ministerial exception in Massachusetts

2020The ministerial exception serves to prevent courts from "interfer[ing] with the internal governance of the church, [and] depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs." Id.

2020Menard argues that the exception should not bar her claim, as she "is not a minster, rabbi, priest, deacon or any person who deals with doctrine, canon law, discipline or any ministerial relationships." However, the Supreme Court was clear in Hosanna-Tabor that "the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation." 565 U.S. at 191 .

2020In Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 Mass. 574, 583 (2002), the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that the doctrine applied to discrimination claims raised under G.

2020In Williams, 436 Mass. at 582-583 , the Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged but did not reach the question of "whether the First Amendment provides a complete barrier to a minister's complaints of conduct by church superiors that properly could be characterized as sexual harassment in the context of an employment discrimination claim." As in Williams, we need not pass on the viability of such an argument, because any allegations of harassment included in Menard's complaint are so threadbare that they are dismissible for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

2020Ind. 1998) (teacher was not a minister, notwithstanding that she "did participate in some religious activities as a teacher at All Saints, but it cannot be fairly said that she functioned as a minister or a member of the clergy"); Geary v. Visitation of Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply the ministerial exception to a lay teacher at a Catholic church school, notwithstanding the teacher's general employment obligation to be a visible witness to the Catholic Church's philosophy and principles); Page 53 of 54 DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166,

2009See e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1993) (math teacher at a Catholic school not within the purview of the ministerial exception).

2020See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that other federal Circuits "have considered a particular employee to be a 'minister' for purposes of the ministerial exception based on the function of the plaintiff's employment position rather than the fact of ordination."); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 , 304 n.6 (3rd Cir. 2006) ("In evaluating whether a particular employee is subject to the ministerial exception, other circuits have concluded that the focus should be on the 'function of the position.") (quoting Rayburn v. General Conferenc

2009See E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Uniu. of Amer., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (C.A.D.C. 1996), quoting Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (the ministerial exception applies to employees of religious institutions whose “primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith... or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship”); E.E.O.C. v. Sw.

2012See Hosanna-Tabor, supra at 712 (Alito, J., concurring) (employees whose “functions are essential to the independence of practically all religious groups” include “those who are entrusted with teaching and conveying the tenets of the faith to the next generation”); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283-284 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982) (members of faculty at Baptist seminary, where “only religiously oriented courses are taught,” covered by ministerial exception because of their religious function in conveying religious doctrine).

2009Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (“ministers” included non-ordained faculty at a Baptist seminary where no course had a secular purpose).

2012See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 , 301 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 903 (2007); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 798-799 (4th Cir. 2000); EEOCs.

2009See E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 802, 804 (4th Cir. 2000) (a music director at the Catholic high school was within the purview of the ministerial exception because music is “a vital means of expressing and celebrating those beliefs which a religious community holds most sacred” and an “integral part of many different religious traditions” and the teacher was the “vessel through whom the church chose to spread its message in song”).

2020In that case, the SJC held that the ministerial exception prohibited discrimination claims asserted by a teacher that "taught religious subjects at a school that functioned solely as a religious school, whose mission was to teach Jewish children about Jewish learning, language, history, traditions, and prayer." Id. at 486 .

2020The Supreme Judicial Court revisited the ministerial exception in Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 463 Mass. 472, 486-487 (2012), wherein the exception served to bar an employment discrimination claim raised by a teacher at a religious school.

2020See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that other federal Circuits "have considered a particular employee to be a 'minister' for purposes of the ministerial exception based on the function of the plaintiff's employment position rather than the fact of ordination."); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 , 304 n.6 (3rd Cir. 2006) ("In evaluating whether a particular employee is subject to the ministerial exception, other circuits have concluded that the focus should be on the 'function of the position.") (quoting Rayburn v. General Conferenc

2020In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that it was important not to "overemphasize" the "performance of secular duties." Id. (rejecting the idea that the ministerial exception --------------------------- [28] Both before and after Hosanna-Tabor, while using a functional approach, many courts focused on the employee's "primary duties." See e.g., Petruska 462 F.3d at 304 n.6 ("As a general rule, an employee will be considered a minister if her primary duties include 'teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision of particip

2020Review Comm'n, 768 N.W.2d 868 , 881 n.16 (Wis. 2009) ("The focus. . . should be on the function of the position, not the title or a categorization of job duties."); Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schs. of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., 875 A.2d 669, 675 (D.C.

2020Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Ky. 2014).

2020In Kant, decided the same day as Kirby, the Supreme Court of Kentucky was "present[ed] [with] the question [of] whether the ministerial exception categorically applie[d] to all professors employed by seminaries." Kant, 426 S.W.3d at 588 .

2020Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Ky. 2014) ("Barring a Salvation Army employee's Title VII claim, the Fifth Circuit, in creating the ministerial exception over forty years ago [in McClure)], relied heavily on preserving church autonomy and not even peeking over the 'wall of separation' between church and state.") (quoting McClure, 460 F.2d at 558 ).

2020For the ministerial exception to apply as a bar to an employment discrimination claim, the employer must demonstrate two things: (a) that it is a religious institution; --------------------------- [21] "The ministerial exception is best understood as a narrow, more focused subsidiary of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine," Kirby, 426 S.W.3d at 604 , which is also called the church autonomy doctrine.

2020In Lishu Yin, another case decided after Hosanna-Tabor, the court held that a multidenominational Christian college that identified itself as a ministry was a religious institution that could invoke the ministerial exception. 335 F. Supp. 3d at 814 — 815.

2020The court concluded that the college "possesse[d] 'obvious religious characteristics," because it "train[ed] Christians for global missions, full-time Christian ministry in a variety of strategic professions, and marketplace ministry." Id. at 815 (citation omitted).

2020Two such cases are EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), and Winberv.

2020Page 28 of 54 Id. at 485 (emphasis added).

2020Id. at 1177 .

2020Id. at 1177 .

2020DeWeese-Boyd's work did not make her a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception.[34] See Richardson v. Northwest Christian Univ., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1145 (D.

2020At bottom, "[i]f [DeWeese-Boyd] was a minister, it is hard to see how any teacher at a religious school would fall outside the exception." Richardson, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 1145 .

2020In Shaliehsabou, the Fourth Circuit observed that it "ha[d] never addressed whether the phrase 'religious institution,' in the context of the ministerial exception, applie[d] only to churches or church-operated entities, or whether it ha[d] broader meaning." Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310 .

2020There, without "decid[ing] the full reach of the phrase 'religious institution," id. at 311 , the Fourth Circuit held that the ministerial exception applied to a "religiously affiliated" Jewish nursing home because: (a) "its By-Laws define[d] it as a religious and charitable non-profit corporation"; (b) its mission was "to provide elder care to 'aged of the Jewish faith in accordance with the precepts of Jewish law and customs"; and, (c) "[p]ursuant to [this] mission," the nursing home "maintained a rabbi on its staff, employed mashgichim to ensure compliance with the Jewish dietary laws, and

2020See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that other federal Circuits "have considered a particular employee to be a 'minister' for purposes of the ministerial exception based on the function of the plaintiff's employment position rather than the fact of ordination."); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 , 304 n.6 (3rd Cir. 2006) ("In evaluating whether a particular employee is subject to the ministerial exception, other circuits have concluded that the focus should be on the 'function of the position.") (quoting Rayburn v. General Conferenc

2020See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that other federal Circuits "have considered a particular employee to be a 'minister' for purposes of the ministerial exception based on the function of the plaintiff's employment position rather than the fact of ordination."); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 , 304 n.6 (3rd Cir. 2006) ("In evaluating whether a particular employee is subject to the ministerial exception, other circuits have concluded that the focus should be on the 'function of the position.") (quoting Rayburn v. General Conferenc

2020More recently, in Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 934 F.3d 568, 569, 572 (7th Cir. 2019), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the ministerial exception to a plaintiff who had been the musical director, but was demoted to an organ player before being fired.

2020In ruling that the ministerial exception nevertheless applied, the court noted that "[i]f the Roman Catholic Church believes that organ music is vital to its religious services, and that to advance its faith it needs the ability to select organists, who are we judges to disagree?" Id. 570 .

2020Review Comm'n, 768 N.W.2d 868 , 881 n.16 (Wis. 2009) ("The focus. . . should be on the function of the position, not the title or a categorization of job duties."); Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schs. of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., 875 A.2d 669, 675 (D.C.

2020See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 177 (referring to "the employer [als a religious group"); see also Winbery, 124 So. 3d at 1214 (stating Hosanna-Tabor did not address how to determine whether the defendants were a religious organization entitled to protection under the Religious Clauses).[23] Therefore, the Supreme Court did not provide any guidance in Hosanna-Tabor for trial courts to use to determine what organizations may properly invoke the ministerial exception.

2020On the other hand, relying on Mississippi College, the plaintiffs in Winberv, former professors at Louisiana College, argued that the ministerial exception did not apply because "Louisiana College is [a] non-hierarchical religious college," not a church, and the plaintiffs "were not ministers." Id.

2020In Conlon v. Intervarsitv Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2015), the plaintiff "worked at InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA ("IVCF") in Michigan as a spiritual director, involved in providing religious counsel and prayer." Conlon, 777 F.3d at 831 .

2020So [the court] must first determine whether IVCF is an organization that can assert the ministerial exception." Id. at 833 .