ancient common-law rule in New York

2017CPLR 205(a) and its predecessors were "designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a hearing in court [until he or she] reaches a judgment on the merits" ( Gaines v City of New York, 215 NY at 539 ; see Malay v City of Syracuse, 25 NY3d at 327 ).

1989Corp., 12 NY2d 212 , cert denied 374 US 808 .) Accordingly, as part of a comprehensive bill (L 1986, ch 682), which addressed other inequities of tort law as well, the Legislature enacted CPLR 214-c to ameliorate the harsh effect of this ancient common-law rule, which often prevented recovery by a person exposed to a toxic or harmful substance who would not be aware of the injury at the time it was inflicted but only at a later date when the latent effects of the harm would first manifest itself.

1989Corp., 12 NY2d 212 , cert denied 374 US 808 .) Accordingly, as part of a comprehensive bill (L 1986, ch 682), which addressed other inequities of tort law as well, the Legislature enacted CPLR 214-c to ameliorate the harsh effect of this ancient common-law rule, which often prevented recovery by a person exposed to a toxic or harmful substance who would not be aware of the injury at the time it was inflicted but only at a later date when the latent effects of the harm would first manifest itself.

1984In Allanson v Cummings (supra) this court declined to follow the ancient common-law rule that, although the owner of a damaged chattel may recover for loss of its use during the time required for repairs, he may not recover if the chattel is destroyed (see, generally, Dennis v Ford Motor Co., 332 F Supp 901, 905 , affd 471 F2d 733; Reis v Long Is.

1984In Allanson v Cummings (supra) this court declined to follow the ancient common-law rule that, although the owner of a damaged chattel may recover for loss of its use during the time required for repairs, he may not recover if the chattel is destroyed (see, generally, Dennis v Ford Motor Co., 332 F Supp 901, 905 , affd 471 F2d 733; Reis v Long Is.

1954Almost twenty-seven years ago, Judge Potjíto, in discussing the extent to which the principle had then survived, said (Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 572 , supra): “The law of the rights of married women has been evolved from the ‘ archaic period of our race ’ (Earl, J., in Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, 156 ), when husband and wife were regarded in law as one person, to its present status where the recognition of the wife’s separate person and property is practically complete.

1954Almost twenty-seven years ago, Judge Potjíto, in discussing the extent to which the principle had then survived, said (Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 572 , supra): “The law of the rights of married women has been evolved from the ‘ archaic period of our race ’ (Earl, J., in Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, 156 ), when husband and wife were regarded in law as one person, to its present status where the recognition of the wife’s separate person and property is practically complete.

1954(Cf. People v. Randolph, supra, and Bertles v. Nunan, supra.) That rule, which prevented the prosecution of a husband for the larceny of his wife’s property was the natural result of the application by the courts of the ancient common-law principle that husband and wife were one person to the definition of the crime of larceny, which involved a taking by one person of the property of another.

1954The ancient common-law rule favored per capita distribution among descendants in all degrees where the gift or conveyance was to “ issue ” or “ descendants ” (Soper v. Brown, 136 N. Y. 244 ).

1954The rule was evolved to serve the English preference for estates in fee tail; and modern courts, recognizing that it frequently does violence to the intention of the settlor or testator and results in hardship, have regarded it with growing distaste and applied it with increasing reluctance (see Petry v. Petry, 186 App. Div. 738 , affd. sub nom.

1954(Cf. People v. Randolph, supra, and Bertles v. Nunan, supra.) That rule, which prevented the prosecution of a husband for the larceny of his wife’s property was the natural result of the application by the courts of the ancient common-law principle that husband and wife were one person to the definition of the crime of larceny, which involved a taking by one person of the property of another.

1841The first question, in the order of consideration in which the case presents itself to my mind, is this: Granting the mortgaged land to have been held by the company in such wise that according to the peculiar provisions of its charter the original mortgagor has “ the right of redemption ” of such property, does the unaccepted tender of the debt, after forfeiture, discharge the lien upon the land, so as to cause the legal title to revert to the mortgagor, and thus enable him to maintain his action of ejectment 1 The ancient common law doctrine is undoubtedly stated with precision by the Chance