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9 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1868–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fries Correctional Equip., Inc. v. Con-Tech, Inc.green2 sentences1997See also Fries , 559 So.2d at 563 ("[A] defendant's avoidance of service might be grounds for imposition of costs or other sanctions, but should not be grounds for a refusal to set aside such a large default judgment. " (Emphasis added.)) In discussing the factor of prejudice to the plaintiff, the court stated in Rooney and Fries that the prejudice must be substantial and that mere delay in the plaintiff's recovery on the claim is not sufficient to justify a refusal to set aside a default judgment. 1995As stated in Fries , supra, "Such prejudice must be substantial, and mere delay in the recovery on the claim is not sufficient prejudice to justify refusal to set a default judgment aside. . . ." 559 So.2d at 562 , citing Kirtland , supra. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated prejudice so great that it could not be remedied by imposing costs on the defendants. | 1 | 3 |
Amica Mutual Insurance v. Maloneygreen2 sentences2012Co. v. Maloney, 120 N.M. 523, 529 , 903 P.2d 834, 840 (1995) (providing that the automobile insurers’ actions in sending standard letters to the tortfeasors’ insurer stating that they had subrogation interest in their insureds’ recoveries against the tortfeasors and asking for repayment after settlement did not amount to "active participation” in insureds' settlements with tortfeasors’ insurer, for purposes of "active participation” exception to common-fund doctrine); and Castellari v. Partners Health Plan of Colo., Inc., 860 P.2d 593, 595 (Colo.Ct.App.1993) (holding that the insurer that had 2012Co. v. Maloney, 120 N.M. 523, 529 , 903 P.2d 834, 840 (1995) (providing that the automobile insurers’ actions in sending standard letters to the tortfeasors’ insurer stating that they had subrogation interest in their insureds’ recoveries against the tortfeasors and asking for repayment after settlement did not amount to "active participation” in insureds' settlements with tortfeasors’ insurer, for purposes of "active participation” exception to common-fund doctrine); and Castellari v. Partners Health Plan of Colo., Inc., 860 P.2d 593, 595 (Colo.Ct.App.1993) (holding that the insurer that had | 1 | 1 |
Castellari v. Partners Health Plan of Colorado, Inc.green1 sentence2012Co. v. Maloney, 120 N.M. 523, 529 , 903 P.2d 834, 840 (1995) (providing that the automobile insurers’ actions in sending standard letters to the tortfeasors’ insurer stating that they had subrogation interest in their insureds’ recoveries against the tortfeasors and asking for repayment after settlement did not amount to "active participation” in insureds' settlements with tortfeasors’ insurer, for purposes of "active participation” exception to common-fund doctrine); and Castellari v. Partners Health Plan of Colo., Inc., 860 P.2d 593, 595 (Colo.Ct.App.1993) (holding that the insurer that had | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Wendy's International, Inc.green2 sentences2010See Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 365 F.3d at 1273 n. 4 ("Moreover, in the unlikely scenario where the trustee would recover more than an amount that would satisfy all creditors and the costs and fees incurred, then, perhaps judicial estoppel could be invoked by the defendant to limit any recovery to only that amount and prevent an undeserved windfall from devolving on the non-disclosing debtor."); In re Upshur, 317 B.R. at 453 (noting that, "if the trustee recovered more than the amount necessary to satisfy all creditors . . ., the defendants could invoke judicial estoppel to try to limit an 2010See Parker v. Wendy’s Int'l, Inc., 365 F.3d at 1273 n. 4 (“Moreover, in the unlikely scenario where the trustee would recover more than an amount that would satisfy all creditors and the costs and fees incurred, then, perhaps judicial estoppel could be invoked by the defendant to limit any recovery to only that amount and prevent an undeserved windfall from devolving on the non-disclosing debtor.”); In re Upshur, 317 B.R. at 453 (noting that, “if the trustee recovered more than the amount necessary to satisfy all creditors ..., the defendants could invoke judicial estoppel to try to limit any | 1 | 1 |
In Re Upshurgreen2 sentences2010See Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 365 F.3d at 1273 n. 4 ("Moreover, in the unlikely scenario where the trustee would recover more than an amount that would satisfy all creditors and the costs and fees incurred, then, perhaps judicial estoppel could be invoked by the defendant to limit any recovery to only that amount and prevent an undeserved windfall from devolving on the non-disclosing debtor."); In re Upshur, 317 B.R. at 453 (noting that, "if the trustee recovered more than the amount necessary to satisfy all creditors . . ., the defendants could invoke judicial estoppel to try to limit an 2010See Parker v. Wendy’s Int'l, Inc., 365 F.3d at 1273 n. 4 (“Moreover, in the unlikely scenario where the trustee would recover more than an amount that would satisfy all creditors and the costs and fees incurred, then, perhaps judicial estoppel could be invoked by the defendant to limit any recovery to only that amount and prevent an undeserved windfall from devolving on the non-disclosing debtor.”); In re Upshur, 317 B.R. at 453 (noting that, “if the trustee recovered more than the amount necessary to satisfy all creditors ..., the defendants could invoke judicial estoppel to try to limit any | 1 | 1 |
Woodward Iron Co. v. Craiggreen2 sentences1989See, also, Woodward Iron Co. v. Craig, 256 Ala. 37 , 53 So.2d 586 (1951). 1989See, also, Woodward Iron Co. v. Craig, 256 Ala. 37 , 53 So.2d 586 (1951). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rooney v. Southern Dependacare, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Rooney, 672 So.2d at 6 ; Fries, 559 So.2d at 562 . " 708 So.2d at 196 . 2005Rooney, 672 So.2d at 6 ; Fries, 559 So.2d at 562 . " 708 So.2d at 196 . | 2 | 1997–2005 |
Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc.
green
2 sentences1995As stated in Fries , supra, "Such prejudice must be substantial, and mere delay in the recovery on the claim is not sufficient prejudice to justify refusal to set a default judgment aside. . . ." 559 So.2d at 562 , citing Kirtland , supra. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated prejudice so great that it could not be remedied by imposing costs on the defendants. 1995As stated in Fries, supra, "Such prejudice must be substantial, and mere delay in the recovery on the claim is not sufficient prejudice to justify refusal to set a default judgment aside...." 559 So.2d at 562 , citing Kirtland, supra. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated prejudice so great that it could not be remedied by imposing costs on the defendants. | 2 | 1990–1995 |
Aldridge v. Hamilton
green
2 sentences2005Rooney, 672 So.2d at 6 ; Fries, 559 So.2d at 562 . " 708 So.2d at 196 . 2005Rooney, 672 So.2d at 6 ; Fries, 559 So.2d at 562 . " 708 So.2d at 196 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ex Parte Fischer
neutral
2 sentences1943Fischer v. Pope et al., 233 Ala. 301 , 171 So. 752 ; 24 R.C.L. p. 807, § 15; Ex parte Fischer, 229 Ala. 455 , 157 So. 869 ; Stewart v. Burgin et al., 219 Ala. 131 , 121 So. 420 . 1943Fischer v. Pope et al., 233 Ala. 301 , 171 So. 752 ; 24 R.C.L. p. 807, § 15; Ex parte Fischer, 229 Ala. 455 , 157 So. 869 ; Stewart v. Burgin et al., 219 Ala. 131 , 121 So. 420 . | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Fischer v. Pope
green
2 sentences1943Fischer v. Pope et al., 233 Ala. 301 , 171 So. 752 ; 24 R.C.L. p. 807, § 15; Ex parte Fischer, 229 Ala. 455 , 157 So. 869 ; Stewart v. Burgin et al., 219 Ala. 131 , 121 So. 420 . 1943Fischer v. Pope et al., 233 Ala. 301 , 171 So. 752 ; 24 R.C.L. p. 807, § 15; Ex parte Fischer, 229 Ala. 455 , 157 So. 869 ; Stewart v. Burgin et al., 219 Ala. 131 , 121 So. 420 . | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Stewart v. Burgin
neutral
2 sentences1943Fischer v. Pope et al., 233 Ala. 301 , 171 So. 752 ; 24 R.C.L. p. 807, § 15; Ex parte Fischer, 229 Ala. 455 , 157 So. 869 ; Stewart v. Burgin et al., 219 Ala. 131 , 121 So. 420 . 1943Fischer v. Pope et al., 233 Ala. 301 , 171 So. 752 ; 24 R.C.L. p. 807, § 15; Ex parte Fischer, 229 Ala. 455 , 157 So. 869 ; Stewart v. Burgin et al., 219 Ala. 131 , 121 So. 420 . | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Sims v. Boynton
neutral
1 sentence1868And we can perceive no valid reason why the same rule should not be applicable to an action of unlawful detainer, where the personal representative had been in actual possession of the land. — Sims v. Boynton, 32 Ala. 353 ; Lomax's Exr's, 597, mar. p. 371, et seq. | 1 | 1868–1868 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.