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6 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
John M. Horvath, D.C., P.C. v. Progressive Casualty Insurancegreen1 sentence2010Co. ( 24 Misc 3d 194, 202 [2009]), where the court engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the amendment to CPLR 2001, the MacLeods’ mistake with respect to the commencement of this action can be described as a technical, nonprejudicial procedural misstep that a court is obligated to disregard (see Matter of United Servs. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Zerbstred1 sentence2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona, supra , 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. ( State v Armstrong, supra , 223 Wis 2d at 347 , 588 NW2d at 613 .) The analogy drawn in Armstrong , however, overlooks the long-standing principle that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." ( Johnson v Zerbst , 304 US 45 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, supra, 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. 2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona, supra , 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. ( State v Armstrong, supra , 223 Wis 2d at 347 , 588 NW2d at 613 .) The analogy drawn in Armstrong , however, overlooks the long-standing principle that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." ( Johnson v Zerbst , 304 US 45 | 2 | 2004–2004 |
LeConte v. Lee
green
1 sentence2013Like the parties here, the courts in the two cases apparently confused the decision’s use of the term “best for all concerned” with the more familiar term “best interests.” It should be recognized that the court in LeConte nonetheless engaged in a thoughtful analysis of matters bearing on the well-being of the dog Bubkas before ultimately finding that the plaintiff had a “superior possessory right” and was thus “entitled to the return of his canine companion” (LeConte, 35 Misc 3d at 288 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Armstrong
red
2 sentences2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona, supra , 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. ( State v Armstrong, supra , 223 Wis 2d at 347 , 588 NW2d at 613 .) The analogy drawn in Armstrong , however, overlooks the long-standing principle that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." ( Johnson v Zerbst , 304 US 45 2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona, supra , 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. ( State v Armstrong, supra , 223 Wis 2d at 347 , 588 NW2d at 613 .) The analogy drawn in Armstrong , however, overlooks the long-standing principle that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." ( Johnson v Zerbst , 304 US 45 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
In re Kosch
neutral
2 sentences1996In Matter of Britton ( 187 Misc 70, 76-77 ), Surrogate Witmer, in a thoughtful analysis, pointed out that Matter of Kosch, Lewis & Reuben (supra [cited therein as Matter of McKevett, 253 App Div 919 ]) was based only on dicta appearing in Matter of Matheson ( 265 NY 81 ). 1996In Matter of Britton ( 187 Misc 70, 76-77 ), Surrogate Witmer, in a thoughtful analysis, pointed out that Matter of Kosch, Lewis & Reuben (supra [cited therein as Matter of McKevett, 253 App Div 919 ]) was based only on dicta appearing in Matter of Matheson ( 265 NY 81 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In re the Accounting of Miller
green
1 sentence1996In Matter of Britton ( 187 Misc 70, 76-77 ), Surrogate Witmer, in a thoughtful analysis, pointed out that Matter of Kosch, Lewis & Reuben (supra [cited therein as Matter of McKevett, 253 App Div 919 ]) was based only on dicta appearing in Matter of Matheson ( 265 NY 81 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In re the Estate of Pepi
neutral
1 sentence1996Similar reasoning was also employed by Surrogate Bennett in Matter of Pepi (supra). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In Re Estate of Matheson
green
1 sentence1996In Matter of Britton ( 187 Misc 70, 76-77 ), Surrogate Witmer, in a thoughtful analysis, pointed out that Matter of Kosch, Lewis & Reuben (supra [cited therein as Matter of McKevett, 253 App Div 919 ]) was based only on dicta appearing in Matter of Matheson ( 265 NY 81 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bayer v. Bayer
neutral
1 sentence1985We reject, further, the mother’s contention that the hearing court gave undue import to or incorrectly interpreted the testimony of the expert psychiatric witness, Dr. Posner. * The nisi prius court, as trier of fact, is entitled to credit the testimony of expert witnesses which it deems probative and reject the testimony which it determines is lacking in probity (cf. Bayer v Bayer, 102 AD2d 879, 880 ). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.