday v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences1970Code, § 311.) [*] (Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) Proceedings Before Trial, § 144, p. 137.) Only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause. ( Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 645 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ].) [7] It is noted that the Legislature appears to take cognizance of the decisional rule that a pretrial on-the-merits consideration of the character of the involved material (obscene or not obscene) is available to a defendant. ( Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, supra, 59 Cal.2d 901 ; Aday v. Municipal Court, supr 1970(Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, supra, 59 Cal.2d 901 ; Aday v. Municipal Court, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d 229 .) Subparagraph (n) thereof states that nothing contained in section 1538.5 “shall prohibit a person making a motion, otherwise permitted by law, to return property [subparagraph (n) does not mention suppression of evidence], brought on the ground that the property obtained is protected by the free speech . . . provisions of the . . . constitutions.” and that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed as altering . . . the law relating to the burden of proof regarding . . . seizure . . . .” Sect | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Wyoming Pacific Oil Co. v. Preston
green
2 sentences1969Oil Co. v. Preston (1958) 50 Cal.2d 736 [ 329 P.2d 489 ]).” We accordingly affirm that in a proper case the courts of this state have discretion to recognize decisional or implied exceptions to the apparently stringent rule as provided in the Wyoming Pacific Oil Co. case, supra. *752 However, it appears to us that the trial court could not have reached any other conclusion than it did under the facts disclosed by the record. 1969Oil Co. v. Preston (1958) 50 Cal.2d 736 [ 329 P.2d 489 ]).” We accordingly affirm that in a proper case the courts of this state have discretion to recognize decisional or implied exceptions to the apparently stringent rule as provided in the Wyoming Pacific Oil Co. case, supra. *752 However, it appears to us that the trial court could not have reached any other conclusion than it did under the facts disclosed by the record. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Palmer v. Wahler green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Crofoot v. Spivak green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Porter v. Cirod, Inc. green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.