subpoena requirement in New York

2004Since OPMC properly sought access to petitioner’s records on the basis of the CMR Order duly issued by its Director pursuant to statutory authority, it was entirely proper for respondents to make an in camera submission of the factual material supporting the CMR Order, which material is subject to the confidentiality requirements of Public Health Law § 230 (9), (10) (a) (v) and (11) (a) (see Tanner v Dr. A., supra; see also Matter of Levin v Murawski, 59 NY2d 35 , 42 n 4 [1983]; Matter of Levin v Guest, 112 AD2d 830, 831-832 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 629 [1986], cert denied 476 US 1171 [1986]).

2004Since OPMC properly sought access to petitioner’s records on the basis of the CMR Order duly issued by its Director pursuant to statutory authority, it was entirely proper for respondents to make an in camera submission of the factual material supporting the CMR Order, which material is subject to the confidentiality requirements of Public Health Law § 230 (9), (10) (a) (v) and (11) (a) (see Tanner v Dr. A., supra; see also Matter of Levin v Murawski, 59 NY2d 35 , 42 n 4 [1983]; Matter of Levin v Guest, 112 AD2d 830, 831-832 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 629 [1986], cert denied 476 US 1171 [1986]).

2000Under these circumstances, the defendant may not claim that he was improperly denied the right to be present (see, People v Williams, 85 NY2d 945, 947 ; People v Velasco, 77 NY2d 469, 472 ; cf., People v Sloan, 79 NY2d 386, 391 ).

2000Under these circumstances, the defendant may not claim that he was improperly denied the right to be present (see, People v Williams, 85 NY2d 945, 947 ; People v Velasco, 77 NY2d 469, 472 ; cf., People v Sloan, 79 NY2d 386, 391 ).

2000Under these circumstances, the defendant may not claim that he was improperly denied the right to be present (see, People v Williams, 85 NY2d 945, 947 ; People v Velasco, 77 NY2d 469, 472 ; cf., People v Sloan, 79 NY2d 386, 391 ).

1994The Legislature has conferred upon respondent the "power to issue subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum * * * for the purpose of investigating any matter within [its] jurisdiction” (Election Law § 3-107; see, 9 NYCRR 6203.1; Matter of New York State Bd. of Elections, 49 AD2d 806 ).

1994We first consider the validity of the subpoena by inquiry into the threshold question of whether respondent had authority to issue it and, if so, whether the issuance was shown to have been sufficiently justified (see, Matter of Nicholson v State Commn. on Judicial Conduct, 50 NY2d 597, 610-611 ; see also, Matter of Goldberg v Axelrod, 104 AD2d 520 , lv denied 64 NY2d 602 ).

1990(People v Szychulda, 113 Misc 2d 736 [App Term, 2d Dept], affd 57 NY2d 719 [police willfully refused to submit subpoenaed personnel records, thereby preventing in camera inspection or other proper court action].) .

1990(People v Szychulda, 113 Misc 2d 736 [App Term, 2d Dept], affd 57 NY2d 719 [police willfully refused to submit subpoenaed personnel records, thereby preventing in camera inspection or other proper court action].) .

1980Finally, our previous affirmance (Matter of Napatco, Inc. v Lefkowitz, 43 NY2d 884 ) of the quashing of the Attorney-General’s subpoena is no bar to this action for an injunction, for we recognized in our memorandum on that appeal that, “read as the Attorney-General would read them [defendant’s advertisement and form letter] they can be said to constitute an offer to engage in activities prohibited by subdivision 1 of section 495 of the Judiciary Law” ( 43 NY2d, at p 885 ).

1980Finally, our previous affirmance (Matter of Napatco, Inc. v Lefkowitz, 43 NY2d 884 ) of the quashing of the Attorney-General’s subpoena is no bar to this action for an injunction, for we recognized in our memorandum on that appeal that, “read as the Attorney-General would read them [defendant’s advertisement and form letter] they can be said to constitute an offer to engage in activities prohibited by subdivision 1 of section 495 of the Judiciary Law” ( 43 NY2d, at p 885 ).

1973Cases cited by De Salvo for the now settled proposition that evidence derived from a tainted or illegal source may be excluded both in Federal and State proceedings are not relevant (e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , and cases in their wake in the Supreme Court).

1973Cases cited by De Salvo for the now settled proposition that evidence derived from a tainted or illegal source may be excluded both in Federal and State proceedings are not relevant (e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , and cases in their wake in the Supreme Court).