statement after privilege in Texas

2009The Court explained, “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 . “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975); see also Ramos, 245 S.W.3d at 418 .

2003The purpose of this third factor is to prevent police from abusing a defendant by repeated interrogation of the accused for the purpose of wearing down his resistance so as to "overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been invoked." Mosley , 423 U.S. at 101 , 96 S. Ct. at 325 ; compare with United States v. Hernandez , 574 F.2d 1364 , 1369 (5th Cir. 1978).

2009The Court explained, “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 . “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975); see also Ramos, 245 S.W.3d at 418 .

1998Without the right to cut oft questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-28 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2009Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex. Crim.

2009The Court explained, “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 . “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975); see also Ramos, 245 S.W.3d at 418 .

1988Although the right to terminate the interview at any time is not expressly among those warnings required by Miranda, Perillo v. State, 758 S.W.2d 567, 575 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), Miranda stressed that “[wjithout the right to cut off questioning, the setting of the in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been invoked.” Miranda, supra, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 .

1988Although the right to terminate the interview at any time is not expressly among those warnings required by Miranda, Perillo v. State, 758 S.W. 2d 567, 575 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), Miranda stressed that "[w]ithout the right to cut off questioning, the setting of the in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been invoked." Miranda, supra, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 .

1988(Emphasis supplied.) While Mosley rejected the literal interpretation of this passage in Miranda because it would lead to "absurd and unintended results," 423 U.S. at 102 , 96 S.Ct. at 325, the Court did say that "[t]o permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned." Id. [6] The issue presented in Doyle and Hale was whether a defendant's post-arrest silence could be used by impeaching him as a witness in his own behalf.