res judicata from raising doctrine in Ohio

2011For the sake of convenience, we begin with the third assignment of error that provides: “Res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude the State from relitigating the validity of Dzelajlija’s indictment when it failed to appeal that issue to the Ohio Supreme Court.” {¶ 11} Within this assignment of error, defendant asserts that because the State did not challenge this court’s determination in Dzelajlija II that the indictment was fatally defective, it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising that challenge before the trial court on remand. {¶ 12} “Under the doctrine of res judica

2011For the sake of convenience, we begin with the third assignment of error that provides: “Res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude the State from relitigating the validity of Dzelajlija’s indictment when it failed to appeal that issue to the Ohio Supreme Court.” {¶ 11} Within this assignment of error, defendant asserts that because the State did not challenge this court’s determination in Dzelajlija II that the indictment was fatally defective, it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising that challenge before the trial court on remand. {¶ 12} “Under the doctrine of res judica

2014“When the plea agreement is silent on the issue of allied offenses of similar import, * * * the trial court is obligated under R.C. 2941.25 to determine whether the offenses are allied, and if they are, to convict the defendant of only one offense.” State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 29.

2014“When the plea agreement is silent on the issue of allied offenses of similar import, * * * the trial court is obligated under R.C. 2941.25 to determine whether the offenses are allied, and if they are, to convict the defendant of only one offense.” State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 29.

2011Obviously, we did not hold that an indictment for Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity is defective if it does not specify the predicate offenses, since we did not reach that issue. –17– {¶ 44} In State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 194 , 2000-Ohio-298 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a conspiracy indictment must specify the required overt act in the furtherance of the conspiracy, even when the overt act is specified in a bill of particulars.

2011Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2004-Ohio-6592 , 819 N.E.2d 687 ; State v. Lynn (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 106, 108 , 214 N.E.2d 226 . {¶ 14} Here, in light of our remand to the trial court, this matter was not final and was pending before the trial court at the time of the announcement of the Horner decision.

2011Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2004-Ohio-6592 , 819 N.E.2d 687 ; State v. Lynn (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 106, 108 , 214 N.E.2d 226 . {¶ 14} Here, in light of our remand to the trial court, this matter was not final and was pending before the trial court at the time of the announcement of the Horner decision.

2011Obviously, we did not hold that an indictment for Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity is defective if it does not specify the predicate offenses, since we did not reach that issue. –17– {¶ 44} In State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 194 , 2000-Ohio-298 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a conspiracy indictment must specify the required overt act in the furtherance of the conspiracy, even when the overt act is specified in a bill of particulars.

2011Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2004-Ohio-6592 , 819 N.E.2d 687 ; State v. Lynn (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 106, 108 , 214 N.E.2d 226 . {¶ 14} Here, in light of our remand to the trial court, this matter was not final and was pending before the trial court at the time of the announcement of the Horner decision.

2003Pasqualone , 140 Ohio App.3d at 657 . {¶ 10} The foregoing logic would readily extend to an original action in which a defendant attempts to challenge the imposition of court costs.