extraordinary factors (California) · Go Syfert
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extraordinary factors in California

7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1880–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
In Re Sturmgreen
cal · 1974 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
2 sentences

1978(See In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 265-270 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; Way v. Superior Court [1977] 74 Cal.App.3d 165, 172-173 .)” (At pp. 784-785.) Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is manifest that the CRB acted well within its discretion.

1978(See In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 265-270 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; Way v. Superior Court [1977] 74 Cal.App.3d 165, 172-173 .)” (At pp. 784-785.) Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is manifest that the CRB acted well within its discretion.

22
Robertson v. Rodriguezgreen
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Code, § 1717 attorney fees as costs]; Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 360 [jurisdiction to rule on motion for statutory attorney fees as costs]; Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461 [same].) As for the contention that the court sua sponte awarded attorney fees in violation of Hixon’s due process rights after the Zipperts’ counsel filed a purportedly unsolicited supplemental declaration, we have already addressed this extraordinary claim.

11
Carpenter v. JACK IN THE BOX CORP.green
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Code, § 1717 attorney fees as costs]; Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 360 [jurisdiction to rule on motion for statutory attorney fees as costs]; Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461 [same].) As for the contention that the court sua sponte awarded attorney fees in violation of Hixon’s due process rights after the Zipperts’ counsel filed a purportedly unsolicited supplemental declaration, we have already addressed this extraordinary claim.

11
In Re Graygreen
calctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
2 sentences

1978“The statute appears to require that such a longer term be justified on the basis of certain objective facts, viz. (1) the number of crimes of which the prisoner was convicted; (2) the number of prior convictions; (3) the fact that the prisoner was armed; or (4) that he used a deadly weapon; or (5) that he inflicted great bodily harm on the victim; this is further implied by the due process guarantees written into the law, including an inmates’ right to counsel and to be ‘informed in writing of the extraordinary factors specifically considered determinative and on what basis the release date h

1978“The statute appears to require that such a longer term be justified on the basis of certain objective facts, viz. (1) the number of crimes of which the prisoner was convicted; (2) the number of prior convictions; (3) the fact that the prisoner was armed; or (4) that he used a deadly weapon; or (5) that he inflicted great bodily harm on the victim; this is further implied by the due process guarantees written into the law, including an inmates’ right to counsel and to be ‘informed in writing of the extraordinary factors specifically considered determinative and on what basis the release date h

11
Hinojosa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Boardgreen
cal · 1972 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
2 sentences

1976Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 157 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 ].) An injury incurred during such travel is compensable, however, in “special” situations “in which the employer, because of benefit to himself, places an extraordinary requirement upon the employee, thereby re-establishing the employment relationship in the case of transit,- and imposing liability on the employer in the case of the employee’s injury.” ( 8 Cal.3d at p. 159 .) [] At the time of the accident, petitioner was carrying report cards, papers, books, art activities material, ánd sewing thread spools in her car.

1976Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 157 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 ].) An injury incurred during such travel is compensable, however, in “special” situations “in which the employer, because of benefit to himself, places an extraordinary requirement upon the employee, thereby re-establishing the employment relationship in the case of transit,- and imposing liability on the employer in the case of the employee’s injury.” ( 8 Cal.3d at p. 159 .) [] At the time of the accident, petitioner was carrying report cards, papers, books, art activities material, ánd sewing thread spools in her car.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Way v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty. green
calctapp · 1977
2 sentences

1978That objective justification is required is further implied by the due process guarantees written into the law, including an inmate’s right to counsel, and to be “ ‘informed in writing of the extraordinary factors specifically considered determinative and on what basis the release date has been calculated.’ ” (Way v. Superior Court, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d 165, 173 .) “But having thus seemingly narrowed the board’s discretion, the Legislature ends on a broad discretionary note: ‘In fixing a term under this section the board shall be guided by, but not limited to, the term which reasonably could b

1978(See In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 265-270 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; Way v. Superior Court [1977] 74 Cal.App.3d 165, 172-173 .)” (At pp. 784-785.) Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is manifest that the CRB acted well within its discretion.

31978–1978
In Re Greenwood green
calctapp · 1978
1 sentence

1978In fixing a term under this section the board shall be guided by, but not limited to, the term which reasonably could be imposed on a person who committed a similar offense under similar circumstances on or after July 1, 1977, and further, the board shall be guided by the following finding and declaration hereby made by the Legislature: that the necessity to protect the public from repetition of extraordinary crimes of violence against the person is the paramount consideration.'” (Italics added.) In analyzing the authority of the CRB under section 1170.2, subdivision (b), we concluded In re Gr

11978–1978
Caldwell v. United States green
cadc · 1953
1 sentence

1975In short, the extraordinary hearing held in Caldwell v. United States, supra, 205 F.2d 879, 880 , could have been held in this case.

11975–1975
People ex rel. Central National Bank v. Fitzgerald neutral
nysupct · 1877
1 sentence

1880In The People v. Fitzgerald, 54 How.

11880–1880

Where else courts name it

PA 31 (1925–2026) NY 23 (1871–2025) VA 14 (1987–2025) IL 12 (1956–2022) GA 10 (2006–2022) CA 7 (1880–2015) OH 6 (2004–2022) NJ 6 (1952–2026) TX 5 (1997–2026) MO 4 (1881–1978) WA 4 (1995–2026) SC 4 (2002–2012) IA 4 (1914–2020) NC 4 (1991–2017) MD 4 (1969–2010) CT 3 (1919–2018) MT 3 (1978–1982) WV 2 (1935–1991) MI 2 (2019–2019) UT 2 (1989–1992) LA 2 (1930–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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