vested right defense in New York

1990We also find that the IAS court did not err in refusing to give retroactive effect to the amendment to CPLR 308 (2) on the authority of Dorfman v Leidner ( 150 AD2d 935, 936 , lv granted 75 NY2d 705 ), wherein it was held that the amendment should not be given retroactive effect because the defendant had a vested right in the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction which may not be impaired by retrospective application of the amendment.

1981The absence of a vested right in a rule of law has particular reference to statutes relating to remedy and procedure, subjects frequently treated as within the exclusive control of the legislative bodies (see, e.g., Gibbes v Zimmerman, 290 US 326 ; Insurance Co. v Glidden Co., 284 US 151 ; League v Texas, 184 US 156 ).

1981The absence of a vested right in a rule of law has particular reference to statutes relating to remedy and procedure, subjects frequently treated as within the exclusive control of the legislative bodies (see, e.g., Gibbes v Zimmerman, 290 US 326 ; Insurance Co. v Glidden Co., 284 US 151 ; League v Texas, 184 US 156 ).

1981The absence of a vested right in a rule of law has particular reference to statutes relating to remedy and procedure, subjects frequently treated as within the exclusive control of the legislative bodies (see, e.g., Gibbes v Zimmerman, 290 US 326 ; Insurance Co. v Glidden Co., 284 US 151 ; League v Texas, 184 US 156 ).

1981Therefore, such statutes are generally applied retroactively to pending actions (see, e.g., Preston Co. v Funkhouser, supra; Laird v Carton, 196 NY 169 ; Peace v Wilson, 186 NY 403 ; Lazarus v Metropolitan El.

1981Therefore, such statutes are generally applied retroactively to pending actions (see, e.g., Preston Co. v Funkhouser, supra; Laird v Carton, 196 NY 169 ; Peace v Wilson, 186 NY 403 ; Lazarus v Metropolitan El.

1981Therefore, such statutes are generally applied retroactively to pending actions (see, e.g., Preston Co. v Funkhouser, supra; Laird v Carton, 196 NY 169 ; Peace v Wilson, 186 NY 403 ; Lazarus v Metropolitan El.

1949(Matter of Hoople, 179 N. Y. 308, 312 .) Knowing, as we do, that the power of the respondent comptroller to grant a refund of a tax collected or to offset the payment thereof is strictly limited by the local law mentioned above, I find it difficult to believe that fairness to the appellant taxpayer — even though its position may present a persuasive appeal in equity — should dictate recoupment where, as we have seen, the taxpayer concedes that it failed to comply with the statutory limitation of one year.

1947If we state the premise as being that no one has a vested right to a defense, we may logically conclude that repeal of the statute giving the defense of illegality takes away that defense and hence permits recovery upon the contract which originally was affected with illegality (Hoppock v. Stone, 49 Barb. 524 ; Central Bank v. Empire Stone Dressing Co., 26 Barb. 23 ; Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599 ; Lido Capital Corporation v. Vogel, 161 Misc. 48 ; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 85, 152-153, 254 ).

1947If we state the premise as being that no one has a vested right to a defense, we may logically conclude that repeal of the statute giving the defense of illegality takes away that defense and hence permits recovery upon the contract which originally was affected with illegality (Hoppock v. Stone, 49 Barb. 524 ; Central Bank v. Empire Stone Dressing Co., 26 Barb. 23 ; Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599 ; Lido Capital Corporation v. Vogel, 161 Misc. 48 ; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 85, 152-153, 254 ).

1947If we state the premise as being that no one has a vested right to a defense, we may logically conclude that repeal of the statute giving the defense of illegality takes away that defense and hence permits recovery upon the contract which originally was affected with illegality (Hoppock v. Stone, 49 Barb. 524 ; Central Bank v. Empire Stone Dressing Co., 26 Barb. 23 ; Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599 ; Lido Capital Corporation v. Vogel, 161 Misc. 48 ; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 85, 152-153, 254 ).

1947If we state the premise as being that no one has a vested right to a defense, we may logically conclude that repeal of the statute giving the defense of illegality takes away that defense and hence permits recovery upon the contract which originally was affected with illegality (Hoppock v. Stone, 49 Barb. 524 ; Central Bank v. Empire Stone Dressing Co., 26 Barb. 23 ; Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599 ; Lido Capital Corporation v. Vogel, 161 Misc. 48 ; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 85, 152-153, 254 ).