ministerial exception in New Jersey

2024In Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-96 , and Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 746-62, the Supreme Court applied the ministerial exception in employment discrimination settings, focusing its inquiry on the fact-sensitive question whether a religious organization’s former employee constituted a “minister” under the First Amendment.

2024The Supreme Court also dispensed with the notion that the ministerial exception is limited to settings in which a minister seeks the remedy of reinstatement to the ministerial position; the Supreme Court considered it “immaterial” that the teacher had abandoned her claim for reinstatement, and stated that an award of damages and attorneys’ fees “would operate as a penalty on the [c]hurch for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no 2 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict among federal appellate courts as to “whether the ministerial exception is a jurisdictional bar o

2024The United States Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, holding that the exception “ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the [religious institution’s] faithful -- ‘a matter strictly ecclesiastical’ -- is the church’s alone.” 565 U.S. 171 , 194-95 1 (2012) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)).

2024The Court emphasized that the matter before it was an employment discrimination case, and it “express[ed] no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.” Id. at 196 .

2024Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)); see also Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine provides that a civil court may not adjudicate ‘the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision relating to government of the religious polity.’” (quoting Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 , 878 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987))). 14 and the parties conducted discovery limited to the question whether Hyman was a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception.

2024Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)); see also Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine provides that a civil court may not adjudicate ‘the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision relating to government of the religious polity.’” (quoting Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 , 878 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987))). 14 and the parties conducted discovery limited to the question whether Hyman was a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception.

2024See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 768 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that the appellate courts that adopted the ministerial exception prior to Hosanna-Tabor “had long understood that the exception’s stark departure from antidiscrimination law is narrow” and “treaded ‘case-by-case’” because of the “exception’s ‘potential for abuse.’” (quoting Scharon v. Saint Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 , 363 n.3 (8th Cir. 1991))).

2024See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 768 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that the appellate courts that adopted the ministerial exception prior to Hosanna-Tabor “had long understood that the exception’s stark departure from antidiscrimination law is narrow” and “treaded ‘case-by-case’” because of the “exception’s ‘potential for abuse.’” (quoting Scharon v. Saint Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 , 363 n.3 (8th Cir. 1991))).

2024Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)); see also Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine provides that a civil court may not adjudicate ‘the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision relating to government of the religious polity.’” (quoting Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 , 878 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987))). 14 and the parties conducted discovery limited to the question whether Hyman was a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception.

2024See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 , 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that the ministerial exception did not bar a minister’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim against a religious institution because the claim depended on the truth or falsity of what the institution had promised the plaintiff and “the state’s prohibition against fraud [did] not infringe upon [the institution’s] freedom to select its ministers”).

2024With no reference to McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26 (2002), the Appellate Division held that “the ministerial exception applies to bar tort claims, provided (1) the injured party is a minister formerly employed by a religious institution and (2) the claims are related to the religious institution’s employment decision.” 474 N.J.

2024We adopt the standard prescribed in McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 51 (2002), subject to modifications conforming that standard to recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, as the governing test for a court’s determination whether the ministerial exception bars a tort claim asserted by a religious institution’s former employee who is a minister.

2024See Sumner v. Simpson Univ., 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 221-23 (Ct. App. 2018) (dismissing 26 this Court prescribed a standard for courts to apply when they determine whether a given claim is barred by the exception.

2002Gellington, supra, 203 F.3d at 1301, 1303 (barring Title VII claim by minister alleging constructive discharge and retaliation after being reassigned to church 800 miles away from his home with substantial reduction in salary).

2002Gellington, supra, 203 F.3d at 1301, 1303 (barring Title VII claim by minister alleging constructive discharge and retaliation after being reassigned to church 800 miles away from his home with substantial reduction in salary).

2001To paraphrase the Ninth Circuit's four dissenters on the denial of the rehearing petition in Bollard, a decision to entertain plaintiff's action here would require the judicial branch to delve into religious matters outside our province, such as the conditions of the plaintiff's association with the Diocese; its disciplinary and supervisory decisions; whether plaintiff would have otherwise been ordained into the priesthood; and the extent to which he could be made whole from loss of a life of spiritual service, and the proper measure of compensation for the emotional pain he suffers from this

2001To paraphrase the Ninth Circuit's four dissenters on the denial of the rehearing petition in Bollard, a decision to entertain plaintiff's action here would require the judicial branch to delve into religious matters outside our province, such as the conditions of the plaintiff's association with the Diocese; its disciplinary and supervisory decisions; whether plaintiff would have otherwise been ordained into the priesthood; and the extent to which he could be made whole from loss of a life of spiritual service, and the proper measure of compensation for the emotional pain he suffers from this

1997Id at 294-95, 608 A.2d 206 ; Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 128 N.J. 303, 306 , 608 A.2d 218 (1992).

1989In the absence of some legislative restriction, administrative agencies have the inherent power to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders that have been entered. [ Ruvoldt v. Nolan, 63 N.J. 171, 183 (1973), quoting from Burl.