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7 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 2009–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fernandez v. BARUCHgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So.2d 841, 844-845 (Ala.1988), citing Fernandez v. Baruch, 52 N.J. 127 , 244 A.2d 109 (1968) (explaining that a physician does not have a duty to take measures to prevent a patient from committing suicide if the patient’s suicide was not reasonably foreseeable under generally accepted medical standards). 2023See, e.g., Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So.2d 841, 844-845 (Ala.1988), citing Fernandez v. Baruch, 52 N.J. 127 , 244 A.2d 109 (1968) (explaining that a physician does not have a duty to take measures to prevent a patient from committing suicide if the patient’s suicide was not reasonably foreseeable under generally accepted medical standards). | 3 | 3 |
Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hosp.green2 sentences2023See, e.g., Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So.2d 841, 844-845 (Ala.1988), citing Fernandez v. Baruch, 52 N.J. 127 , 244 A.2d 109 (1968) (explaining that a physician does not have a duty to take measures to prevent a patient from committing suicide if the patient’s suicide was not reasonably foreseeable under generally accepted medical standards). 2023See, e.g., Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So.2d 841, 844-845 (Ala.1988), citing Fernandez v. Baruch, 52 N.J. 127 , 244 A.2d 109 (1968) (explaining that a physician does not have a duty to take measures to prevent a patient from committing suicide if the patient’s suicide was not reasonably foreseeable under generally accepted medical standards). | 3 | 3 |
Browning v. Burtgreen2 sentences2026Furthermore, the O’Dell Court listed four factors to consider when deciding whether the claim was a medical claim: “(1) whether the equipment ‘was used for “the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness;’” (2) ‘whether the equipment was “an inherently necessary part of a medical procedure;’” (3) whether ‘use of the equipment “arose out of” a physician ordered treatment;’ and (4) whether ‘use of the equipment required a “certain amount” of professional expertise or professional skill.’” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting McDill v. Sunbridge Care Ents., 2013-Ohio-1618, ¶ 21 , quoting 2022In McDill, we reviewed the four factors the First District Court of Appeals considered in deciding whether the claim was a medical claim: In reaching its decision, the court examined four factors: (1) whether the equipment “was used for ‘the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness;’ “ (2) “whether the equipment was ‘an inherently necessary part of a medical procedure;’ “ (3) whether “use of the equipment ‘arose out of’ a physician ordered treatment;” and (4) whether “use of the equipment required a ‘certain amount’ of professional expertise or professional skill.” I | 2 | 2 |
Rome v. Flower Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2026Id., 2022-Ohio-4156, at ¶ 40, 42 (4th Dist.). 2026Furthermore, the O’Dell Court listed four factors to consider when deciding whether the claim was a medical claim: “(1) whether the equipment ‘was used for “the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness;’” (2) ‘whether the equipment was “an inherently necessary part of a medical procedure;’” (3) whether ‘use of the equipment “arose out of” a physician ordered treatment;’ and (4) whether ‘use of the equipment required a “certain amount” of professional expertise or professional skill.’” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting McDill v. Sunbridge Care Ents., 2013-Ohio-1618, ¶ 21 , quoting | 1 | 2 |
O'Dell v. Vrable III, Inc.green1 sentence2026Id., 2022-Ohio-4156, at ¶ 40, 42 (4th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Conkin v. CHS-Ohio Valley, Inc.green1 sentence2026Furthermore, the O’Dell Court listed four factors to consider when deciding whether the claim was a medical claim: “(1) whether the equipment ‘was used for “the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness;’” (2) ‘whether the equipment was “an inherently necessary part of a medical procedure;’” (3) whether ‘use of the equipment “arose out of” a physician ordered treatment;’ and (4) whether ‘use of the equipment required a “certain amount” of professional expertise or professional skill.’” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting McDill v. Sunbridge Care Ents., 2013-Ohio-1618, ¶ 21 , quoting | 1 | 1 |
Milton Banking Co. v. Adkinsgreen1 sentence2023See also Milton Banking Co. v. Adkins, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 19CA07, 2020-Ohio-1481, ¶ 14 . {¶20} Kerns’ complaint included a general negligence claim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McDill v. Sunbridge Care Ents., Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2026Furthermore, the O’Dell Court listed four factors to consider when deciding whether the claim was a medical claim: “(1) whether the equipment ‘was used for “the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness;’” (2) ‘whether the equipment was “an inherently necessary part of a medical procedure;’” (3) whether ‘use of the equipment “arose out of” a physician ordered treatment;’ and (4) whether ‘use of the equipment required a “certain amount” of professional expertise or professional skill.’” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting McDill v. Sunbridge Care Ents., 2013-Ohio-1618, ¶ 21 , quoting | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Long v. Warren General Hospital
green
2 sentences2022Hosp., 121 Ohio App.3d 489 , 700 N.E.2d 364 (11th Dist. 1997) (patient who fell after orderly directed him to walk from bed to gurney for transport to doctor-ordered colonoscopy had a “medical claim” for the injuries sustained in the fall because he was obtaining physician-ordered medical diagnostic testing and the need to transport arose out of the diagnostic testing). {¶42} However, where the fall does not arise out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment, the fall gives rise to a general negligence claim, not a medical claim. 2022Hosp., 121 Ohio App.3d 489 , 700 N.E.2d 364 (11th Dist. 1997) (patient who fell after orderly directed him to walk from bed to gurney for transport to doctor-ordered colonoscopy had a “medical claim” for the injuries sustained in the fall because he was obtaining physician-ordered medical diagnostic testing and the need to transport arose out of the diagnostic testing). {¶42} However, where the fall does not arise out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment, the fall gives rise to a general negligence claim, not a medical claim. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Lykins v. Fun Spot Trampolines
green
2 sentences2009Although she concedes that trampoline use is a recreational activity, she argues that “the risk of being bounced up on a trampoline and landing on a hard, inflexible surface is not one that is inherent and foreseeable to the activity.” Consequently, she asserts that the trial court erred in applying the “reckless or intentional” standard instead of the general negligence standard. {¶ 23} Appellant relies almost exclusively on the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ holding in Lykins v. Fun Spot Trampolines, 172 Ohio App.3d 226 , 2007-Ohio-1800 , 874 N.E.2d 811 , to establish that her injury is 2009Although she concedes that trampoline use is a recreational activity, she argues that “the risk of being bounced up on a trampoline and landing on a hard, inflexible surface is not one that is inherent and foreseeable to the activity.” Consequently, she asserts that the trial court erred in applying the “reckless or intentional” standard instead of the general negligence standard. {¶ 23} Appellant relies almost exclusively on the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ holding in Lykins v. Fun Spot Trampolines, 172 Ohio App.3d 226 , 2007-Ohio-1800 , 874 N.E.2d 811 , to establish that her injury is | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.