ministerial exception in California

2026He argued that the ministerial exception did not apply to his claims because under two United States Supreme Court cases—Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 7 School v. E.E.O.C. (2012) 565 U.S. 171 (Hosanna-Tabor) and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) 591 U.S. 732 (Our Lady)—the exception exempts religious organizations only from “antidiscrimination laws in the context of hiring and firing their ministers,” which he did not allege here.

2026Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.” (Hosanna-Tabor, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 181 .) This rule acquired the label “ministerial exception.” (Our Lady, supra, 591 at p. 746; Lorenzo, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 269.) The United States Supreme Court first recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 171 .

2018Blease, Acting P. J. *210 *579 "The First Amendment guarantees to a religious institution the right to decide matters affecting its ministers' employment, free from the scrutiny and second-guessing of the civil courts." ( Schmoll v. Chapman University (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1434 , 1436, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 ( Schmoll ).) The so-called ministerial exception is "a 'nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled' exception to federal civil rights legislation. [Citation.] The idea is that the law should not be construed to govern the relationship of *580 a church and its ministers." ( Hope Internat.

2018Blease, Acting P. J. *210 *579 "The First Amendment guarantees to a religious institution the right to decide matters affecting its ministers' employment, free from the scrutiny and second-guessing of the civil courts." ( Schmoll v. Chapman University (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1434 , 1436, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 ( Schmoll ).) The so-called ministerial exception is "a 'nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled' exception to federal civil rights legislation. [Citation.] The idea is that the law should not be construed to govern the relationship of *580 a church and its ministers." ( Hope Internat.

2011Cir. 1996) 317 U.S. App.D.C. 343 [ 83 F.3d 455, 461 ].) The “exception encompasses all employees of a religious institution, whether ordained or not, whose primary functions serve its spiritual and pastoral mission.” (Id., 83 F.3d at p. 463 .) “Although the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the ministerial exception,[ 6 ] the lower federal courts have widely embraced it, applying it both to ministers and to a variety of nonordained employees with duties functionally equivalent to those of ministers.” (Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p.

2008In Gunn I, the majority opinion explained as follows: “[T]he ministerial exception ‘bars courts from reviewing employment decisions by religious organizations affecting employees who have the religious duties of ministers. [Citations.]’ (Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 527, 543 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 85 P.3d 67 ] (Catholic Charities).) . . . [f] . . . [][] The ministerial exception can apply to otherwise actionable claims of defamation and invasion of privacy, when based on statements ‘related to the hiring, firing, discipline or administration of cle

2026(See Our Lady, supra, 591 U.S. at p. 747 [ministerial exception bars only ‘certain employment discrimination claims’].) Instead, ‘the scope of the ministerial exception . . . is limited to what is necessary to comply with the First Amendment.’ (Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3d 940 , 947 (Bollard).) And barring a minister’s employment claim without any evidence that the claim would raise an ecclesiastical concern is necessary to comply with the First Amendment only if that claim will inevitably ‘thrust the secular courts into the constitutionally u

2025(See Our Lady, supra, 591 U.S. at p. 747 [ministerial exception bars only “certain employment discrimination claims”].) Instead, “the scope of the ministerial exception . . . is limited to what is necessary to comply with the First Amendment.” (Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3d 940 , 947 (Bollard).) And barring a minister’s employment claim without any evidence that the claim would raise an ecclesiastical concern is necessary to comply with the First Amendment only if that claim will inevitably “thrust the secular courts into the constitutionally u

2021Finally, they argued their communications with the media were protected by the common interest privilege, Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), 5 and barred by the ministerial exception.6 They argued Foley’s claim for intentional 5 Civil Code section 47 provides in pertinent part that a publication or broadcast is privileged if made: “(c) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be

2018However, Hosanna-Tabor specifically stated that it expressed "no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers." ( Id . at p. 196, 132 S.Ct. 694 .) Prior to Hosanna-Tabor , one California Appellate Court held that the ministerial exception prevented the court from deciding a cause of action for breach of an implied employment contract to terminate only for good cause. ( Schmoll, supra , 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1437, 1444, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 .) Schmoll, who was a minister and cha

2026African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Prioleau (D.C. 2012) 49 A.3d 812 , 817 . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] “Thus, the ministerial exception does not bar every employment claim for lost or unpaid wages.

2019App. 2012) 49 A.3d 812, 817 [ministerial exception did not bar minister’s breach of contract action against church because it would not “require the court to entangle itself in church doctrine”]; Bollard v. California Province of Soc. of Jesus (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3d 940 (Bollard) [ministerial exception did not bar novice priest’s sexual harassment claim against Jesuit order].) For all of these reasons, I would reject the expansive application of the ministerial exception suggested by the Temple, and instead adopt the narrower construction articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Bollard, supra, 1

2018Seminary (Ky. 2014) 426 S.W.3d 597 ( Kirby ), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a seminary was a religious institution under the ministerial exception.

2018University v. Superior Court, supra , 119 Cal.App.4th at pages 736-737, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 643 , noted that although education presents more conceptual difficulties when determining whether an employee is a minister for purposes of the exception, "where the school itself is a seminary-that is, exclusively preoccupied with religion and the training of a religion's own clergy as distinct from more general learning-the ministerial exception has been categorically applied to faculty, ordained or not." In Kirby, supra, 426 S.W.3d 597 , 603, 611-612, the Kentucky Supreme Court considered whether a tenur

2026“As Justice Edmon explained in her concurring opinion in Su v. Stephen S. Wise Temple (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1175 (Su), the ministerial exception does not bar an employment claim ‘simply because the person on whose behalf a suit is brought is a minister . . . .’ [Citation.] This is because ‘the aspect of the church-minister employment relationship that warrants heightened constitutional protection—a church’s freedom to choose its representatives’—is not ‘present’ in every employment claim.

2025But the Center does not explain why, and its omission is telling. 13 As Justice Edmon explained in her concurring opinion in Su v. Stephen S. Wise Temple (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1175 (Su), the ministerial exception does not bar an employment claim “simply because the person on whose behalf a suit is brought is a minister . . . .” (See also Bollard, supra, 196 F.3d at p. 947 [“it strays too far from the rationale of the Free Exercise Clause to extend constitutional protection to this sort of disciplinary inaction simply because a minister is the target as well as the agent of the harassing

2025Under that exception, courts must “stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions” (Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) 591 U.S. 732 , 746 (Our Lady)), if those disputes will, by their very nature, require “the court to resolve a religious controversy” (Sumner v. Simpson University (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 577, 590 (Sumner)).

2025(Sumner, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 593 .) In support of this holding, the court found that the resolution of the contract claim “does not require a review of [the plaintiff’s] religious qualification or performance as a religious leader.” (Ibid.) In other words, the plaintiff’s claim did not inevitably raise a matter of ecclesiastical concern.

2011(Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc. (4th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 299, 306 .) “The ministerial exception doctrine is based on the notion a church’s appointment of its clergy, along with such closely related issues as clerical salaries, assignments, working conditions and termination of employment, is an inherently religious function because clergy are such an integral part of a church’s functioning as a religious institution. [Citation.]” (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 417, 433 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 ].) Therefore, “secular cour

2011(Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc. (4th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 299, 306 .) “The ministerial exception doctrine is based on the notion a church’s appointment of its clergy, along with such closely related issues as clerical salaries, assignments, working conditions and termination of employment, is an inherently religious function because clergy are such an integral part of a church’s functioning as a religious institution. [Citation.]” (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 417, 433 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 ].) Therefore, “secular cour

2026The trial court denied the motion, finding that Ehrenkranz’s “putative employer posted the required undertaking,” adding, “The fact that Smith and Galijan are individuals that allegedly acted on behalf of the employer and can also be liable as the employer does not mean that they too needed to file duplicative undertakings.” Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment On April 12, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication, “on the ground that the action has no merit because the ministerial exception of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applie

2025They relied primarily on Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 668 (Alcazar I), affirmed in part and vacated in part in Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 1288 (Alcazar II), a case in which the Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception barred a minister’s minimum wage claims against his religious employer.

2011Cir. 1996) 317 U.S. App.D.C. 343 [ 83 F.3d 455, 461 ].) The “exception encompasses all employees of a religious institution, whether ordained or not, whose primary functions serve its spiritual and pastoral mission.” (Id., 83 F.3d at p. 463 .) “Although the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the ministerial exception,[ 6 ] the lower federal courts have widely embraced it, applying it both to ministers and to a variety of nonordained employees with duties functionally equivalent to those of ministers.” (Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p.

2011Cir. 1996) 317 U.S. App.D.C. 343 [ 83 F.3d 455, 461 ].) The “exception encompasses all employees of a religious institution, whether ordained or not, whose primary functions serve its spiritual and pastoral mission.” (Id., 83 F.3d at p. 463 .) “Although the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the ministerial exception,[ 6 ] the lower federal courts have widely embraced it, applying it both to ministers and to a variety of nonordained employees with duties functionally equivalent to those of ministers.” (Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p.

2025(Markel, at p. 803.) Meanwhile, Alcazar II merely adopted, “in all . . . respects,” the portion of the three-judge panel’s decision “holding that the [ministerial] exception applies to the minimum-wage claim at issue.” (Alcazar II, supra, 627 F.3d at p. 1290.) The panel’s decision, in turn, relied primarily on a quote from McClure v. Salvation Army (5th Cir. 1972) 460 F.2d 553 (McClure), the first published case to articulate the ministerial exception, to justify its application of the exception to bar the plaintiff’s minimum wage claim.

2004(McClure, supra, 460 F.2d at p. 555 .) The court held that the First Amendment necessarily exempted the church from the strictures of the federal civil rights laws in that context, noting that a minister is the “the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose.” (McClure, at pp. 559, 561.) The basic contours of the ministerial exception as now developed in the common law are fairly stable.

2021Finally, they argued their communications with the media were protected by the common interest privilege, Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), 5 and barred by the ministerial exception.6 They argued Foley’s claim for intentional 5 Civil Code section 47 provides in pertinent part that a publication or broadcast is privileged if made: “(c) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be

2019Cal. 2015) 136 F.Supp.3d 1094 , 1113–1115, [sexual harassment claim brought by a teacher at Catholic high school was not barred by the ministerial exception because she was not an ordained minister, was not “called,” and lacked a theological education]; but see Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish 15 Day School (7th Cir. 2018) 882 F.3d 655 , 656–662 [applying ministerial exception to Jewish grade school teacher]; Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tustin (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1041 [applying ministerial exception to Protestant preschool teacher; decided prior to Hosanna-Tabor].) The pre

2018University v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 719 , 734, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 643 .) The Supreme Court has concluded that the ministerial exception bars a minister's employment discrimination suit based on the church's decision to fire her. ( Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC (2012) 565 U.S. 171 , 196, 132 S.Ct. 694 , 181 L.Ed.2d 650 ( Hosanna-Tabor ) ) The Supreme Court has not decided whether the exception bars a breach of contract or tort action. ( Ibid . ) That is the issue we decide in this case.

2018University v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 719 , 734, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 643 .) The Supreme Court has concluded that the ministerial exception bars a minister's employment discrimination suit based on the church's decision to fire her. ( Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC (2012) 565 U.S. 171 , 196, 132 S.Ct. 694 , 181 L.Ed.2d 650 ( Hosanna-Tabor ) ) The Supreme Court has not decided whether the exception bars a breach of contract or tort action. ( Ibid . ) That is the issue we decide in this case.

2004United Methodist Church (5th Cir.1999) 173 F.3d 343 , 345-350.) The rule that emerges from these decisions is sometimes called the "ministerial exception," because it operates as a nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled exception to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., hereafter titlE VII.) The Fifth Circuit first recognized the ministerial exception in McClure v. Salvation Army, supra, 460 F.2d 553 .

2004Ann Conf United Methodist Church, supra, 173 F.3d 343 , 347-350; E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America, supra, 83 F.3d 455, 460-463 ; cf. Schmoll v. Chapman University, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1438-1445 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 [recognizing a ministerial exception to state employment laws].) Most organizations entitled to invoke the ministerial exemption will be involved in the "inculcation of religious values," which the first criterion requires. (health & Saf.Code, § 1367.25, subd. (b)(1)(A).) many will also satisfy the WCEA's fourth exemption criterion, which requires that a religious

2026As Judge Bress observed in his concurring opinion in Huntsman v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (9th Cir. 2025) 127 F.4th 784, 798 , footnote 2 (Huntsman), ‘the church autonomy doctrine would not immunize religious leaders from fraudulently enriching themselves under the guise of religion.’ Likewise, a minister’s claim for unpaid wages pursuant to an employment contract should not be barred without any evidence of a ‘religious justification for’ the breach (Bollard, supra, 196 F.3d at p. 947) because her religious employer already approved those wages

2025(See Huntsman, supra, 127 F.4th at p. 797 (conc. opn. of Bress, J.) [citing Our Lady and Hosanna-Tabor as “[t]he most notable example[s] in recent years” of the application of the church autonomy doctrine].) That doctrine “protects First Amendment values by prohibiting courts from resolving ‘controversies over religious doctrine and practice.’ ” (Huntsman, at p. 792.) Before the doctrine may be applied, “ ‘a threshold inquiry is whether the alleged misconduct is “rooted in religious belief.” ’ ” (Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Internat. (10th Cir. 2022) 36 F.4th 1021, 1029 (Tucker).) In this res

2026The cases are, of course, not binding (see Lorenzo, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 276), as we ourselves have noted in People v. Mackey (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 32 , 87: “ ‘we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s test and are not bound to follow it, even on constitutional questions.’ ” Beyond that, we agree with Lorenzo that the cases “provided little or no analysis to support [their] overly broad interpretation of the ministerial exception.” (Lorenzo, at p. 276.) In Markel, the Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception “encompasses all adverse personnel or tangible employment actions between

2025(See, e.g., People v. Mackey (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 32, 87 [“we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s test and are not bound to follow it, even on constitutional questions”].) We do so again here because the Ninth Circuit has provided little or no analysis to support its overly broad interpretation of the ministerial exception.

2021Finally, they argued their communications with the media were protected by the common interest privilege, Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), 5 and barred by the ministerial exception.6 They argued Foley’s claim for intentional 5 Civil Code section 47 provides in pertinent part that a publication or broadcast is privileged if made: “(c) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be

2018(Ibid.) As to the other statements and actions, the court held the ministerial “exception applies to ‘otherwise actionable claims of defamation and invasion of privacy, when based on statements “related to the hiring, firing, discipline or administration of clergy.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] And that would encompass posttermination acts if they were part of the process of termination.” (Gunn v. Mariners Church, Inc., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 217 .) The ministerial exception applies where the acts and statements are “ ‘part and parcel’ ” of the termination.