statement after privilege in New York

1996Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked” (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 473-474 , supra).

1982Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” The question is whether the repeated inquiry here violated the intention of the Miranda court to adopt “fully effective means * * * to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored” (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US, at p 479 ).

2003Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has once been invoked.” (Id. at 473-474.) Furthermore, the exercise of the right to remain silent must be “scrupulously honored” (id. at 479; see also Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 103-104 [1975]; People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).

1996Subsequently, the Supreme Court explained that "[t]he critical safeguard identified in the [previous] passage” (Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 103 ) was a defendant’s right " 'to cut off questioning’ ” (Michigan v Mosley, supra, at 103) so as to control the timing, subjects, and duration of the interrogation, all of which serves to counteract "the coercive pressures of the custodial setting” (Michigan v Mosley, supra, at 104).

2007Moreover, where a statement obtained in violation of a defendant’s Miranda rights gives rise to a subsequent statement after the warnings are administered, “[t]he later statement is . . . admissible [only] if there is a definite, pronounced break in questioning so as to provide the defendant with sufficient time to reflect upon the situation and return him or her ‘to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning’ ” (People v Durrin, 32 AD3d 665, 668 [2006] [citations omitted]; see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d at 130-131 ).

2007Moreover, where a statement obtained in violation of a defendant’s Miranda rights gives rise to a subsequent statement after the warnings are administered, “[t]he later statement is . . . admissible [only] if there is a definite, pronounced break in questioning so as to provide the defendant with sufficient time to reflect upon the situation and return him or her ‘to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning’ ” (People v Durrin, 32 AD3d 665, 668 [2006] [citations omitted]; see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d at 130-131 ).

2003Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has once been invoked.” (Id. at 473-474.) Furthermore, the exercise of the right to remain silent must be “scrupulously honored” (id. at 479; see also Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 103-104 [1975]; People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]).