parental preference principle in Nebraska

2003In Blecha , the court applied the parental preference doctrine to conclude that the biological father’s natural right to the custody of his child trumped the interest of “strangers to the parent-child relationship.” 257 Neb. at 547 , 599 N.W.2d at 832 .

2003In Blecha , the court applied the parental preference doctrine to conclude that the biological father’s natural right to the custody of his child trumped the interest of “strangers to the parent-child relationship.” 257 Neb. at 547 , 599 N.W.2d at 832 .

1994It may well be that the district court contemplated upon remand precisely what we expressly order; nonetheless, we believe the district court, having reached the correct conclusions in the case, should have ordered the custody of Kassandra and Nicholas restored to their father pursuant to his request for “care, custody, and *195 control of the... children.” In reaching this conclusion, we rely upon the doctrine of parental preference pronounced by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Stuhr v. Stuhr, 240 Neb. 239, 246 , 481 N.W.2d 212, 217 (1992): The parental preference principle, reflected in Nielse

1994It may well be that the district court contemplated upon remand precisely what we expressly order; nonetheless, we believe the district court, having reached the correct conclusions in the case, should have ordered the custody of Kassandra and Nicholas restored to their father pursuant to his request for “care, custody, and *195 control of the... children.” In reaching this conclusion, we rely upon the doctrine of parental preference pronounced by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Stuhr v. Stuhr, 240 Neb. 239, 246 , 481 N.W.2d 212, 217 (1992): The parental preference principle, reflected in Nielse

2023Id.

2023Id.

2020We held that evidence that the mother had previously witnessed incidents of the father’s chaining the child to a couch was insufficient to meet the State’s burden to prove the mother unfit and overcome parental preference. 61 We reversed 55 Id. 56 See, e.g., In re Interest of Sloane O., supra note 17; In re Interest of Jaydon W. & Ethan W., 25 Neb.

2018Id. [13-16] Under the parental preference principle, a parent’s natural right to the custody of his or her child trumps the interests of strangers, including the State, to the parent-child relationship and the preferences of the child.

2016In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., 10 Neb.

2015In In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., 10 Neb.

2021These principles apply in cases where a parent and those standing in loco parentis seek custody, as well as cases seeking to modify child custody, such as the instant case. [7] With respect to the modification circumstance, in Windham v. Kroll, 307 Neb. 947 , 951 N.W.2d 744 (2020), we reiterated that the parental preference principle applies when modifying custody rights as between a natural or adoptive par- ent and one who stands in loco parentis.

2021These principles apply in cases where a parent and those standing in loco parentis seek custody, as well as cases seeking to modify child custody, such as the instant case. [7] With respect to the modification circumstance, in Windham v. Kroll, 307 Neb. 947 , 951 N.W.2d 744 (2020), we reiterated that the parental preference principle applies when modifying custody rights as between a natural or adoptive par- ent and one who stands in loco parentis.

2003In the order denying Adrian’s application for custody, the district court recognized the principal tenets of the parental preference doctrine as iterated in this court’s opinion in In re Interest of Eric O. & Shane O., 9 Neb.

2003In the order denying Adrian's application for custody, the district court recognized the principal tenets of the parental preference doctrine as iterated in this court's opinion in In re Interest of Eric O. & Shane O., 9 Neb.App. 676 , 617 N.W.2d 824 (2000).

2019See, e.g., In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H., 282 Neb. 584 , 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011); Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 276 Neb. 653 , 756 N.W.2d 522 (2008); In re Interest of Xavier H., 274 Neb. 331 , 740 N.W.2d 13 (2007); In re Guardianship of D.J., supra; Gomez v. Savage, 254 Neb. 836 , 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998).

2019See, e.g., In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H., 282 Neb. 584 , 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011); Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 276 Neb. 653 , 756 N.W.2d 522 (2008); In re Interest of Xavier H., 274 Neb. 331 , 740 N.W.2d 13 (2007); In re Guardianship of D.J., supra; Gomez v. Savage, 254 Neb. 836 , 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998).

2019See, e.g., In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H., 282 Neb. 584 , 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011); Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 276 Neb. 653 , 756 N.W.2d 522 (2008); In re Interest of Xavier H., 274 Neb. 331 , 740 N.W.2d 13 (2007); In re Guardianship of D.J., supra; Gomez v. Savage, 254 Neb. 836 , 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998).

2019See, e.g., In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H., 282 Neb. 584 , 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011); Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 276 Neb. 653 , 756 N.W.2d 522 (2008); In re Interest of Xavier H., 274 Neb. 331 , 740 N.W.2d 13 (2007); In re Guardianship of D.J., supra; Gomez v. Savage, 254 Neb. 836 , 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998).

2018App. 713 [parent-child] relationship or has forfeited that right.’” Id. at 244, 682 N.W.2d at 243 (quoting In re Interest of Amber G. et al., 250 Neb. 973 , 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306 , 903 N.W.2d 651 (2017)). [7-10] In weighing these two principles, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that in guardianship termination proceedings involving a biological or adoptive parent, “the parental preference principle serves to establish a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are served by reuniting the ch

2018App. 713 [parent-child] relationship or has forfeited that right.’” Id. at 244, 682 N.W.2d at 243 (quoting In re Interest of Amber G. et al., 250 Neb. 973 , 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306 , 903 N.W.2d 651 (2017)). [7-10] In weighing these two principles, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that in guardianship termination proceedings involving a biological or adoptive parent, “the parental preference principle serves to establish a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are served by reuniting the ch

2016Third, if the district court determines that Heather and Jesse both have a right under the parental preference principle to seek Jaelyn’s custody, it must determine the appropriate forum to resolve a custody dispute between them: the district court or the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, where Jesse’s custody pro- ceeding is apparently still pending.66 64 Id. at 376-77, 488 N.W.2d at 372 (emphasis supplied). 65 Nielsen v. Nielsen, 207 Neb. 141 , 296 N.W.2d 483 (1980). 66 See In re Adoption of Jaelyn B., supra note 1. - 999 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports JESSE B. v. TYLEE H.

2016Third, if the district court determines that Heather and Jesse both have a right under the parental preference principle to seek Jaelyn’s custody, it must determine the appropriate forum to resolve a custody dispute between them: the district court or the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, where Jesse’s custody pro- ceeding is apparently still pending.66 64 Id. at 376-77, 488 N.W.2d at 372 (emphasis supplied). 65 Nielsen v. Nielsen, 207 Neb. 141 , 296 N.W.2d 483 (1980). 66 See In re Adoption of Jaelyn B., supra note 1. - 999 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports JESSE B. v. TYLEE H.

2023YOST Cite as 315 Neb. 568 [B]ecause natural and adoptive parents have a funda- mental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their minor children which is constitutionally protected, custody disputes between a natural or adoptive parent and a nonparent are governed by the parental preference doctrine.

2023YOST Cite as 315 Neb. 568 who established an in loco parentis relationship with a step- child during the marriage.

2023Rather, in the face of a natural parent’s objection, in loco parentis gives standing to litigate whether the child’s best interests are served by maintaining the in loco parentis relationship. 50 48 Windham v. Kroll, supra note 36 , 307 Neb. at 958, 951 N.W.2d at 752 . 49 See, e.g., Windham v. Kroll, supra note 36 ; State on behalf of Tina K., supra note 36; Windham v. Griffin, supra note 31 ; Stuhr, supra note 47 ; State on behalf of Combs v. O’Neal, 11 Neb.

2023But they thought the cause should be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether (1) the stepchild desired to continue the in loco parentis relationship, (2) the stepfather should be required to pay child support for the stepdaughter, and (3) the stepchild’s biological father should be given notice and an opportunity to be joined as a party to the dissolution. 64 One year after Hickenbottom, we decided Stuhr v. Stuhr 65 and explained how the parental preference doctrine applies in a custody dispute between a natural parent and a stepparent 62 Hickenbottom, supra note 1 , 239 Neb. at

2023But they thought the cause should be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether (1) the stepchild desired to continue the in loco parentis relationship, (2) the stepfather should be required to pay child support for the stepdaughter, and (3) the stepchild’s biological father should be given notice and an opportunity to be joined as a party to the dissolution. 64 One year after Hickenbottom, we decided Stuhr v. Stuhr 65 and explained how the parental preference doctrine applies in a custody dispute between a natural parent and a stepparent 62 Hickenbottom, supra note 1 , 239 Neb. at

2022Under the parental preference doctrine, unless the State affirmatively shows a parent is unfit or has forfeited the right to custody, due regard for the parent’s - 863 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 30 Nebraska Appellate Reports IN RE INTEREST OF MARQUEE N. Cite as 30 Neb.

2022Therefore, the parental preference doctrine required that the court place Marquee Jr. with Marquee Sr. - 872 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 30 Nebraska Appellate Reports IN RE INTEREST OF MARQUEE N. Cite as 30 Neb.

2020BENTLEY Cite as 27 Neb.

2020Cite as 307 Neb. 1 that is constitutionally protected. 4 Establishment and continu- ance of the parent-child relationship is the most fundamental right a child possesses to be equated in importance with per- sonal liberty and the most basic constitutional rights. 5 In rec- ognition of this important relationship, the parental preference principle establishes a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of the child are served by placing custody of a minor child with his or her parent. 6 Under the parental preference principle, absent proof that a parent is unfit or has forfeited the right

2020The district court found the parental preference principle was overcome because Jayson was unfit to have custody of the children, he had forfeited his - 300 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports TILSON v. TILSON Cite as 307 Neb. 275 right to custody, and it was in the best interests of the children for Kimberly to have custody.

2020The district court found the parental preference principle was overcome because Jayson was unfit to have custody of the children, he had forfeited his - 300 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports TILSON v. TILSON Cite as 307 Neb. 275 right to custody, and it was in the best interests of the children for Kimberly to have custody.

2020We held that evidence that the mother had previously witnessed incidents of the father’s chaining the child to a couch was insufficient to meet the State’s burden to prove the mother unfit and overcome parental preference. 61 We reversed 55 Id. 56 See, e.g., In re Interest of Sloane O., supra note 17; In re Interest of Jaydon W. & Ethan W., 25 Neb.

2020Cite as 307 Neb. 817 of the child. 55 Under the parental preference doctrine, unless the State affirmatively shows a parent is unfit or has forfeited the right to custody, due regard for the parent’s natural right to the custody of a child requires that a parent be presump- tively regarded as the proper guardian. 56 Only exceptional circumstances involving proof of serious physical or psycho- logical harm to the child or a substantial likelihood of such harm will negate the superior right of a fit parent who has not forfeited parental rights to custody under the parental prefer- ence doctrine.

2019Cite as 302 Neb. 226 for children in the custody of [DHHS] who are unable to return home.”12 The district court traditionally determines custody matters as between unmarried parents when juvenile services are not required.13 In such cases, the parental preference doctrine is not implicated, because there is no controversy between a biological parent and one who is neither a biological nor adop- tive parent.

2019Supp. 2018)). 39 See In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581 , 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012). 40 See, In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151 , 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016); In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., supra note 5; In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., 286 Neb. 1008 , 840 N.W.2d 493 (2013).

2019Supp. 2018)). 39 See In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581 , 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012). 40 See, In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151 , 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016); In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., supra note 5; In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., 286 Neb. 1008 , 840 N.W.2d 493 (2013).