Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931). · Go Syfert
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Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1977 · …findings of fact by boards or commissions which . . . are statutorily made conclusive upon the courts if supported by evidence. ≈ altered
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1950 · …it is settled law of california that the business of insurance is one affected with a public interest. ⚠ not in text
406 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 68 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: The People v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility (ny, 2023-06-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1931 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1931 1978 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The People v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility
NY · 2023 · confidence medium
Co. of Wis. v Glidden Co., 284 US 151, 158-159 [1931] [to uphold a law against a substantive due process challenge, “it is enough that, when the statute is read in the light of circumstances generally known . . . , the possibility of a rational basis for the legislative judgment is not excluded”]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) North Glenn Homeowners Association v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Iowa Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 159 (1931).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GTFM, LLC. v. TKN Sales, Inc.
2d Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Co. of Wis. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931) (citation omitted) (rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to a Minnesota statute). 59 Instead of deciding this appeal solely along these lines, the majority addresses a situation, different from ours, in which GTFM would find itself in federal court based on diversity of citizenship defending an MSRA action commenced in arbitration.
cited Cited as authority (rule) High Country Arts v. Hartford Fire Insur
4th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 159 (1931); see also Bentley v. North Carolina Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bayscene Resident Negotiators v. Bayscene Mobilehome Park
Cal. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Co. v. Glidden Co. (1931) 284 U.S. 151, 158 [ 76 L.Ed. 214, 219 , 52 S.Ct. 69 ] [fire insurance *132 policies required to provide for compulsory binding arbitration of the amount of loss].) Compulsory, binding arbitration still remains limited in large measure to situations in which the parties have agreed to arbitration as an alternative form of dispute resolution; however a growing number of statutory schemes whereby either one or both parties are compelled to submit to binding arbitration do exist.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bentley v. North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Ass'n
N.C. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Co. of Wisconsin v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 159-60 , 76 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colgrove v. Battin (2×)
SCOTUS · 1973 · confidence medium
Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 158 (1931); Wagner Electric Mfg.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shapiro v. Thompson (2×)
SCOTUS · 1969 · confidence medium
See, e. g., Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 436 (1827); Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 158 (1931); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 67 (1936); United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U. S. 29, 32 (1963).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chevy Chase Village v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals
Md. · 1968 · confidence medium
Ed. 692 ; Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins, Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 159, 160 , 52 S. Ct. 69 , 79 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burke v. Fidelity Trust Company
Md. · 1953 · confidence medium
Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 159, 160 , 52 S. Ct. 69 , 79 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry (2×)
Cal. · 1942 · confidence medium
Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 157-158 [ 52 S. Ct. 69 , 76 L.Ed. 214 ]; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 [ 17 S. Ct. 718 , 41 L.Ed. 1165 ]; Louisville & Nashville R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Holmes
D. Mont. · 1940 · confidence medium
We agree with this statement; and it is supported by the authorities . generally: Hardware Dealers’ Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 157, 158 , 52 S.Ct. 69 , 76 L.Ed. 214 ; New York Life Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell
SCOTUS · 1935 · confidence medium
Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582, 584 ; Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158, 159 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Metropolitan Casualty Insurance v. Brownell
SCOTUS · 1935 · confidence medium
Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 584 ; Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 158, 159 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal.
SCOTUS · 1935 · confidence medium
Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 157, 158 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) San Francisco Shopping News Co. v. City of South San Francisco
9th Cir. · 1934 · confidence medium
Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 158, 159 , 52 S. Ct. 69 , 76 L.
examined Cited "see" State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Licea (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See and compare Hardware Dealers Mutual v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 , 52 S.Ct. 69 , 76 L.Ed. 214 (1931) (legislation which requires arbitration of single issue of amount of loss is not an unconstitutional denial of due process or equal protection because arbitrator may only decide the amount of loss, all other issues are reserved for the court); Hamilton v. Home Ins., 137 U.S. 370 , 11 S.Ct. 133 , 34 L.Ed. 708 (1890) (a provision in a contract for the payment of money upon the contingency that the amount to be paid shall be submitted to arbitrators, whose award shall be final as to that amoun…
examined Cited "see" Abraham v. Farmers Home Mutual Insurance Co. (3×)
Minn. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 , 52 S.Ct. 69 , 76 L.Ed. 214 (1931) (arbitration clause for settlement of losses as condition precedent for doing business within the state held not denial of due process or equal protection); Supornick v. National Retailers Mutual Insurance Co., 209 Minn. 500 , 296 N.W. 904 (1941) (penalty and forfeiture clause held constitutional).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Department of Environmental Quality v. Morley
Mich. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hardware Dealers’ Mut Fire Ins Co of Wis v Glidden Co, 284 US 151, 158 ; 52 S Ct 69 ; 76 L Ed 214 (1931) (holding that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment neither implies that all trials must be by jury, nor guarantees any particular form or method of state procedure” and that “a state may choose the remedy best adapted, in the legislative judgment, to protect the interests concerned, provided its choice is not unreasonable or arbitrary, and the procedure it adopts satisfies the constitutional requirements of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rastelli Bros., Inc. v. Netherlands Ins. Co. (2×)
D.N.J. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also id. at 159, 52 S.Ct. 69 (“appraisal of the loss by arbitration”).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. District of Columbia (3×)
D.C. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hardware Dealers ’ Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden Company, 284 U.S. 151 , 52 S.Ct. 69 , 76 L.Ed. 214 (1931); Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142 , 42 S.Ct. 214 , 66 L.Ed. 514 (1922).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors of County of Nassau
N.Y. App. Div. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
Although “a vester cause of action is property and is protected from arbitrary interference (Pritchard v. Norton, 106 US 124, 132 ), [an aggrieved party] has no property, in the constitutional sense, in any particular form of remedy; all that he is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the preservation of his substantial right to redress by some effective procedure” (Gibbes v Zimmerman, 290 US 326, 332 , supra; see, also, Insurance Co. v Glidden Co., 284 US 151 , supra; Crane v Hahlo, supra; Ettor v Tacoma, supra; Backus v Fort St.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
HARDWARE DEALERS MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE CO.
v.
GLIDDEN CO. Et Al.
4.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 23, 1931.
284 U.S. 151
1931 U.S. LEXIS 465
Mr. Mortimer H. Boutelle, with whom Mr. Nathan H. Chase was on the brief, for appellant., Messrs. Homer C. Fulton and Eugene M. O’Neill, with whom Messrs. Arthur E. Nelson and Edward L. Boyle were on the brief, for appellees.
Stone.
Cited by 151 opinions  |  Published
Me. Justice Stone

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case is here on appeal, § 237a of the Judicial Code, from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, upholding the constitutionality of the arbitration provisions of the standard fire insurance policy prescribed by Minnesota statutes. 181 Minn. 518; 233 N. W. 310.

Appellant, a Wisconsin corporation licensed to carry on the business of writing fire insurance' in Minnesota, issued, within the state, its policy insuring appellees’ assignor against loss, by fire, of personal property located there." The policy was in standard form, the use of which is enjoined by statutes of Minnesota on all fire insurance companies licensed to do business in the state. Mason’s Minn. Stat. 1927, §§ 3314, 3366, 3512, 3515, 3711. Failure to comply with the command of the statute is ground for revocation of the license to do business, § 3550, and wilful violation of it by any company or agent is made a criminal offense, punishable by fine or imprisonment. §§ 3515, 9923.

A fire loss having.occurred, the insured appointed an arbitrator and demanded of appellant that the amount be determined by arbitration as provided by the policy. [1][*156] The appellant having refused to participate in the arbitration, the insured, in accordance with the arbitration clause, procured' the appointment of an umpire to act with the arbitrator designated by the insured. The arbitrator and umpire thus selected proceeded to determine the amount of the loss and made their award accordingly.

In the present suit, brought to recover the amount of the award, the appellant set up by way of defense, the single point relied on here, that so much of the statutes of Minnesota as requires the use by appellant of the arbitration provisions of the standard policy infringes the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting this contention and in sustaining a recovery of the amount of the award, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, consistently with its earlier decisions, ruled that the authority of the arbitrators did not extend to a determination of the liability under the policy, which[*157] was a judicial question, reserved to the courts, but that their decision as to the amount of the loss is conclusive upon the parties unless grossly excessive or inadequate, or procured by fraud. See Glidden Co. v. Retail Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 181 Minn. 518, 521, 522; 233 N. W. 310; Abramowitz v. Continental Ins. Co., 170 Minn. 215; 212 N. W. 449; Harrington v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 179 Minn. 510; 229 N. W. 792.

This type of arbitration clause has long been commonly used in fire insurance policies, both in Minnesota and elsewhere, and, when voluntarily placed in the insurance contract, compliance with its provisions has been held to be a condition precedent to. an action on the policy. Gasser v. Sun Fire Office, 42 Minn. 315; 44 N. W. 252; Hamilton v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 242; Scott v. Avery, 5 House of Lords 811, 854; see Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 121.

Appellees insist that the use of the clause here was voluntary, since the appellant was not compelled to write the policy, and that in any case appellant, by long acquiescence in the statute, is estopped to challenge, after the loss, the right, of the insured to; rely upon it. Without stopping to examine these contentions, we assume that appellant’s freedom of contract was restricted by operation of the statute, and pass directly to the question decided by the, state court, whether the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the exercise of such compulsion by the legislative power.

The right to make contracts embraced in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is not unlimited. Liberty implies only freedom from arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 567. Hence, legislation otherwise within ihe scope of acknowledged state power, not unreasonably[*158] or arbitrarily exercised, cannot be condemned because it curtails-the power of the individual to contract. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539; Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578; German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389; Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685; Keokee Cons. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224.

The-present statute substitútes a determination by ar-. bitration for trial in court of the single issue of the •amount of loss suffered under a fire insurance policy. As appellant’s objection to it is directed specifically to the power of the state to substitute the one remedy for the other, rather than to the constitutionality of the particular procedure prescribed or followed before the arbitrators, it suffices to say that the procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs remedied is peculiarly a' subject of state regulation and control. The Fourteenth Amendment neither jmplies that all trials must be by jury, nor guarantees any particular form or method of state procedure. See Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40. In' the exercise of that power and to satisfy a public need, a state-may .choose the remedy best adapted, in the legislative judgment, to protect the interests 'concerned, provided its choice is not unreasonable or arbitrary, and the procedure it adopts satisfies the constitutional require-’ ments of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.

The record and briefs present no facts disclosing the reasons for the enactment of the present legislation or the effects of its operation, but as it deals with a subject within the scope of the legislative power, the presumption of constitutionality is to be indulged. O’Gorman & Young, Inc., v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251; see Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 584; Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 397. We cannot assume that the Minnesota legislature did not have knowledge of conditions supporting its judgment that the legislation was in, the public interest, and it is enough that,[*159] when the statute is read in the light ot circumstances generally known to attend the recovery of fire insurance losses, the possibility of a rational basis for the legislative judgment is not excluded.

•Without the aid of the presumption, we know that.the arbitration clause has long been voluntarily inserted by insurers in fire policies, and we share in the common knowledge that the amount of loss is a fruitful and often the only subject of controversy between insured and insurer; that speedy determination, of the policy liability such as may be secured by arbitration of this issue is a matter of wide concern, see Fidelity Mut. Life Assn. v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308; Farmers’ & Merchants’ Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U. S. 301; that in the appraisal of the loss by arbitration, expert knowledge and prompt inspection of the damaged property may be availed of to an extent not ordinarily possible in the course of the more deliberate processes of a judicial proceeding. These considerations are sufficient to support the exercise of the legislative judgment in requiring a more summary method of determining the amount of the loss than that afforded by traditional forms. Hence the requirement that disputes of this type arising under this special class of insurance contracts be submitted to arbitrators, cannot be deemed to be a denial of either due process or equal protection of the laws.

Granted, as we now hold, that the state, in the present circumstances, has power to prescribe a summary method of ascertaining the amount of loss, the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, so far as now invoked, are satisfied if the substitute remedy is substantial and efficient. See Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 147. We cannot say ■that the determination by arbitrators, chosen as provided by the present statute, of the single issue of the amount of loss under a fire insurance policy, reserving all other issues for trial in court, does not afford such a remedy, or[*160] that in this respect it falls short of due process, more than the provisions of state workmen’s compensation laws for establishing the amount of compensation by a commission, New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 207-208; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 235; or the appraisal by a commissioner of the value of property taken or destroyed by the public, made controlling by condemnation statutes, Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 369; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 695; Crane v. Hahlo, supra, p. 147; or findings of fact' by boards or commissions which, by various statutes, are made conclusive upon the courts if supported by evidence, Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 222 U. S. 541; Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 663; Silberschein v. United States, 266 U. S. 221; Ma-King Products Co. v. Blair, 271 U. S. 479.

Affirmed..