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6 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Carlos Botero-Ospinagreen2 sentences2013See also McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 25 , 37 P.3d 130 , 136-137 n. 21 citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995), (en banc) ("a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articu-lable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring."); Gomez, 2007 OK CR 33, ¶ 6 , 168 P.3d at 1142 (observation of traffic violation constituted sufficient cause to stop defendant). 2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop | 2 | 2 |
Lozoya v. Stategreen2 sentences2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop 2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop | 2 | 2 |
McGaughey v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See also McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 25 , 37 P.3d 130 , 136-137 n. 21 citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995), (en banc) ("a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articu-lable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring."); Gomez, 2007 OK CR 33, ¶ 6 , 168 P.3d at 1142 (observation of traffic violation constituted sufficient cause to stop defendant). 2013See also McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 25 , 37 P.3d 130 , 136-137 n. 21 citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995), (en banc) ("a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articu-lable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring."); Gomez, 2007 OK CR 33, ¶ 6 , 168 P.3d at 1142 (observation of traffic violation constituted sufficient cause to stop defendant). | 1 | 2 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop 2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Mikulskigreen2 sentences2025Accordingly, the officers' actions, although in violation of Colorado law, did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation."); United States v. Mikulski , 317 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[O]fficers' violation of state law is not, without more, necessarily a federal constitutional violation." ¶12 This Court applied the Moore reasoning in an unpublished decision, Crawford Oliver Martin v. State , F-2013-538, December 4, 2014. 2025Accordingly, the officers' actions, although in violation of Colorado law, did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation."); United States v. Mikulski , 317 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[O]fficers' violation of state law is not, without more, necessarily a federal constitutional violation." ¶12 This Court applied the Moore reasoning in an unpublished decision, Crawford Oliver Martin v. State , F-2013-538, December 4, 2014. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gonzalesgreen2 sentences2025See Bowling v. Rector , 584 F.3d 956, 968 (10th Cir. 2009) ("For Fourth Amendment purposes, the conduct of officers acting in excess of their statutory authority must be tested by traditional Fourth Amendment standards . . ."); United States v. Gonzales , 535 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2008) (where officers acted outside their jurisdiction in violation of Colorado law, their actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because "[their] actions were based on an observed traffic violation, and [defendant] does not assert any facts other than the state-law violation that would make the stop unrea 2025See Bowling v. Rector , 584 F.3d 956, 968 (10th Cir. 2009) ("For Fourth Amendment purposes, the conduct of officers acting in excess of their statutory authority must be tested by traditional Fourth Amendment standards . . ."); United States v. Gonzales , 535 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2008) (where officers acted outside their jurisdiction in violation of Colorado law, their actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because "[their] actions were based on an observed traffic violation, and [defendant] does not assert any facts other than the state-law violation that would make the stop unrea | 1 | 1 |
Bowling v. Rectorgreen2 sentences2025See Bowling v. Rector , 584 F.3d 956, 968 (10th Cir. 2009) ("For Fourth Amendment purposes, the conduct of officers acting in excess of their statutory authority must be tested by traditional Fourth Amendment standards . . ."); United States v. Gonzales , 535 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2008) (where officers acted outside their jurisdiction in violation of Colorado law, their actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because "[their] actions were based on an observed traffic violation, and [defendant] does not assert any facts other than the state-law violation that would make the stop unrea 2025See Bowling v. Rector , 584 F.3d 956, 968 (10th Cir. 2009) ("For Fourth Amendment purposes, the conduct of officers acting in excess of their statutory authority must be tested by traditional Fourth Amendment standards . . ."); United States v. Gonzales , 535 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2008) (where officers acted outside their jurisdiction in violation of Colorado law, their actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because "[their] actions were based on an observed traffic violation, and [defendant] does not assert any facts other than the state-law violation that would make the stop unrea | 1 | 1 |
Gomez v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See also McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 25 , 37 P.3d 130 , 136-137 n. 21 citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995), (en banc) ("a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articu-lable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring."); Gomez, 2007 OK CR 33, ¶ 6 , 168 P.3d at 1142 (observation of traffic violation constituted sufficient cause to stop defendant). 2013See also McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 25 , 37 P.3d 130 , 136-137 n. 21 citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995), (en banc) ("a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articu-lable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring."); Gomez, 2007 OK CR 33, ¶ 6 , 168 P.3d at 1142 (observation of traffic violation constituted sufficient cause to stop defendant). | 1 | 1 |
Skelly v. Stategreen2 sentences2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop 2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop | 1 | 1 |
Botero-Ospina v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop 2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Sharpe
green
2 sentences2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop 2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop 2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
green
2 sentences2001The Skelly case is discussed in detail infra, in the analysis of McGaughey's appeal of his other case. [25] Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 (emphasis added) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [26] Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). [27] Id. at 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 (internal citations omitted). 2001The Skelly case is discussed in detail infra, in the analysis of McGaughey's appeal of his other case. [25] Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 (emphasis added) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [26] Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). [27] Id. at 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Delaware v. Prouse
green
2 sentences2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop 2001In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court used the term "investigative stops of vehicles" to describe what are typically called "traffic stops." 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 . [19] Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 . [20] Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [21] Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 , (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 , 116 S.Ct. 2529 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (en banc) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Florida v. Royer
green
2 sentences2001The Skelly case is discussed in detail infra, in the analysis of McGaughey's appeal of his other case. [25] Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 (emphasis added) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [26] Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). [27] Id. at 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 (internal citations omitted). 2001The Skelly case is discussed in detail infra, in the analysis of McGaughey's appeal of his other case. [25] Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 (emphasis added) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). [26] Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). [27] Id. at 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ferguson v. United States
green
2 sentences1996It is irrelevant, for purposes of Fourth Amendment review, “whether the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine according to the general practice of the police department or the particular officer making the stop.” [■United States v.] Ferguson, 8 F.3d [385] at 391 [(6th Cir.1993), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 828 , 115 S.Ct. 97 , 130 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994) ] It is also irrelevant that the officer may have had other subjective motives for stopping the vehicle. 1996It is irrelevant, for purposes of Fourth Amendment review, “whether the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine according to the general practice of the police department or the particular officer making the stop.” [■United States v.] Ferguson, 8 F.3d [385] at 391 [(6th Cir.1993), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 828 , 115 S.Ct. 97 , 130 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994) ] It is also irrelevant that the officer may have had other subjective motives for stopping the vehicle. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.