injustice rule in New York

1918(Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378 ; Banker v. Banker, 63 id. 409 .) And it had this effect as evidence against persons acquiring rights or interests under the lunatic prior to the inquisition, although they were not parties to, and had no notice whatever of, the proceedings. “ It was probably to abolish the injustice of this rule that in the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure it was declared that ‘ the inquiry * * * must be confined to the question whether he is so incompetent at thé time of the inquiry.’ ” *360 Such authorities to the contrary as Richie v. Shepard ( 158 App. Div. 192 )

1918(Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378 ; Banker v. Banker, 63 id. 409 .) And it had this effect as evidence against persons acquiring rights or interests under the lunatic prior to the inquisition, although they were not parties to, and had no notice whatever of, the proceedings. “ It was probably to abolish the injustice of this rule that in the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure it was declared that ‘ the inquiry * * * must be confined to the question whether he is so incompetent at thé time of the inquiry.’ ” *360 Such authorities to the contrary as Richie v. Shepard ( 158 App. Div. 192 )

1918(Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378 ; Banker v. Banker, 63 id. 409 .) And it had this effect as evidence against persons acquiring rights or interests under the lunatic prior to the inquisition, although they were not parties to, and had no notice whatever of, the proceedings. “ It was probably to abolish the injustice of this rule that in the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure it was declared that ‘ the inquiry * * * must be confined to the question whether he is so incompetent at thé time of the inquiry.’ ” *360 Such authorities to the contrary as Richie v. Shepard ( 158 App. Div. 192 )

1918(Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378 ; Banker v. Banker, 63 id. 409 .) And it had this effect as evidence against persons acquiring rights or interests under the lunatic prior to the inquisition, although they were not parties to, and had no notice whatever of, the proceedings. “ It was probably to abolish the injustice of this rule that in the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure it was declared that ‘ the inquiry * * * must be confined to the question whether he is so incompetent at thé time of the inquiry.’ ” *360 Such authorities to the contrary as Richie v. Shepard ( 158 App. Div. 192 )

1918(Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378 ; Banker v. Banker, 63 id. 409 .) And it had this effect as evidence against persons acquiring rights or interests under the lunatic prior to the inquisition, although they were not parties to, and had no notice whatever of, the proceedings. “ It was probably to abolish the injustice of this rule that in the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure it was declared that ‘ the inquiry * * * must be confined to the question whether he is so incompetent at thé time of the inquiry.’ ” *360 Such authorities to the contrary as Richie v. Shepard ( 158 App. Div. 192 )

1904It would lead to convictions, upon the particular charge made, by proof of other acts in no way connected with it, and to uniting evidence of several offenses to produce conviction for a single one." ( People v. Corbin, 56 N.Y. 363 .) In People v. Sharp ( 107 N.Y. 427 ) it was said: "The general rule is that when a man is put upon trial for one offense he is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense alone, and that, under ordinary circumstances, proof of his guilt of one or a score of other offenses in his lifetime is wholly excluded.

1904It would lead to convictions, upon the particular charge made, by proof of other acts in no way connected with it, and to uniting evidence of several offenses to produce conviction for a single one." ( People v. Corbin, 56 N.Y. 363 .) In People v. Sharp ( 107 N.Y. 427 ) it was said: "The general rule is that when a man is put upon trial for one offense he is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense alone, and that, under ordinary circumstances, proof of his guilt of one or a score of other offenses in his lifetime is wholly excluded.

1901It would lead to convictions, upon the particular charge made, by proof of other acts in no way connected with it, and to uniting evidence of several offenses to produce conviction for a single one." In People v. Shea ( 147 N.Y. 78 ) the rule is thus stated: "The impropriety of giving evidence showing that the accused had been guilty of other crimes merely for the purpose of thereby inferring his guilt of the crime for which he is on trial may be said to have been assumed and consistently maintained by the English courts ever since the common law has itself been in existence.

1895Cohen v. Cohen, 11 Misc.