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6 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stoecker v. Echevarriagreen1 sentence2026Stoecker v. Echevarria, 408 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
5303 Realty Corp. v. O & Y Equity Corp.green2 sentences1991(Chambi v. Navarro, Vives & Cia, 95 A.D.2d 667 [ 463 N.Y.S.2d 218 ]; Doar v. Kozick, 87 A.D.2d 603 , 448 N.Y.S.2d 56 ; CPLR 6501; see 5303 Realty Corp. v. O & Y Equity Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 313 , 486 N.Y.S.2d 877 , 476 N.E.2d 276 ). 1991(Chambi v. Navarro, Vives & Cia, 95 A.D.2d 667 [ 463 N.Y.S.2d 218 ]; Doar v. Kozick, 87 A.D.2d 603 , 448 N.Y.S.2d 56 ; CPLR 6501; see 5303 Realty Corp. v. O & Y Equity Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 313 , 486 N.Y.S.2d 877 , 476 N.E.2d 276 ). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sachergreen1 sentence1990Concurring in the Court of Appeals judgment in United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 455 (2d Cir.1950), aff'd, 343 U.S. 1 , 72 S.Ct. 451 , 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952), Judge Jerome Frank observed: Undeniably, to punish summarily for contempt — to charge and hold a man guilty of a crime without a trial — is, and should be, an extraordinary exception in a civilized legal system; ordinarily, in this country an accused person is constitutionally entitled to a trial and before someone other than his accuser. | 1 | 1 |
Furman v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1989The Supreme Court has developed a highly complex body of law to effectuate the eighth-amendment guarantee that in order to avoid the arbitrariness that would violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, capital-punishment sentencing schemes must not result in death sentences that are "wantonly and * * * freakishly imposed" and "are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 , 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2762 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 346, 390 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 1989The Supreme Court has developed a highly complex body of law to effectuate the eighth-amendment guarantee that in order to avoid the arbitrariness that would violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, capital-punishment sentencing schemes must not result in death sentences that are "wantonly and * * * freakishly imposed" and "are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 , 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2762 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 346, 390 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence2004Foremost among them are the demands placed on counsel, for whom “[cjapital cases present an extraordinary challenge.” Ibid. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Doar v. Kozick
green
2 sentences1991(Chambi v. Navarro, Vives & Cia, 95 A.D.2d 667 [ 463 N.Y.S.2d 218 ]; Doar v. Kozick, 87 A.D.2d 603 , 448 N.Y.S.2d 56 ; CPLR 6501; see 5303 Realty Corp. v. O & Y Equity Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 313 , 486 N.Y.S.2d 877 , 476 N.E.2d 276 ). 1991(Chambi v. Navarro, Vives & Cia, 95 A.D.2d 667 [ 463 N.Y.S.2d 218 ]; Doar v. Kozick, 87 A.D.2d 603 , 448 N.Y.S.2d 56 ; CPLR 6501; see 5303 Realty Corp. v. O & Y Equity Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 313 , 486 N.Y.S.2d 877 , 476 N.E.2d 276 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Chambi v. Navarro, Vives & Cia, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1991(Chambi v. Navarro, Vives & Cia, 95 A.D.2d 667 [ 463 N.Y.S.2d 218 ]; Doar v. Kozick, 87 A.D.2d 603 , 448 N.Y.S.2d 56 ; CPLR 6501; see 5303 Realty Corp. v. O & Y Equity Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 313 , 486 N.Y.S.2d 877 , 476 N.E.2d 276 ). 1991(Chambi v. Navarro, Vives & Cia, 95 A.D.2d 667 [ 463 N.Y.S.2d 218 ]; Doar v. Kozick, 87 A.D.2d 603 , 448 N.Y.S.2d 56 ; CPLR 6501; see 5303 Realty Corp. v. O & Y Equity Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 313 , 486 N.Y.S.2d 877 , 476 N.E.2d 276 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Sacher v. United States
green
2 sentences1990Concurring in the Court of Appeals judgment in United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 455 (2d Cir.1950), aff'd, 343 U.S. 1 , 72 S.Ct. 451 , 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952), Judge Jerome Frank observed: Undeniably, to punish summarily for contempt — to charge and hold a man guilty of a crime without a trial — is, and should be, an extraordinary exception in a civilized legal system; ordinarily, in this country an accused person is constitutionally entitled to a trial and before someone other than his accuser. 1990Concurring in the Court of Appeals judgment in United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 455 (2d Cir.1950), aff'd, 343 U.S. 1 , 72 S.Ct. 451 , 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952), Judge Jerome Frank observed: Undeniably, to punish summarily for contempt — to charge and hold a man guilty of a crime without a trial — is, and should be, an extraordinary exception in a civilized legal system; ordinarily, in this country an accused person is constitutionally entitled to a trial and before someone other than his accuser. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
O'Regan v. Schermerhorn
green
1 sentence1952This freedom of action is given by law to such officers, not for their own sake but for the sake of the public, and for the advancement of justice; that being free from civil liability they may be free in thought and independent in judgment as all who are called upon to administer justice ought to be." O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 N.J. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Smith v. Parman
green
2 sentences1952Yaselli v. Goff, supra ; Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115 , 165 Pac. 663 , L.R.A. 1917 F. 698 ( Sup. Ct. Kan. 1917); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117 , 44 N.E. 1001 ( Sup. Ct. Ind. 1896); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Oreg. 641 , 222 Pac. 318 , 228 P. 135 , 34 A.L.R. 1489 ( Sup. Ct. Oreg. 1924); Edelman v. Dunn, supra. The sole purpose of the grant of this extraordinary immunity from civil suit is the consequent freedom in the use of discretion required of a quasi -judicial officer, or as once said by our former Justice Ackerson, "* * * the ground on which the foregoing rule of privilege rests is that, 1952Yaselli v. Goff, supra ; Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115 , 165 Pac. 663 , L.R.A. 1917 F. 698 ( Sup. Ct. Kan. 1917); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117 , 44 N.E. 1001 ( Sup. Ct. Ind. 1896); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Oreg. 641 , 222 Pac. 318 , 228 P. 135 , 34 A.L.R. 1489 ( Sup. Ct. Oreg. 1924); Edelman v. Dunn, supra. The sole purpose of the grant of this extraordinary immunity from civil suit is the consequent freedom in the use of discretion required of a quasi -judicial officer, or as once said by our former Justice Ackerson, "* * * the ground on which the foregoing rule of privilege rests is that, | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Edelman v. Dunn
green
1 sentence1952Yaselli v. Goff, supra ; Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115 , 165 Pac. 663 , L.R.A. 1917 F. 698 ( Sup. Ct. Kan. 1917); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117 , 44 N.E. 1001 ( Sup. Ct. Ind. 1896); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Oreg. 641 , 222 Pac. 318 , 228 P. 135 , 34 A.L.R. 1489 ( Sup. Ct. Oreg. 1924); Edelman v. Dunn, supra. The sole purpose of the grant of this extraordinary immunity from civil suit is the consequent freedom in the use of discretion required of a quasi -judicial officer, or as once said by our former Justice Ackerson, "* * * the ground on which the foregoing rule of privilege rests is that, | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Watts v. Gerking
green
2 sentences1952Yaselli v. Goff, supra ; Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115 , 165 Pac. 663 , L.R.A. 1917 F. 698 ( Sup. Ct. Kan. 1917); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117 , 44 N.E. 1001 ( Sup. Ct. Ind. 1896); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Oreg. 641 , 222 Pac. 318 , 228 P. 135 , 34 A.L.R. 1489 ( Sup. Ct. Oreg. 1924); Edelman v. Dunn, supra. The sole purpose of the grant of this extraordinary immunity from civil suit is the consequent freedom in the use of discretion required of a quasi -judicial officer, or as once said by our former Justice Ackerson, "* * * the ground on which the foregoing rule of privilege rests is that, 1952Yaselli v. Goff, supra ; Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115 , 165 Pac. 663 , L.R.A. 1917 F. 698 ( Sup. Ct. Kan. 1917); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117 , 44 N.E. 1001 ( Sup. Ct. Ind. 1896); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Oreg. 641 , 222 Pac. 318 , 228 P. 135 , 34 A.L.R. 1489 ( Sup. Ct. Oreg. 1924); Edelman v. Dunn, supra. The sole purpose of the grant of this extraordinary immunity from civil suit is the consequent freedom in the use of discretion required of a quasi -judicial officer, or as once said by our former Justice Ackerson, "* * * the ground on which the foregoing rule of privilege rests is that, | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Griffith v. Slinkard
green
2 sentences1952Yaselli v. Goff, supra ; Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115 , 165 Pac. 663 , L.R.A. 1917 F. 698 ( Sup. Ct. Kan. 1917); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117 , 44 N.E. 1001 ( Sup. Ct. Ind. 1896); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Oreg. 641 , 222 Pac. 318 , 228 P. 135 , 34 A.L.R. 1489 ( Sup. Ct. Oreg. 1924); Edelman v. Dunn, supra. The sole purpose of the grant of this extraordinary immunity from civil suit is the consequent freedom in the use of discretion required of a quasi -judicial officer, or as once said by our former Justice Ackerson, "* * * the ground on which the foregoing rule of privilege rests is that, 1952Yaselli v. Goff, supra ; Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115 , 165 Pac. 663 , L.R.A. 1917 F. 698 ( Sup. Ct. Kan. 1917); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117 , 44 N.E. 1001 ( Sup. Ct. Ind. 1896); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Oreg. 641 , 222 Pac. 318 , 228 P. 135 , 34 A.L.R. 1489 ( Sup. Ct. Oreg. 1924); Edelman v. Dunn, supra. The sole purpose of the grant of this extraordinary immunity from civil suit is the consequent freedom in the use of discretion required of a quasi -judicial officer, or as once said by our former Justice Ackerson, "* * * the ground on which the foregoing rule of privilege rests is that, | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.