record at the plea hearing in Ohio

2025The State cites State v. Moore, 2017-Ohio-8483 (8th Dist.), in support of its argument that we should not vacate Tyson’s plea.

2019Davis’s argument relies on the “facts” as “placed on the record at the plea hearing” by the prosecutor (emphasis added.) (see Appellant’s Brief, p. 10), which differ from the description of the burglary offense set forth in the indictment or that read by the trial court during the plea hearing. {¶ 26} As we recognized above, the indictment’s description of the Count Two burglary charge against Davis is nearly identical to the language of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), which provides: (A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following: *** (2) Trespass in an occupied structure o

2019Davis’s argument relies on the “facts” as “placed on the record at the plea hearing” by the prosecutor (emphasis added.) (see Appellant’s Brief, p. 10), which differ from the description of the burglary offense set forth in the indictment or that read by the trial court during the plea hearing. {¶ 26} As we recognized above, the indictment’s description of the Count Two burglary charge against Davis is nearly identical to the language of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), which provides: (A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following: *** (2) Trespass in an occupied structure o

2015Cuyahoga No. 83149, 2004-Ohio-2334, ¶ 19 (“[T]he trial court need not specifically inform the defendant he is ‘ineligible for probation’ if the totality of the circumstances warrant the trial court in making a determination the defendant understands the offense is ‘nonprobational.’”). {¶21} In Nero, supra, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court found substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) where defense counsel stated on the record at the plea hearing that the defendant “knows * * * he is going to be incarcerated” and the defendant asked for time to “straighten out [his] affairs.” Nero, 5

2015Cuyahoga No. 83149, 2004-Ohio-2334, ¶ 19 (“[T]he trial court need not specifically inform the defendant he is ‘ineligible for probation’ if the totality of the circumstances warrant the trial court in making a determination the defendant understands the offense is ‘nonprobational.’”). {¶21} In Nero, supra, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court found substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) where defense counsel stated on the record at the plea hearing that the defendant “knows * * * he is going to be incarcerated” and the defendant asked for time to “straighten out [his] affairs.” Nero, 5

2014Montgomery No. 24288, 2012-Ohio-1230, ¶ 14 .” Id. {¶ 9} Moody’s plea agreement, as read into the record at the plea hearing, provided: “‘In consideration for Defendant’s no contest plea to an amended charge of Attempted Failure to Provide Notice of Change of Address, a felony of the fourth degree, the State stands silent as to disposition.’ * * * The only mention of restitution occurred when the trial court explained the potential penalties to Moody.” Id., ¶ 13.

2014Montgomery No. 24288, 2012-Ohio-1230, ¶ 14 .” Id. {¶ 9} Moody’s plea agreement, as read into the record at the plea hearing, provided: “‘In consideration for Defendant’s no contest plea to an amended charge of Attempted Failure to Provide Notice of Change of Address, a felony of the fourth degree, the State stands silent as to disposition.’ * * * The only mention of restitution occurred when the trial court explained the potential penalties to Moody.” Id., ¶ 13.

2004Finally, regarding the ninth factor, he states that he maintained his innocence to both psychiatric examiners and he told Dr. Nalluri that the charges disgusted him and that his wife knew he was innocent. {¶ 32} Appellant likens his case to our prior case of State v. Cuthbertson (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 895 , where we reversed the trial court's refusal to allow presentence plea withdrawal.