parental preference principle in Nebraska

2019Stat. § 24-517 (10) (Reissue 2016). 8 In re Interest of Jaden H., 263 Neb. 129 , 638 N.W.2d 867 (2002). 9 In re Interest of Constance G., 247 Neb. 629 , 529 N.W.2d 534 (1995). 10 See, In re Interest of Amber G. et. al., 250 Neb. 973 , 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306 , 903 N.W.2d 651 (2017); In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., 10 Neb. App. 908 , 639 N.W.2d 668 (2002). 11 Neb. Rev.

2019Stat. § 24-517 (10) (Reissue 2016). 8 In re Interest of Jaden H., 263 Neb. 129 , 638 N.W.2d 867 (2002). 9 In re Interest of Constance G., 247 Neb. 629 , 529 N.W.2d 534 (1995). 10 See, In re Interest of Amber G. et. al., 250 Neb. 973 , 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306 , 903 N.W.2d 651 (2017); In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., 10 Neb. App. 908 , 639 N.W.2d 668 (2002). 11 Neb. Rev.

2003In Blecha , the court applied the parental preference doctrine to conclude that the biological father’s natural right to the custody of his child trumped the interest of “strangers to the parent-child relationship.” 257 Neb. at 547 , 599 N.W.2d at 832 .

2003In Blecha , the court applied the parental preference doctrine to conclude that the biological father’s natural right to the custody of his child trumped the interest of “strangers to the parent-child relationship.” 257 Neb. at 547 , 599 N.W.2d at 832 .

1994It may well be that the district court contemplated upon remand precisely what we expressly order; nonetheless, we believe the district court, having reached the correct conclusions in the case, should have ordered the custody of Kassandra and Nicholas restored to their father pursuant to his request for “care, custody, and *195 control of the... children.” In reaching this conclusion, we rely upon the doctrine of parental preference pronounced by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Stuhr v. Stuhr, 240 Neb. 239, 246 , 481 N.W.2d 212, 217 (1992): The parental preference principle, reflected in Nielse

1994It may well be that the district court contemplated upon remand precisely what we expressly order; nonetheless, we believe the district court, having reached the correct conclusions in the case, should have ordered the custody of Kassandra and Nicholas restored to their father pursuant to his request for “care, custody, and *195 control of the... children.” In reaching this conclusion, we rely upon the doctrine of parental preference pronounced by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Stuhr v. Stuhr, 240 Neb. 239, 246 , 481 N.W.2d 212, 217 (1992): The parental preference principle, reflected in Nielse

2023Id.

2023Id.

2020We held that evidence that the mother had previously witnessed incidents of the father’s chaining the child to a couch was insufficient to meet the State’s burden to prove the mother unfit and overcome parental preference. 61 We reversed 55 Id. 56 See, e.g., In re Interest of Sloane O., supra note 17; In re Interest of Jaydon W. & Ethan W., 25 Neb. App. 562 , 909 N.W.2d 385 (2018); In re Interest of Miah T. & DeKandyce H., 23 Neb. App. 592 , 875 N.W.2d 1 (2016); In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., supra note 40. 57 See State on behalf of Tina K. v. Adam B., supra note 30. 58 In re Interest

2018Id. [13-16] Under the parental preference principle, a parent’s natural right to the custody of his or her child trumps the interests of strangers, including the State, to the parent-child relationship and the preferences of the child.

2018App. 713 [parent-child] relationship or has forfeited that right.’” Id. at 244, 682 N.W.2d at 243 (quoting In re Interest of Amber G. et al., 250 Neb. 973 , 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306 , 903 N.W.2d 651 (2017)). [7-10] In weighing these two principles, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that in guardianship termination proceedings involving a biological or adoptive parent, “the parental preference principle serves to establish a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are served by reuniting the ch

2018App. 713 [parent-child] relationship or has forfeited that right.’” Id. at 244, 682 N.W.2d at 243 (quoting In re Interest of Amber G. et al., 250 Neb. 973 , 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306 , 903 N.W.2d 651 (2017)). [7-10] In weighing these two principles, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that in guardianship termination proceedings involving a biological or adoptive parent, “the parental preference principle serves to establish a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are served by reuniting the ch

2021These principles apply in cases where a parent and those standing in loco parentis seek custody, as well as cases seeking to modify child custody, such as the instant case. [7] With respect to the modification circumstance, in Windham v. Kroll, 307 Neb. 947 , 951 N.W.2d 744 (2020), we reiterated that the parental preference principle applies when modifying custody rights as between a natural or adoptive parent and one who stands in loco parentis.

2021These principles apply in cases where a parent and those standing in loco parentis seek custody, as well as cases seeking to modify child custody, such as the instant case. [7] With respect to the modification circumstance, in Windham v. Kroll, 307 Neb. 947 , 951 N.W.2d 744 (2020), we reiterated that the parental preference principle applies when modifying custody rights as between a natural or adoptive parent and one who stands in loco parentis.

2022In re Interest of A.A. et al., 307 Neb. 817 , 845, 951 N.W.2d 144 , 167 (2020).

2020Cite as 307 Neb. 817 of the child. 55 Under the parental preference doctrine, unless the State affirmatively shows a parent is unfit or has forfeited the right to custody, due regard for the parent’s natural right to the custody of a child requires that a parent be presumptively regarded as the proper guardian. 56 Only exceptional circumstances involving proof of serious physical or psychological harm to the child or a substantial likelihood of such harm will negate the superior right of a fit parent who has not forfeited parental rights to custody under the parental preference doctrine. 57 Th

2003In the order denying Adrian’s application for custody, the district court recognized the principal tenets of the parental preference doctrine as iterated in this court’s opinion in In re Interest of Eric O. & Shane O., 9 Neb.

2003In the order denying Adrian's application for custody, the district court recognized the principal tenets of the parental preference doctrine as iterated in this court's opinion in In re Interest of Eric O. & Shane O., 9 Neb.App. 676 , 617 N.W.2d 824 (2000).

2019See, e.g., In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H. , 282 Neb. 584 , 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011) ; Farnsworth v. Farnsworth , 276 Neb. 653 , 756 N.W.2d 522 (2008) ; In re Interest of Xavier H. , 274 Neb. 331 , 740 N.W.2d 13 (2007) ; In re Guardianship of D.J., supra ; Gomez v. Savage , 254 Neb. 836 , 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998).

2019See, e.g., In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H. , 282 Neb. 584 , 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011) ; Farnsworth v. Farnsworth , 276 Neb. 653 , 756 N.W.2d 522 (2008) ; In re Interest of Xavier H. , 274 Neb. 331 , 740 N.W.2d 13 (2007) ; In re Guardianship of D.J., supra ; Gomez v. Savage , 254 Neb. 836 , 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998).

2019See, e.g., In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H. , 282 Neb. 584 , 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011) ; Farnsworth v. Farnsworth , 276 Neb. 653 , 756 N.W.2d 522 (2008) ; In re Interest of Xavier H. , 274 Neb. 331 , 740 N.W.2d 13 (2007) ; In re Guardianship of D.J., supra ; Gomez v. Savage , 254 Neb. 836 , 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998).

2019See, e.g., In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H. , 282 Neb. 584 , 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011) ; Farnsworth v. Farnsworth , 276 Neb. 653 , 756 N.W.2d 522 (2008) ; In re Interest of Xavier H. , 274 Neb. 331 , 740 N.W.2d 13 (2007) ; In re Guardianship of D.J., supra ; Gomez v. Savage , 254 Neb. 836 , 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998).

2019Stat. § 24-517 (10) (Reissue 2016). 8 In re Interest of Jaden H., 263 Neb. 129 , 638 N.W.2d 867 (2002). 9 In re Interest of Constance G., 247 Neb. 629 , 529 N.W.2d 534 (1995). 10 See, In re Interest of Amber G. et. al., 250 Neb. 973 , 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306 , 903 N.W.2d 651 (2017); In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., 10 Neb. App. 908 , 639 N.W.2d 668 (2002). 11 Neb. Rev.

2018App. 713 [parent-child] relationship or has forfeited that right.’” Id. at 244, 682 N.W.2d at 243 (quoting In re Interest of Amber G. et al., 250 Neb. 973 , 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306 , 903 N.W.2d 651 (2017)). [7-10] In weighing these two principles, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that in guardianship termination proceedings involving a biological or adoptive parent, “the parental preference principle serves to establish a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are served by reuniting the ch

2015Nor was the juvenile court required to give DHHS custody of Sloane by virtue of Sloane’s adjudication on the abuse and neglect docket.16 The parental preference doctrine generally protects Sabrina’s right to cus- tody of Sloane.17 10 Id. 11 See In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H., 282 Neb. 584 , 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011). 12 See id. 13 Id. 14 See id. 15 See § 43-297.01. 16 See § 43-284. 17 See In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H., supra note 11. - 904 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF SLOANE O.

2015Cite as 291 Neb. 892 Due proc­ess is flexible and calls for such procedural protec- tions as the particular situation demands.10 As Sloane’s mother, due process considerations safeguard Sabrina’s right to cus- tody of Sloane, subject only to the State’s interest in protect- ing Sloane from harm. [6-9] Under the parental preference principle, a parent’s nat- ural right to the custody of his or her child trumps the interests of strangers, including the State, to the parent-child relation- ship and the preferences of the child.11 Therefore, unless it has been affirmatively shown that a biological

2016Third, if the district court determines that Heather and Jesse both have a right under the parental preference principle to seek Jaelyn’s custody, it must determine the appropriate forum to resolve a custody dispute between them: the district court or the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, where Jesse’s custody pro- ceeding is apparently still pending.66 64 Id. at 376-77, 488 N.W.2d at 372 (emphasis supplied). 65 Nielsen v. Nielsen, 207 Neb. 141 , 296 N.W.2d 483 (1980). 66 See In re Adoption of Jaelyn B., supra note 1. - 999 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports JESSE B. v. TYLEE H.

2016Third, if the district court determines that Heather and Jesse both have a right under the parental preference principle to seek Jaelyn’s custody, it must determine the appropriate forum to resolve a custody dispute between them: the district court or the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, where Jesse’s custody pro- ceeding is apparently still pending.66 64 Id. at 376-77, 488 N.W.2d at 372 (emphasis supplied). 65 Nielsen v. Nielsen, 207 Neb. 141 , 296 N.W.2d 483 (1980). 66 See In re Adoption of Jaelyn B., supra note 1. - 999 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 293 Nebraska R eports JESSE B. v. TYLEE H.

2023Rather, in the face of a natural parent’s objection, in loco parentis gives standing to litigate whether the child’s best interests are served by maintaining the in loco parentis relationship. 50 48 Windham v. Kroll, supra note 36 , 307 Neb. at 958, 951 N.W.2d at 752 . 49 See, e.g., Windham v. Kroll, supra note 36 ; State on behalf of Tina K., supra note 36; Windham v. Griffin, supra note 31 ; Stuhr, supra note 47 ; State on behalf of Combs v. O’Neal, 11 Neb. App. 890 , 662 N.W.2d 231 (2003). 50 Jennifer T., supra note 21, 298 Neb. at 807, 906 N.W.2d at 57. - 587 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advan

2023Rather, in the face of a natural parent’s objection, in loco parentis gives standing to litigate whether the child’s best interests are served by maintaining the in loco parentis relationship. 50 48 Windham v. Kroll, supra note 36 , 307 Neb. at 958, 951 N.W.2d at 752 . 49 See, e.g., Windham v. Kroll, supra note 36 ; State on behalf of Tina K., supra note 36; Windham v. Griffin, supra note 31 ; Stuhr, supra note 47 ; State on behalf of Combs v. O’Neal, 11 Neb. App. 890 , 662 N.W.2d 231 (2003). 50 Jennifer T., supra note 21, 298 Neb. at 807, 906 N.W.2d at 57. - 587 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advan

2023But they thought the cause should be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether (1) the stepchild desired to continue the in loco parentis relationship, (2) the stepfather should be required to pay child support for the stepdaughter, and (3) the stepchild’s biological father should be given notice and an opportunity to be joined as a party to the dissolution. 64 One year after Hickenbottom, we decided Stuhr v. Stuhr 65 and explained how the parental preference doctrine applies in a custody dispute between a natural parent and a stepparent 62 Hickenbottom, supra note 1 , 239 Neb. at

2023But they thought the cause should be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether (1) the stepchild desired to continue the in loco parentis relationship, (2) the stepfather should be required to pay child support for the stepdaughter, and (3) the stepchild’s biological father should be given notice and an opportunity to be joined as a party to the dissolution. 64 One year after Hickenbottom, we decided Stuhr v. Stuhr 65 and explained how the parental preference doctrine applies in a custody dispute between a natural parent and a stepparent 62 Hickenbottom, supra note 1 , 239 Neb. at

2022Therefore, the parental preference doctrine required that the court place Marquee Jr. with Marquee Sr. - 872 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 30 Nebraska Appellate Reports IN RE INTEREST OF MARQUEE N. Cite as 30 Neb. App. 862 [5-7] The Supreme Court has held in situations where a child is removed from one parent’s home pursuant to the juvenile code that the juvenile court’s discretion regarding placement pending disposition is limited by Nebraska’s “‘parental preference doctrine,’” which governs the rights of the other parent against whom no allegations have been made.

2022Under the parental preference doctrine, unless the State affirmatively shows a parent is unfit or has forfeited the right to custody, due regard for the parent’s - 863 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 30 Nebraska Appellate Reports IN RE INTEREST OF MARQUEE N. Cite as 30 Neb. App. 862 natural right to the custody of a child requires that a parent be presumptively regarded as the proper guardian. 7.

2020Joshua elabo- rates that procedural due process requires that the noncustodial parent be given notice of specific allegations of unfitness before the State can deprive such parent of temporary custody pursuant to that parent’s constitutionally protected parental 19 See In re Interest of Taeven Z., 19 Neb. App. 831 , 812 N.W.2d 313 (2012). 20 See State on behalf of Pathammavong v. Pathammavong, 268 Neb. 1 , 679 N.W.2d 749 (2004). - 840 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF A.A.

2020Joshua elabo- rates that procedural due process requires that the noncustodial parent be given notice of specific allegations of unfitness before the State can deprive such parent of temporary custody pursuant to that parent’s constitutionally protected parental 19 See In re Interest of Taeven Z., 19 Neb. App. 831 , 812 N.W.2d 313 (2012). 20 See State on behalf of Pathammavong v. Pathammavong, 268 Neb. 1 , 679 N.W.2d 749 (2004). - 840 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF A.A.

2020Cite as 307 Neb. 1 that is constitutionally protected. 4 Establishment and continuance of the parent-child relationship is the most fundamental right a child possesses to be equated in importance with personal liberty and the most basic constitutional rights. 5 In rec- ognition of this important relationship, the parental preference principle establishes a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of the child are served by placing custody of a minor child with his or her parent. 6 Under the parental preference principle, absent proof that a parent is unfit or has forfeited the right to c