statement after privilege in California

2017Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked ." ( Id . at pp. 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , italics added, fn. omitted.) Given that the United States Supreme Court itself has used the phrase "Fifth Amendment privilege" to mean "the right to remain silent," it is not too much of a stretch to imagine that the Legislature might have used the phrase "privilege against self-incrimination" to mean much the same thing. *94 Defendant's counterargument re

1996Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked." ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 ], italics added, fn. omitted.) In another leading case the high court quoted the foregoing passage and reemphasized its rule: "The critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue is a person's `right to cut off questioning.' [384 U.S.] at 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at 723 ].

1985Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ].) Whether the suspect has indeed invoked that right, however, is a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances: “A desire to halt the interrogation may be indicated in a variety of way

1985Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ].) Whether the suspect has indeed invoked that right, however, is a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances: “A desire to halt the interrogation may be indicated in a variety of way

1984Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.’” (Italics in original.) (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ]; People v. Parker (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 24, 28 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 49 ].) A suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege by words or conduct that “reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness . . . to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time.” (Italics in ori

1984Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.’” (Italics in original.) (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ]; People v. Parker (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 24, 28 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 49 ].) A suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege by words or conduct that “reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness . . . to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time.” (Italics in ori

1984See also People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 535-537 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 954-955 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 464 P.2d 114 ].) When appellant said he wanted an attorney, the interrogation should have stopped.

1971Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” The California Supreme Court has strictly applied these principles, viewing the rule as one “that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, had been employed to secure admissions or confessions.” (People v. Fioritto, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 717 ; People v. Ireland, sup

1995“Disrespect of the right [to remain silent] is indicative of coercion[.]” (People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 935 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 327 ].) “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘s

1995“Disrespect of the right [to remain silent] is indicative of coercion[.]” (People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 935 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 327 ].) “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘s

2001Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” 20 In Michigan v. Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. 96 , the United States Supreme Court interpreted this passage and explained that permitting “the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly *362 frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned.” 21 The court held that the admissibility

2001Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” 20 In Michigan v. Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. 96 , the United States Supreme Court interpreted this passage and explained that permitting “the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly *362 frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned.” 21 The court held that the admissibility

1995“Disrespect of the right [to remain silent] is indicative of coercion[.]” (People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 935 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 327 ].) “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘s

1995“Disrespect of the right [to remain silent] is indicative of coercion[.]” (People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 935 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 327 ].) “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘s

1995“Disrespect of the right [to remain silent] is indicative of coercion[.]” (People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 935 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 327 ].) “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘s

1995“Disrespect of the right [to remain silent] is indicative of coercion[.]” (People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 935 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 327 ].) “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘s

1995“Disrespect of the right [to remain silent] is indicative of coercion[.]” (People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 935 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 327 ].) “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ].) “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘s

1991The right to worship without fear is too precious a freedom for us to tolerate an invasion and manipulation by state officials of the religious beliefs of individuals, including those accused of crime.” (People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 992, fn. 22, 989 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d 931 at p. 953 ; cf. Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 424 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 ].) These tactics constituted “deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will.” (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298 at p. 312 [ 84 L.Ed.2d at 234 ].) These tactics succeed

1991The right to worship without fear is too precious a freedom for us to tolerate an invasion and manipulation by state officials of the religious beliefs of individuals, including those accused of crime.” (People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 992, fn. 22, 989 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d 931 at p. 953 ; cf. Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 424 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 ].) These tactics constituted “deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will.” (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298 at p. 312 [ 84 L.Ed.2d at 234 ].) These tactics succeed

1991The right to worship without fear is too precious a freedom for us to tolerate an invasion and manipulation by state officials of the religious beliefs of individuals, including those accused of crime.” (People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 992, fn. 22, 989 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d 931 at p. 953 ; cf. Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 424 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 ].) These tactics constituted “deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will.” (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298 at p. 312 [ 84 L.Ed.2d at 234 ].) These tactics succeed

1991The right to worship without fear is too precious a freedom for us to tolerate an invasion and manipulation by state officials of the religious beliefs of individuals, including those accused of crime.” (People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 992, fn. 22, 989 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d 931 at p. 953 ; cf. Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 424 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 ].) These tactics constituted “deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will.” (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298 at p. 312 [ 84 L.Ed.2d at 234 ].) These tactics succeed

1991The right to worship without fear is too precious a freedom for us to tolerate an invasion and manipulation by state officials of the religious beliefs of individuals, including those accused of crime.” (People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 992, fn. 22, 989 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d 931 at p. 953 ; cf. Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 424 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 ].) These tactics constituted “deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will.” (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298 at p. 312 [ 84 L.Ed.2d at 234 ].) These tactics succeed

1991The right to worship without fear is too precious a freedom for us to tolerate an invasion and manipulation by state officials of the religious beliefs of individuals, including those accused of crime.” (People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 992, fn. 22, 989 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d 931 at p. 953 ; cf. Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 424 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 ].) These tactics constituted “deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will.” (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298 at p. 312 [ 84 L.Ed.2d at 234 ].) These tactics succeed

1987“In reaching a decision on appeal an appellate court is governed by the record; will not consider facts having no support in the record; and will disregard statements of such facts set forth in a brief.” (Oldenkott v. American Electric, Inc. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 198, 207 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 127 ]; Gantner v. Gantner (1952) 39 Cal.2d 272, 277-278 [ 246 P.2d 923 ].) Accordingly, we cannot consider the unsupported factual allegations as to prejudice in plaintiffs5 brief, and are governed by the absence of any such allegations in Mitchell’s declaration, and by the court’s statement after the hearing th

1987“In reaching a decision on appeal an appellate court is governed by the record; will not consider facts having no support in the record; and will disregard statements of such facts set forth in a brief.” (Oldenkott v. American Electric, Inc. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 198, 207 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 127 ]; Gantner v. Gantner (1952) 39 Cal.2d 272, 277-278 [ 246 P.2d 923 ].) Accordingly, we cannot consider the unsupported factual allegations as to prejudice in plaintiffs5 brief, and are governed by the absence of any such allegations in Mitchell’s declaration, and by the court’s statement after the hearing th

1987“In reaching a decision on appeal an appellate court is governed by the record; will not consider facts having no support in the record; and will disregard statements of such facts set forth in a brief.” (Oldenkott v. American Electric, Inc. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 198, 207 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 127 ]; Gantner v. Gantner (1952) 39 Cal.2d 272, 277-278 [ 246 P.2d 923 ].) Accordingly, we cannot consider the unsupported factual allegations as to prejudice in plaintiffs5 brief, and are governed by the absence of any such allegations in Mitchell’s declaration, and by the court’s statement after the hearing th

1987“In reaching a decision on appeal an appellate court is governed by the record; will not consider facts having no support in the record; and will disregard statements of such facts set forth in a brief.” (Oldenkott v. American Electric, Inc. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 198, 207 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 127 ]; Gantner v. Gantner (1952) 39 Cal.2d 272, 277-278 [ 246 P.2d 923 ].) Accordingly, we cannot consider the unsupported factual allegations as to prejudice in plaintiffs5 brief, and are governed by the absence of any such allegations in Mitchell’s declaration, and by the court’s statement after the hearing th

1986Thus "[i]f ... he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no [further] questioning" until a lawyer is provided. ( Id., at pp. 444-445 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 707], italics added; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], rehg. den., 452 U.S. 973 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 984 , 101 S.Ct. 3128 ].) "Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has bee

1986Thus "[i]f ... he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no [further] questioning" until a lawyer is provided. ( Id., at pp. 444-445 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 707], italics added; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], rehg. den., 452 U.S. 973 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 984 , 101 S.Ct. 3128 ].) "Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has bee

1986(Id., at pp. 444-445 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 707], italics added; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], rehg. den., 452 U.S. 973 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 984 , 101 S.Ct. 3128 ].) “Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda, supra, at p. 474 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723].) No statement obtained during a custodial interrogation is admissible unless the rights to silence and counsel were waived “voluntari

1986Thus "[i]f ... he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no [further] questioning" until a lawyer is provided. ( Id., at pp. 444-445 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 707], italics added; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], rehg. den., 452 U.S. 973 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 984 , 101 S.Ct. 3128 ].) "Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has bee

1985Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ].) Whether the suspect has indeed invoked that right, however, is a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances: “A desire to halt the interrogation may be indicated in a variety of way

1985Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ].) Whether the suspect has indeed invoked that right, however, is a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances: “A desire to halt the interrogation may be indicated in a variety of way

1984Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.’” (Italics in original.) (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ]; People v. Parker (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 24, 28 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 49 ].) A suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege by words or conduct that “reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness . . . to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time.” (Italics in ori

1984Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.’” (Italics in original.) (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ]; People v. Parker (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 24, 28 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 49 ].) A suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege by words or conduct that “reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness . . . to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time.” (Italics in ori

1980If the suspect is willing to discuss the case fully with the police officers after having been taken into custody and advised of his rights, Miranda imposes no constitutional inhibition to continued questioning (People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d, at p. 955 ; People v. *268 Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 719 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ]; People v. Turnage (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 201, 209-210 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 237 ]).

1980If the suspect is willing to discuss the case fully with the police officers after having been taken into custody and advised of his rights, Miranda imposes no constitutional inhibition to continued questioning (People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d, at p. 955 ; People v. *268 Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 719 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ]; People v. Turnage (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 201, 209-210 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 237 ]).

1976In Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ], the Supreme Court held that statements which were inadmissible as affirmative evidence because of a failure to comply with Miranda could nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes to attack the credibility of a defendant's trial testimony, as long as the statements were not "coerced" or "involuntary." The court dismissed language to the contrary in Miranda as dictum ( id., at p. 224 [28 L.Ed.2d at pp. 3-4]) [5] and concluded, "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of

1976In Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ], the Supreme Court held that statements which were inadmissible as affirmative evidence because of a failure to comply with Miranda could nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes to attack the credibility of a defendant's trial testimony, as long as the statements were not "coerced" or "involuntary." The court dismissed language to the contrary in Miranda as dictum ( id., at p. 224 [28 L.Ed.2d at pp. 3-4]) [5] and concluded, "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of

1974In People v. Chambers, 276 Cal.App.2d 89 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 672 ], the Court of Appeal, speaking through Justice Wright and quoting from People v. Duran, 269 Cal.App.2d 112 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 459 ], said: “ ‘there is no reason why once having requested counsel and the request having been recognized by a cessation of interrogation, the accused cannot [later] elect to proceed without counsel if that election is freely, knowingly and intelligently made.’” (276 Cal.App.2d at pp. 106-107.) Factors which bear upon a conclusion that an accused, after asserting his Miranda rights, has later freely, knowingly,

1974In People v. Chambers, 276 Cal.App.2d 89 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 672 ], the Court of Appeal, speaking through Justice Wright and quoting from People v. Duran, 269 Cal.App.2d 112 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 459 ], said: “ ‘there is no reason why once having requested counsel and the request having been recognized by a cessation of interrogation, the accused cannot [later] elect to proceed without counsel if that election is freely, knowingly and intelligently made.’” (276 Cal.App.2d at pp. 106-107.) Factors which bear upon a conclusion that an accused, after asserting his Miranda rights, has later freely, knowingly,

1974In People v. Chambers, 276 Cal.App.2d 89 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 672 ], the Court of Appeal, speaking through Justice Wright and quoting from People v. Duran, 269 Cal.App.2d 112 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 459 ], said: “ ‘there is no reason why once having requested counsel and the request having been recognized by a cessation of interrogation, the accused cannot [later] elect to proceed without counsel if that election is freely, knowingly and intelligently made.’” (276 Cal.App.2d at pp. 106-107.) Factors which bear upon a conclusion that an accused, after asserting his Miranda rights, has later freely, knowingly,

1974In People v. Chambers, 276 Cal.App.2d 89 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 672 ], the Court of Appeal, speaking through Justice Wright and quoting from People v. Duran, 269 Cal.App.2d 112 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 459 ], said: “ ‘there is no reason why once having requested counsel and the request having been recognized by a cessation of interrogation, the accused cannot [later] elect to proceed without counsel if that election is freely, knowingly and intelligently made.’” (276 Cal.App.2d at pp. 106-107.) Factors which bear upon a conclusion that an accused, after asserting his Miranda rights, has later freely, knowingly,

1974In People v. Chambers, 276 Cal.App.2d 89 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 672 ], the Court of Appeal, speaking through Justice Wright and quoting from People v. Duran, 269 Cal.App.2d 112 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 459 ], said: “ ‘there is no reason why once having requested counsel and the request having been recognized by a cessation of interrogation, the accused cannot [later] elect to proceed without counsel if that election is freely, knowingly and intelligently made.’” (276 Cal.App.2d at pp. 106-107.) Factors which bear upon a conclusion that an accused, after asserting his Miranda rights, has later freely, knowingly,

1974In People v. Chambers, 276 Cal.App.2d 89 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 672 ], the Court of Appeal, speaking through Justice Wright and quoting from People v. Duran, 269 Cal.App.2d 112 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 459 ], said: “ ‘there is no reason why once having requested counsel and the request having been recognized by a cessation of interrogation, the accused cannot [later] elect to proceed without counsel if that election is freely, knowingly and intelligently made.’” (276 Cal.App.2d at pp. 106-107.) Factors which bear upon a conclusion that an accused, after asserting his Miranda rights, has later freely, knowingly,