gravamen claim in Texas

2026“The gravamen of a claim is its true nature, as opposed to what is simply alleged or artfully pled, allowing courts to determine the rights and liabilities of the involved parties.” B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 512 S.W.3d 276, 283 (Tex. 2017).

2026The reason behind this expansive reading, according to the Texas Supreme Court, is that that “artful pleading and recasting of claims is not permitted.” Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. 2010). “[I]f the gravamen or essence of a cause of action is a health care liability claim, then allowing the claim to be split or spliced into a multitude of other causes of action with differing standards of care, damages, and procedures would contravene the Legislature’s explicit requirements.” Id. at 197 .2 “The gravamen of a claim is its true nature, as opposed to what is simply alleged or artfu

2022Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Tex. 2010) (“[I]t is the gravamen of the claim, not the form of the pleadings, that controls this determination.”); Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 847 (“To determine whether a cause of action is a health care liability claim . . . , we examine the underlying nature of the claim and are not bound by the form of the pleading.”); Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2004) (“Plaintiffs cannot use artful pleading to avoid the [Act’s] requirements when the essence of the suit is a health care liability claim. . . .

2014Whether a claim falls within this definition turns on “the gravamen of the claim, not the form of the pleadings.” Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 664 (citing Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854 ) (examining the “essence” or “underlying nature” of the claim); accord Loaisiga, 379 S.W.3d at 255 .

2022Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Tex. 2010) (“[I]t is the gravamen of the claim, not the form of the pleadings, that controls this determination.”); Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 847 (“To determine whether a cause of action is a health care liability claim . . . , we examine the underlying nature of the claim and are not bound by the form of the pleading.”); Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2004) (“Plaintiffs cannot use artful pleading to avoid the [Act’s] requirements when the essence of the suit is a health care liability claim. . . .

2014Whether a claim falls within this definition turns on “the gravamen of the claim, not the form of the pleadings.” Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 664 (citing Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854 ) (examining the “essence” or “underlying nature” of the claim); accord Loaisiga, 379 S.W.3d at 255 .

2018Our focus when determining whether a claim falls under the TMLA, including when we consider whether a plaintiff's allegations present a safety standards-based claim, is "the gravamen of the claim or claims against the health care provider." Id. at 178 .

2014See id. at 784-85 (quoting Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 178 , with regard to focusing on the gravamen of the claim).

2025“The gravamen of a claim is its true nature, as opposed to what is simply alleged or artfully pled, allowing courts to determine the rights and liabilities of the involved parties.” B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 512 S.W.3d 276, 283 (Tex. 2017) (citing 14 CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. 2016)) (other citations omitted).

2023In answering that question in the negative—meaning that another chance to amend would be futile—we are persuaded by UNTHSC’s position that the Gonzalezes’ real complaint is that intangible identifying information, not tangible personal property, was used or misused and was the source of their harm.9 The Gonzalezes take issue with UNTHSC’s “gravamen” argument, accusing it 9 of an “attempted rewrite” of their allegations “in order to manufacture immunity.” But the law instructs courts to look beyond how a party characterizes its cause of action to find its “true nature.” B.C. v. Steak N Shake Op

2022Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Tex. 2010) (“[I]t is the gravamen of the claim, not the form of the pleadings, that controls this determination.”); Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 847 (“To determine whether a cause of action is a health care liability claim . . . , we examine the underlying nature of the claim and are not bound by the form of the pleading.”); Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2004) (“Plaintiffs cannot use artful pleading to avoid the [Act’s] requirements when the essence of the suit is a health care liability claim. . . .

2010Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose , 156 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2004). "[I]t is the gravamen of the claim, not the form of the pleadings, that controls this determination." Marks v. St.

2014Whether a claim falls within this definition turns on “the gravamen of the claim, not the form of the pleadings.” Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 664 (citing Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854 ) (examining the “essence” or “underlying nature” of the claim); accord Loaisiga, 379 S.W.3d at 255 .

2014Whether a claim falls within this definition turns on “the gravamen of the claim, not the form of the pleadings.” Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 664 (citing Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854 ) (examining the “essence” or “underlying nature” of the claim); accord Loaisiga, 379 S.W.3d at 255 .

2026The reason behind this expansive reading, according to the Texas Supreme Court, is that that “artful pleading and recasting of claims is not permitted.” Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. 2010). “[I]f the gravamen or essence of a cause of action is a health care liability claim, then allowing the claim to be split or spliced into a multitude of other causes of action with differing standards of care, damages, and procedures would contravene the Legislature’s explicit requirements.” Id. at 197 .2 “The gravamen of a claim is its true nature, as opposed to what is simply alleged or artfu

2026The reason behind this expansive reading, according to the Texas Supreme Court, is that that “artful pleading and recasting of claims is not permitted.” Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. 2010). “[I]f the gravamen or essence of a cause of action is a health care liability claim, then allowing the claim to be split or spliced into a multitude of other causes of action with differing standards of care, damages, and procedures would contravene the Legislature’s explicit requirements.” Id. at 197 .2 “The gravamen of a claim is its true nature, as opposed to what is simply alleged or artfu

2020See City of Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex. 2014); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967) (“Personal indignity is the essence of an action for battery; and consequently the defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those which are offensive and insulting.”); see also Foye, 9 S.W.3d at 441 ; Durban v. Guajardo, 79 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2002, no pet.) (“[T]he basis for an assault and battery action is ‘not the actual harm done to the plaintiff’s body.’”).

2017See e.g., CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528 534 (Tex. 2016) (instructing that in evaluating the type of claim, “we examine the underlying nature and gravamen of the claim, rather than the way it is pleaded”); City of Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 593 (Tex. 2014) (holding that because the gravamen of the complaint was a police officer’s use of excessive force, the plaintiffs claim arose from battery rather than negligence); Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196-97 (Tex. 2010) (evaluating “the gravamen or essence of a cause of action” and recognizing that “artful pleadi

2021Baylor Scott & White, 575 S.W.3d. at 363–364.

2020Ctr. v. Weems, 575 S.W.3d 357, 363 (Tex. 2019) (same). 7 Coming Attractions stresses that its injury stems from the hospital’s alleged assurance to Vinson—a hospital employee, not a patient—that she was safe to travel.

2026This limitation is consistent with the gravamen of a claim for malicious prosecution, which is “improperly making a party the subject of legal process to his detriment.” Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Zavaleta, 827 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1991, writ denied).

2025See id.

2025Duerr, 262 S.W.3d at 70 . pleading.”); Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2004) (“Plaintiffs cannot use artful pleading to avoid the MLIIA’s requirements when the essence of the suit is a health care liability claim.”). 6 See also CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. 2016) (when determining whether a claim is a health care liability claim, “we examine the underlying nature and gravamen of the claim, rather than the way it is pleaded”). 10 As we said in Latham v. Castillo, there is a “difference between negligent conduct and deceptive conduct,” a

2025Id. at 799; see also Steak N Shake, 512 S.W.3d at 283 (“The gravamen of a claim is its true nature, as opposed to what is simply alleged or artfully pled, allowing courts to determine the rights and liabilities of the involved parties.”).

2025Duerr, 262 S.W.3d at 70 . pleading.”); Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2004) (“Plaintiffs cannot use artful pleading to avoid the MLIIA’s requirements when the essence of the suit is a health care liability claim.”). 6 See also CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. 2016) (when determining whether a claim is a health care liability claim, “we examine the underlying nature and gravamen of the claim, rather than the way it is pleaded”). 10 As we said in Latham v. Castillo, there is a “difference between negligent conduct and deceptive conduct,” a

2020See City of Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex. 2014); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967) (“Personal indignity is the essence of an action for battery; and consequently the defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those which are offensive and insulting.”); see also Foye, 9 S.W.3d at 441 ; Durban v. Guajardo, 79 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2002, no pet.) (“[T]he basis for an assault and battery action is ‘not the actual harm done to the plaintiff’s body.’”).

2020See Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

2020See City of Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex. 2014); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967) (“Personal indignity is the essence of an action for battery; and consequently the defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those which are offensive and insulting.”); see also Foye, 9 S.W.3d at 441 ; Durban v. Guajardo, 79 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2002, no pet.) (“[T]he basis for an assault and battery action is ‘not the actual harm done to the plaintiff’s body.’”).

2020See City of Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex. 2014); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967) (“Personal indignity is the essence of an action for battery; and consequently the defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those which are offensive and insulting.”); see also Foye, 9 S.W.3d at 441 ; Durban v. Guajardo, 79 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2002, no pet.) (“[T]he basis for an assault and battery action is ‘not the actual harm done to the plaintiff’s body.’”).

2015If judicial bias, or the appearance of it, existed, due process was denied. 12 We do not believe it reasonable to assume that state judges presented with a claim of manifested judicial bias would fail to recognize the implication of due process rights simply because half a century of due process cases dealt with the mere risk of bias or with actual bias manifested in other ways.” Daye v. Attorney Gen. of New York, 696 F.2d 186, 197 (2nd Cir. 1982) (en banc).

2014Elizabeth Hosp. v. Guillory, 415 S.W.3d 900, 901-03 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2013, pet. filed) (holding that negligence claim by hospital visitor for injuries allegedly sustained when she slipped and fell on water in hospital hallway was not a health care liability claim because there was no nexus between the plaintiffs injury and the alleged violation of an accepted standard of health care); Doctors Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd. v. Mejia, No. 13-12-00602-CV, 2013 WL 4859592 , at *1-4 (TexApp.-Corpus Christi Aug. 1, 2013, pet. filed) (holding that negligence claim by hospital visitor for injuries alleg

2014Elizabeth Hosp. v. Guillory, —S.W.3d—,—, No. 09-12-00490-CV, 2013 WL 6019523 , at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 14, 2013, pet. filed) (holding that negligence claim by hospital visitor for injuries allegedly sustained when she slipped and fell on water in hospital hallway was not a health care liability claim because there was no nexus between the plaintiff’s injury and the alleged violation of an accepted standard of health care); Doctors Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd. v. Mejia, No. 13-12-00602-CV, 2013 WL 4859592 , at *1–4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 1, 2013, pet. filed) (holding that neglige

2014Oaks, 317 S.W.3d at 178 (“With the exception of medical care and health care claims, our focus in determining whether claims come under the TMLA is not the status of the claimant, but the gravamen of the claim or claims against the health care provider.”).

2014In City of El Paso v. Hernandez, 16 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied), ap-pellees alleged that the delay in dispatch ing an ambulance from one El Paso hospital to another resulted in the death of Andrea Hernandez.

2014Medical Center v. Lawton, — S.W.3d —, —, No. 05-13-00188-CV, 2013 WL 6163859, at *1-4 (Tex.App.-Dallas Nov. 25, 2013, pet. filed) (holding that nurse’s claim against hospital-employer for workplace injuries allegedly sustained when raw sewage began to back-up into showers and sinks at the hospital was not a health care liability claim because the gravamen of her claim was unrelated to the provision of health care); 3 Christus St.

2014Medical Center v. Lawton, —S.W.3d—,—, No. 05-13- 00188-CV, 2013 WL 6163859 , at *1–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 25, 2013, pet. filed) (holding that nurse’s claim against hospital-employer for workplace injuries allegedly sustained when raw sewage began to back-up into showers and sinks at the hospital was not a health care liability claim because the gravamen of her claim was unrelated to the provision of health care);3 Christus St.