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6 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n v. R.E. Roark Companies, Inc.green1 sentence2014Instead, piercing is limited to extreme circumstances that amount to fraud, crime, “or a similarly unlawful act.” Id. at ¶ 29. {¶76} By following the Ohio Supreme Court’s standard for piercing the corporate veil, we reject Appellants’ contention that the trial court should have applied the abrogated standard of North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507 , 3 N.E.2d 391 (1936), which required that the corporation be “formed for the purpose of -39- Case No. 17-12-22 perpetrating a fraud.” See LeRoux, 77 Ohio App.3d at 421 , 423 (quoting the North v. Higbee standard and refusing to follow it); Belveder | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003In Haverlack [v. Portage Homes, Inc. (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2 OBR 572, 442 N.E.2d 749 ], we recognized that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a creature of common law, and thus an appropriate subject also for legislative action. 1983In Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc. (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 26 , this court abrogated the doctrine and held, in paragraph two of the syllabus, that “[t]he defense of sovereign immunity is not available, in the absence of a statute providing immunity, to a municipal corporation * * *” in a negligence action. | 5 | 1983–2003 |
Leroux's Billyle Supper Club v. Ma
green
1 sentence2014Instead, piercing is limited to extreme circumstances that amount to fraud, crime, “or a similarly unlawful act.” Id. at ¶ 29. {¶76} By following the Ohio Supreme Court’s standard for piercing the corporate veil, we reject Appellants’ contention that the trial court should have applied the abrogated standard of North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507 , 3 N.E.2d 391 (1936), which required that the corporation be “formed for the purpose of -39- Case No. 17-12-22 perpetrating a fraud.” See LeRoux, 77 Ohio App.3d at 421 , 423 (quoting the North v. Higbee standard and refusing to follow it); Belveder | 1 | 2014–2014 |
North v. Higbee Co.
green
2 sentences2014Instead, piercing is limited to extreme circumstances that amount to fraud, crime, “or a similarly unlawful act.” Id. at ¶ 29. {¶76} By following the Ohio Supreme Court’s standard for piercing the corporate veil, we reject Appellants’ contention that the trial court should have applied the abrogated standard of North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507 , 3 N.E.2d 391 (1936), which required that the corporation be “formed for the purpose of -39- Case No. 17-12-22 perpetrating a fraud.” See LeRoux, 77 Ohio App.3d at 421 , 423 (quoting the North v. Higbee standard and refusing to follow it); Belveder 2014Instead, piercing is limited to extreme circumstances that amount to fraud, crime, “or a similarly unlawful act.” Id. at ¶ 29. {¶76} By following the Ohio Supreme Court’s standard for piercing the corporate veil, we reject Appellants’ contention that the trial court should have applied the abrogated standard of North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507 , 3 N.E.2d 391 (1936), which required that the corporation be “formed for the purpose of -39- Case No. 17-12-22 perpetrating a fraud.” See LeRoux, 77 Ohio App.3d at 421 , 423 (quoting the North v. Higbee standard and refusing to follow it); Belveder | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.