47 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2023 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leyendecker & Associates, Inc. v. Wechtergreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. 1984) (affirming award of $1,500 in mental anguish damages because “[t]he law presumes a statement which is libelous per se defames a person and injures his reputation”); Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (rejecting challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting mental anguish damages award because “[i]n the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required”); Mitre 2011In a case of defamation per se, actual damages to a victim's reputation are presumed. [26] Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter , 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. 1984) (“Once injury to reputation is established, a person defamed may recover general damages without proof of other injury.”); Knox v. Taylor , 992 S.W.2d 40, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“In the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required.”). | 6 | 8 |
Knox v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2013See Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“In the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required.”). 2013See Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 60 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.j 1999, no pet.) ("In the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required.”). | 6 | 6 |
Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Browngreen2 sentences2006Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 583 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983) (“The law presumes actual damages if libel per se is proven.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex.1986). 2006Co. v. Brown , 663 S.W.2d 562, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983) (“The law presumes actual damages if libel per se is proven.”), rev’d in part on other grounds , 704 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. 1986). | 2 | 2 |
Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Browngreen2 sentences2006Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 583 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983) (“The law presumes actual damages if libel per se is proven.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex.1986). 2006Co. v. Brown , 663 S.W.2d 562, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983) (“The law presumes actual damages if libel per se is proven.”), rev’d in part on other grounds , 704 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. 1986). | 2 | 2 |
Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazargreen2 sentences2006“Once injury to reputation is established, a person defamed may recover general damages without proof of other injury.” Leyendecker, 683 S.W.2d at 374 ; Knox, 992 S.W.2d at 60 (“In the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required.”); Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that words that are libelous per se are so obviously hurtful to person aggrieved by them that they require no proof of their injurious charac 2006“Once injury to reputation is established, a person defamed may recover general damages without proof of other injury.” Leyendecker , 683 S.W.2d at 374 ; Knox , 992 S.W.2d at 60 (“In the recovery on a claim of defamation per se , the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required.”); Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar , 682 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that words that are libelous per se are so obviously hurtful to person aggrieved by them that they require no proof of their injurious c | 2 | 2 |
Artripe v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2000Artripe v. Hughes , 857 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied); see Tex. Civ. 2000Artripe v. Hughes, 857 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied); see Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 41.003(a)(1) (Vernon 1997). 7 . | 2 | 2 |
in the Estate of Rosa Elvia Guerrerogreen2 sentences2023Id. at 705–06. 2022In re Estate of Guerrero, 465 S.W.3d 693, 705-06 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). | 1 | 4 |
Mitre v. Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2012See, e.g., Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. 1984) (affirming award of $1,500 in mental anguish damages because “[t]he law presumes a statement which is libelous per se defames a person and injures his reputation”); Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (rejecting challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting mental anguish damages award because “[i]n the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required”); Mitre 1999See Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex.1984); Mitre, 840 S.W.2d at 620 ; Tatum, 749 S.W.2d at 258 . | 1 | 2 |
Dorothy Westbrook v. Sky Chefs, Inc.green1 sentence2022See 45 U.S.C. § 151 ; see also Baylis, 906 F.2d at 875, 877 (holding RLA preempted state-law claims from airline employees that hotel tortiously induced the airline to breach its contract with employees); Westbrook v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 35 F.3d 316, 317 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The RLA governs relations between employers that are 5 Of course, if SWAPA were to prevail, Southwest Airlines would urge that the issue was settled subject only to the untangling of the claims under the single recovery rule, assuming this would even be possible. | 1 | 1 |
James Baylis, Cross-Appellees v. Marriott Corporation, Cross-Appellantgreen1 sentence2022See 45 U.S.C. § 151 ; see also Baylis, 906 F.2d at 875, 877 (holding RLA preempted state-law claims from airline employees that hotel tortiously induced the airline to breach its contract with employees); Westbrook v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 35 F.3d 316, 317 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The RLA governs relations between employers that are 5 Of course, if SWAPA were to prevail, Southwest Airlines would urge that the issue was settled subject only to the untangling of the claims under the single recovery rule, assuming this would even be possible. | 1 | 1 |
Mose A. Guillory and Mary Guillory v. Seaton LLC D/B/A Staff Managementgreen1 sentence2021But dismissal under this instance will be under Rule 91 and the procedure discussed in Herring, not Rule 91a.19 18 As noted, Professor Carlson explained, A special exception challenging a claim will be grounded on one or more of three propositions, the applicable one being set out explicitly: (1) that no legal rule justifies a recovery on a claim or defense of the type alleged; (2) that, though there is a legal rule that might be applicable, the petition or answer omits one or more allegations essential to bring the claim or defense within its scope; or (3) that, though there is a legal rule t | 1 | 1 |
Zhu v. First Cmty. Ins. Co.green1 sentence2019Co., 543 S.W.3d 428, 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. pending) (“As this court has recognized, full and timely payment of an appraisal award under the policy precludes as a matter of law an award of penalties under the Insurance Code’s prompt-payment provisions.”); Nat’l Sec. | 1 | 1 |
Sepulveda v. Krishnangreen1 sentence2016Id. (citing Sepulveda v. Krishnan, 839 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992), aff’d, 916 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
City of Keller v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2015See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827 ; Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 241 Accordingly, we overrule Pointe West’s second issue. | 1 | 1 |
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tuckergreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. 1984) (affirming award of $1,500 in mental anguish damages because “[t]he law presumes a statement which is libelous per se defames a person and injures his reputation”); Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (rejecting challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting mental anguish damages award because “[i]n the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required”); Mitre | 1 | 1 |
Cain v. Hearst Corp.green1 sentence2012See, e.g., Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. 1984) (affirming award of $1,500 in mental anguish damages because “[t]he law presumes a statement which is libelous per se defames a person and injures his reputation”); Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (rejecting challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting mental anguish damages award because “[i]n the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required”); Mitre | 1 | 1 |
Groden v. Allengreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. 1984) (affirming award of $1,500 in mental anguish damages because “[t]he law presumes a statement which is libelous per se defames a person and injures his reputation”); Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (rejecting challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting mental anguish damages award because “[i]n the recovery on a claim of defamation per se, the law presumes actual damages and no independent proof of damages to reputation or of mental anguish is required”); Mitre | 1 | 1 |
Catherine Prichard Kaplan, Independent of the Estate of John F. Prichard v. Charles I. Kaplangreen1 sentence2011Kaplan v. Kaplan , 129 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Larry F. Smith, Inc. v. the Weber Co., Inc.green2 sentences2007See Larry F. Smith, Inc. v. Weber Co. , 110 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied). 2007Id. | 1 | 1 |
| Murphy v. Russellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hanley v. Hanleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDaniel v. Tuckergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Booth v. Texas Builders' Supply Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains Textiles, Inc.
green
2 sentences1982Metal Structures Corporation v. Plains Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 1977Metal Structures Corporation v. Plains Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1971, writ ref’d n. r. e.). | 2 | 1977–1982 |
Schiller v. Rice
green
2 sentences1953It follows as a matter of course, that it will be held as a matter of law also that entering or failing to leave the vehicle under the circumstances is a proximate cause of any injuries sustained by reason of the intoxication of the driver.” Schiller v. Rice, Tex.Sup., 246 S.W.2d 607 , loc. cit. 613-614. 1953It follows as a matter of course, that it will be held as a matter of law also that entering or failing to leave the vehicle under the circumstances is a proximate cause of any injuries sustained by reason of the intoxication of the driver." Schiller v. Rice, Tex.Sup., 246 S.W.2d 607 , loc. cit. 613-614. | 2 | 1953–1953 |
San Antonio, U. G. R. Co. v. Moya
neutral
2 sentences1916“In order to defeat a recovery under the rule of comparative negligence, the contributory negligence must be the sole cause of the accident.” Pope v. Railway (Sup.) 155 S. W. 1175 ; Railway v. Moya, 173 S. W. 608 ; Railway v. Green, 182 S. W. 392 . 1916Pope v. Railway (Sup.) 155 S. W. 1175 ; Railway v. Moya, 173 S. W. 608 . | 2 | 1916–1916 |
Houston v. Avery
neutral
2 sentences1916“In order to defeat a recovery under the rule of comparative negligence, the contributory negligence must be the sole cause of the accident.” Pope v. Railway (Sup.) 155 S. W. 1175 ; Railway v. Moya, 173 S. W. 608 ; Railway v. Green, 182 S. W. 392 . 1916Pope v. Railway (Sup.) 155 S. W. 1175 ; Railway v. Moya, 173 S. W. 608 . | 2 | 1916–1916 |
Ebell v. Bursinger
green
2 sentences1907It is there said: “It is a general and well established rule that in suits by or against a trustee for the recovery or defense of property, the beneficiaries are necessary parties.” Citing Boles v. Linthicum, 48 Texas, 221 ; Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Texas, 120 , and Preston v. Carter, 80 Texas, 388 . 1895Boles v. Linthicum, 48 Texas, 221 ; Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Texas, 120 ; Preston v. Carter, 80 Texas, 388 ; Story Eq., sec. 207. | 2 | 1895–1907 |
Preston v. Carter Bros. & Co.
neutral
2 sentences1907It is there said: “It is a general and well established rule that in suits by or against a trustee for the recovery or defense of property, the beneficiaries are necessary parties.” Citing Boles v. Linthicum, 48 Texas, 221 ; Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Texas, 120 , and Preston v. Carter, 80 Texas, 388 . 1895Boles v. Linthicum, 48 Texas, 221 ; Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Texas, 120 ; Preston v. Carter, 80 Texas, 388 ; Story Eq., sec. 207. | 2 | 1895–1907 |
William Marchbanks v. Liberty Insurance Corporation
green
2 sentences2019Corp., 558 S.W.3d 308 , 312–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. pending) (holding that “full and timely payment of the amount owed under the policy based on an appraisal award precludes as a matter of law a recovery on a claim under the prompt-payment statute” because payment of “an appraisal award does not resolve whether the insurer is liable under the insurance policy”); Zhu v. First Cmty. Ins. 2019Tex. Mar. 27, 2019) (“Timely payment of the entire appraisal award ‘precludes as a matter of law a recovery on a claim under the prompt-payment statute.’”) (quoting Marchbanks, 558 S.W.3d at 312 ); Neff v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Seminole Pipeline Co., MAPCO, Inc. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016Id. (citing Sepulveda v. Krishnan, 839 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992), aff’d, 916 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Krishnan v. Sepulveda
green
1 sentence2016Id. (citing Sepulveda v. Krishnan, 839 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992), aff’d, 916 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis
green
1 sentence2015See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827 ; Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 241 Accordingly, we overrule Pointe West’s second issue. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. and Brien Garcia v. Nury Chapa
green
1 sentence2008In accord with the principles set forth in Tony Gullo Motors, we note that Du Pont did segregate those defense costs that solely related to non-Waste Materials, and Du Pont has not, and could not, seek the recovery of these defense costs, even though some of these costs were likely based on "intertwined facts.” See id. 6 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. Hill green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Tatum v. Liner green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Cavanaugh v. Davis green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Beck v. Lawler green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Davidson v. Clearman green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Security State Bank and Trust v. Craighead green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Pearson v. Bunting neutral | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Fischer v. Britton green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Smyth v. Caswell neutral | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Roy v. Whitaker green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Hudman green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Murphy v. Williams green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Mathes v. Williams green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Ornish green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Lamb v. Isley green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Williams v. Patterson neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Taylor v. Taug green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Hemington v. Hemington neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Thompson v. Van Howeling neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| San Antonio Public Service Co. v. Tracy neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| San Antonio, U. G. R. Co. v. Green neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.